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CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF JAPAN AND CHINA

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CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF JAPAN AND CHINA

by

KYOSON TSUCHIDA

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EVANGELICAL SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

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WITH FEELINGS OF GREAT RESPECT AND LOVE I DEDICATE THIS BOOK, MY FIRST IN ENGLISH, TO THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER, CHIYOKICHI TSUCHIDA.

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PREFACE

Man thinks. That is a very grave and serious matter for him, no matter what the content of his thought may be. What is the meaning of the progress of thought? To begin with, in our thinking, whatever its content, we cannot fail to see, whether from the viewpoint of the unity of an individual life, or from that of the history of the race, a reflection of the gravity and seriousness of human life. Primitive man entertained thought in terms of magic. As regards the various phenomena of the Universe, we can be interested both in their repetitive, homogeneous causal relations, and in their opposites, the special, heterogeneous causal relations. The product of the latter cognition was primitive man's magic-thought. Many civilized men will probably ridicule this primitive thought, and will say that modern civilization started from our having noticed the repetitive, homogeneous causal relations and then produced natural sciences. I will, of course, not deny such a view. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid having both these kinds of cognition at the same time. It is very reasonable, I think, at the present, that there should be philo-

sophers who distinguish the heterogeneous, individual causal relations of the historical sciences from homogeneous, general causal relations of the natural sciences. But, in truth, modern life did not start immediately on our homogeneous cognition. It belonged, to some extent, to the life before modern times. The discovery of the modern life means, in my opinion, rather that we have unified these two kinds of cognition, and come to recognize a certain general meaning in what is special, or to realize the presence of such a generality in the special. In other words, it means the discovery of symbolic life. Man's generous mind or his democratic spirit, that is, the mind that wills to respect humanity, is all born of this discovery.

This book has been written with the intention of introducing to Westerners what Japanese and Chinese contemporary thought is, and how it has been and is developing; to criticize it; and, through that criticism, to express my own views. There has been no book written with this purpose in Japan or China; so that through this book Westerners will probably be able for the first time to know something of the nature of the thought of the two countries. Some readers may say that there is too much treatment of problems common to the world and too little of the special problems of the Orient, or, on the contrary, that here there is too much about the special problems of the Orient and too little about those of the world. But I will

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gladly agree to both these views. Very likely the problems I have treated here are for Easterners all special and concrete problems of which they have been, and still are, thinking through their unity of life or their strife for such unity of life, and are, therefore, the grave and serious problems presented to all men in the world. There is a certain special problem of thinking wherever we may go; and, therefore, there is a certain general problem on account of its being everywhere special. I hope that my Western readers, recognizing this, may become impartial and sympathetic towards Eastern thought, nay more, that, feeling a certain intimacy with it, they may gladly participate in the solution of these problems.

As regards the Chinese part of my book, I have profited greatly by Mr. Yasuzō Shimizu's two works. My cordial thanks are due to him as well as to Professor Kōjirō Sugimori, Dr. Sakuzō Yoshino, Mr. Ch'ên Chio Shêng, Professor Samuel C. Bartlett and many other friends for the great help they have given me. I also express my cordial thanks to Dr. W. Tudor Jones and Mr. J. T. Walley, M.A., for having read and corrected the proofs.

K. T.

Extensive alterations have had to be made by the General Editor. These have consisted mainly in an attempt to present this remarkable volume in

idiomatic English. I found it difficult to know how far to proceed, as I was anxious to preserve the original Japanese flavour of the book. This, I hope, has been done.

W. Tudor Jones

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CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF JAPAN AND CHINA

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

According to a Japanese paper, a tourist party of women teachers from America recently came to Japan, and on landing exclaimed in astonishment, "Can we ride in electric cars even in Japan?" Even teachers who are giving lessons in school have so little knowledge of Japan. How much less must the American or European people at large have. Yes, I know that the writings of Lafcadio Hearn and others concerned with Japan have been widely read among Westerners, and that the fine modern art *Ukiyo-e* of Japan has also been widely appreciated among them; so I suppose that there must be many in the West who form picturesque ideas of Japanese life from them. But the Japan of that fancy is nothing but a lightly veiled image of romantic dreams, far different from the real Japan where trains and electric trams are running through the country. To picture the Japan of to-day from such

things is like constructing industrialism in Europe through the Latin writings of the Middle Ages. In the cartoons drawn by the American cartoonist too, Japan is usually represented as a man dressed in the fashion of the *Harakiri* age, and with the background drawn in the *Ukiyo-e*-type. Can we find any thought in such a Japan? And if we can, how extraordinary it must be!

No more than half a century, at the very longest, has passed since Japan appeared in the history of the West in any real sense. In fact, it was only in the beginning of the twentieth century that Japan assumed any intimate part in Western life. For Westerners, it might be thought (so striking has been its rise) that a new State had been suddenly founded at the end of the nineteenth century. But, as a matter of fact, the Japanese Empire really was founded probably more than twenty centuries ago; and its form has never changed from the beginning up to this day. It must be remembered that there had been thinking of a high character, literature, art and religion. We cannot choose between their value and those of the Westerners. There is only a difference of individuality. But I do acknowledge that the present rise of Japanese civilization, which is so remarkable, has occupied only half a century. It is not really an astonishing phenomenon. For, though when Japan first came in contact with the West, it was, indeed, by Westerners, regarded as an uncivilized country, the truth was that in modern

times industrial civilization is so conspicuous that the word " civilization " has come to stand with us for industrial civilization alone; but that, from the standpoint of general civilization which includes industrial as but one mode, Japan at that time could not be condemned in general as uncivilized. However, Japan was required to alter its mode of civilization to correspond with the type of industrialism. But as this way had already been traversed by the Western States, it was comparatively easy for Japan to trace the same way; and as the area of the country is small and the knowledge of the people had been comparatively well balanced, there have been fewer difficulties on the road for Japan to overcome than for some other countries. This state of things accounts for the outward appearance of rapid development. Japan is now fully launched on the sea of industrial civilization. Like all the Western States, with her own tradition, she wears this dress of civilization. She has the same material civilization as in the West. And the Japanese are thinking upon the same problems, and discuss them with the same technical terms as the Westerners. This is not limited to a small circle of special thinkers who have been abroad for study; but there is wide discussion by the masses and in the press. I only regret that at present Japanese thinkers are unable to make any special contributions to the circle of Western thinkers because the difference of language raises a great barrier between them.

The main population of the Japanese race once lived on the continent of Asia, and in very ancient times moved to the Japan Islands, which, it seems certain, they found already occupied by an aboriginal race called the *Ainu*. In the same way, during the long ages that followed, some of the Chinese and other races emigrated; so that the Japanese race is by no means homogeneous; and the land, too, on which they live, being composed of small islands, cannot be called very spacious. Now, in my opinion, the formation of a united characteristic civilization seems to depend upon the presence of two conditions: first, the formation of a nation, which bears the civilization, should be simple, in order to make the characteristics of civilization pure and unmixed with other elements; and next, the territory should be constituted topographically on a big scale, say, with one great range of mountains or one great stretch of plains, to keep alive and fresh the original creative force of that civilization. Japan having lacked in both these respects, her civilization, in contrast with such a civilization as at one time grew up in the territory of Egypt, India or China, was unable to attain to a characteristic state of her own. The race that had moved to these islands and constituted the main part of the Japanese, having formerly lived on the continent and made this great migration, its literature did not at once lose its original and adventurous spirit, and was on a heroic scale. But, after the migration, as life

became comparatively easy, the civilization continued its way, but declined step by step towards a certain "delicacy." Owing to its geographical position, however, it was not necessary for Japan to be in rivalry with outside enemies; hence, to secure an internal social unity for herself has been her own only concern. The economic life of Japan became self-supporting. On account of all this, outward aggression against other countries has been for her unnecessary, and to be invaded by other enemies also has been out of the question. Japan could, therefore, conserve her energy through the long ages, and accordingly hand down her old civilization to posterity without great loss. But since, on account of its geographic position, the Japanese race could never again emigrate to other countries, leaving their land behind, it was a matter of the utmost importance to them by all means to strive not to lose the organization of their State. It is but natural then that Japanese civilization has developed itself in firm reliance upon this State organization; and that, when this formation was menaced by any danger, the national characteristics came conspicuously into sight.

Accordingly, if I should be asked by Westerners what the characteristics of Japanese civilization and thought are, I should answer that, while indeed we find in them no such radically distinctive individuality as found in India and Egypt, they have still, by unifying the elements of continental civilization

which flowed in from the continent, and by transforming them into a new type of civilization adapted to their own lives, developed a refined and sparkling taste, perfectly unified and nowhere else to be found. For example, the *Ukiyo-e* which has been appreciated by Westerners, if its line and colour be seen separately, has nothing more indeed than can usually be seen in Eastern art, but as a whole it somehow contains a flavour which is felt to be purely of Japan. Hence, the characteristics of Japan are not crudely distinct, but must be delicately distinguished by their flavour or nuance. In these, the flavour and nuance inhere in that spirit of Japan which, of course, could not be found in other civilizations. Japanese thought, where not original, is mainly built up of the elements of Indian religious thought and of the Chinese philosophy of life. But these, having been introduced into this country, were preserved and developed in good condition on the one hand, and Japanized from first to last into the lives of the Japanese people, on the other. The doctrine of *Mahayana* (or the " Great Vehicle "), which is an ultimate development of Buddhism, while it cannot really be seen at all in India, the mother-land of Buddhism, and while its present condition in China is rather pitiable, has in Japan alone developed so remarkably that its two great parts, the doctrine of salvation and the doctrine of emancipation, are completely consummated in both theory and practice, and always determine the philosophy of the popular

mind. Chinese philosophies are still actually flourishing in their mother-land, but in Japan they came to be the laws of everyday life in completer development. Consequently, when Japanese conservatives cry "Back to Japan," the so-called original of Japanese civilization, they call for something which, if analysed to its elements, is not purely original. Nevertheless, it is impossible for the Japanese mind to conceive of these thoughts as derived from others. Christian mission-work in Japan is at present kept in the hands of Westerners for the most part; but Japanese Christians who have any advanced views are now holding their belief in such a way as to Japanize it, *i.e.* to vary it more or less in the direction of the Buddhistic style which has been Japan's manner of life through the long ages. Hereafter, when Christianity has completely left the hands of the Western missionaries, and has been Japanized both in theory and practice suited to the Japanese life, so that it has come to be marked by such new and notable characteristics that it is no longer true Christianity in the sight of the West, then I will say that Christianity has just grown to be a true Japanese religion, permeating the everyday lives of her people.

The great event for Japanese thought in recent times was being deeply stirred by coming into contact with Western civilization. An American Fleet visited Japan with the view of opening friendly relations in 1853. Then the Japanese

people were confronted by a great problem, which gave them such troubles as they had never before experienced. This agitation among them finally burst into the revolution of the Restoration in 1867. All the Japanese people first admired the material equipment accompanying Western civilization, which was excellent beyond all comparison with Japan. They also well knew that the Western States, which had such equipment at that time, were establishing many colonies in every uncivilized country in the world; so that they would have to concentrate their whole attention upon keeping their State, and on advancing their material civilization, which was so far behind that of the Westerners. Now, the effort of Japan for the half-century since the Restoration, has been to run after Western civilization as fast as possible. And this effort was for the first twenty years of the Meiji period peculiarly clumsy and fickle. Though such an effort might be called a realistic movement, the undercurrent of that realism was nothing less than a powerful romanticism—national romanticism so to speak—the purpose of which was to complete the life of Japan nationally. There was a movement of the progressives, whose imitation of Western civilization was excessive, as well as one of conservatism, whose efforts (a reaction against it) were aimed at keeping the spiritual tradition of Japan. But both movements in their substance had probably the same end. Those who wanted to introduce Western civilization here were in reality not

desirous of losing the traditional spirit; and those who wanted, on the contrary, to preserve the traditional characteristics, were in reality desirous of introducing Western material equipment. There was nothing to choose between them notwithstanding their outward differences. The truth was that, at the beginning of the Meiji period, the currents of thought were pretty well unified in their intrinsic natures. It is true that the propositions of the thinkers during those times often varied radically from one extreme to another, but, under the circumstances of those days, it was not at all to be wondered at. The internal lives of the opponents were not in such extravagant contrast as they seemed from the outside. For example, Yukichi Fukuzawa, though his was a most powerful progressive mind early in the Meiji period, still at times when the current somewhat slackened, took a conservative position to prevent stagnation; and Hiroyuki Katō, one of the greatest scholars throughout the Meiji period, who in his early years advocated radical democracy, not to say socialism, shifted his ideal towards the exact contrary, and enthusiastically advocated the complete supremacy of the State over the individual. In 1871, Iwakura, Kido, and Ōkubo, who had been the main actors on the stage of the Restoration, were despatched for observation to the Western countries. When they were observing the industries in Manchester, and saw the delicate machinery there in operation, Kido said to

his colleague, " At this rate, in the future, men will be mere attachments of machines." And this idea was probably the common opinion all over Japan at that time. The condemnation of industrial civilization was lying alongside the demand for the introduction of Western civilization.

For about three centuries before the Restoration Japan assumed a policy of seclusion, and strictly prohibited anyone whatsoever from going abroad. On account of this policy, on the one side, the people became traditionally averse to going abroad, and, on the other, tragedies for violators of the law were frequent. But notwithstanding these obstacles, at the time of the Restoration, there were many men residing abroad. For instance, in France alone, there were probably 800 men. It seems that, during several years before and after the Restoration, many men, no matter what their opinions might be, went abroad at all costs to study Western civilization. When the Department of Education was established in 1871, and took charge of all matters concerning education, out of an estimate for education of only 800,000 yen, about 100,000 yen had to be reserved to pay the expenses of the students abroad who had been already staying there. In various schools the students who were studying lessons in foreign languages were called regular students, and those in Japanese only irregular students. Old traditions in all were abandoned as " old-fashioned," and the new things were admired as " enlightened

civilization" whatever they were. Old works of art were broken down or sold abroad for a mere song, and cheap articles of tin, or lithographic pictures set in frames, were introduced in return. Five-storied pagodas were to be burned off to save the expense of demolition, and to get the articles of metal at the top. In those days, Japanese art stood in great peril; and many pieces were sold abroad at low prices. The specimens of *Ukiyo-e* which we now see in Japan, are mostly such as have once been sold abroad and afterward bought back at a high cost. Japan was looked upon by Westerners as an uncivilized country; and the treaties between Japan and foreign countries were very disadvantageous to Japan for a long time. Therefore the first policy for Japan was to revise the treaties in such a way that Japan could assert an equal right against foreign countries. When a scheme for revising the treaties was on hand about 1882 the people sought a superficial imitation of the West so that it might seem that Japan had already been completely civilized in the Western way. That time was called the age of "Europeanization." At that time some men even stupidly advocated that the race of Japan be improved by introducing Western blood, or that English be adopted as the national language and Japanese prohibited. We should learn from these facts that discriminatory treaties against other countries have an evil effect upon their national life as in our case.

At the beginning of the Meiji period, three currents of thought were introduced to Japan from abroad: first, English utilitarian free thought from England and America; second, social liberalism from France; and last, absolutism from Germany. It is true that these currents of thought were sharply distinguished from one another; but the call for them equally was prompted by national romanticism. On March 14, 1868, as soon as the Meiji Government had been firmly established, the Great Emperor of Meiji, one of the greatest heroes in the history of the modern world, who was then only fifteen years old, proclaimed an imperial edict of five articles as a platform for the new Government as follows:

(1) Let meetings be widely held, and all things determined according to public opinion.

(2) Let all the people, irrespective of their rank, come to one mind, and give themselves heartily to the national welfare.

(3) Let everyone from officials and soldiers down to the whole population devote themselves to some purpose, to prevent stagnation of mind.

(4) Let all give up such old customs as are unworthy, and start anew from the general law of the world.

(5) Let knowledge be sought throughout the world to work out the prosperity of our Empire.

This platform expressed, to be sure, such national romanticism as was vigorously moving at that time; but I might call it a task which was set for the people to solve, through all the steps Japan has taken during the half-century since the Restoration.

English free utilitarianism was introduced before the Restoration, and survived longest in the lives of the Japanese people. Students in the middle schools there, almost without exception, are still taught English; and the Japanese people in general seem to have a more intimate feeling towards English ideas than towards any others.

The man who laboured from the earliest times for the enlightenment of the people and rendered great service to Japanese civilization, was Yukichi Fukuzawa. His insight into the meaning and the position of civilization in the Meiji period was so clear that his guidance of the people and his criticism of the times never failed. His merit lay, we may say, at least in three main points. First, though the men-of-arms (*Samurai*) who had formed a leader class had attached little importance to commercial pursuits before the Restoration, he endeavoured in every way to arouse among the people an appreciation of utility. It is a logical result that the business men of the present time are largely the graduates of his school. Secondly, he used such an easy style in writing as to be understood by the people, and thus popularized Western knowledge of all kinds. This was a twofold service. In the first place, the

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people gained much from it materially; and in the second place, the old style of writing which had been too formal to be used in practical life was changed, and a literary revolution in Japan started. Thirdly, saying, "Heaven does not create man above man, nor man under man," he insisted upon the equality of the people's rights; and this contributed greatly to the development of a democratic spirit in Japan. But his life-motto was "self-support and self-respect." Therefore, though he had thus earnestly introduced Western civilization and ideas to Japan, his efforts towards enlightenment, thanks to his insight, did not end in mere imitation of the West. He is the father of the modern thought that prevailed amongst the people throughout the Meiji period. Especially was his idea of free utilitarianism always the source of realism in Japan. In other words, the ideas that grew out of his teaching always had an objective tendency. Opposed to Fukuzawa, there was an interesting new movement of thought that was led by Masanao Nakamura. Nakamura, who was also a champion of the movement for enlightenment through English thought, insisted chiefly on the sound moral ideas of the West; and this tendency, being in close touch with the national traditions, was received by the people as more intimate to their lives than any other. Therefore, Nakamura's ideas really started a sort of subjective personal tendency. Afterwards, the personal idealism which had so much influence upon Japanese

thought certainly had one of its sources in Nakamura's teaching. The first ten years of the Meiji period was the time when Fukuzawa and Nakamura wielded much power in civilization; English ideas have continued influential through the next decade down to this day. Bentham's and Mill's liberalism, which was thought to be sounder than the radical French one, received a warm welcome among the Japanese people, whose views have always been moderate. Spencer's philosophy was also introduced. But these philosophies, at that time, were studied mainly in their political aspects.

The free democratic ideas of France were influential among the Japanese people before and after 1882, namely, in the second decade of the Meiji period. It is natural that the people who had gone through a revolution in the Restoration should loudly demand extreme democracy and the development of the people's rights to the utmost. French liberal ideas were most congenial to this destructive atmosphere. But as there was no preparation for true democratic politics immediately after the Restoration, absolutism was also influential; and a parliament was not at once called. Furious discussion concerning the establishment of a parliament raged among the people at that time. As a consequence of this, in 1881, a Royal Rescript was issued, promising that a Diet should be called in 1890. The times being so, it is natural that the free, democratic ideas of France were warmly wel-

comed among the Japanese people. *Chōmin Nakae* translated Rousseau's "Social Contract" into Japanese; and it was read enthusiastically among the progressive people. Montesquieu and Voltaire were also introduced. *Kimmochi Saionji*, who is one of the greatest statesmen in Japan and one of the so-called Elder Statesmen, returning at that time from France, held liberal opinions, and published, albeit temporarily, the "Eastern Free Press" in 1881. All things were named in those days by some word for "freedom."

Quite naturally all these ideas were influenced by the development of political parties, because they were always held by the people as social ideas. The first political party which came into existence, in connection with the liberal, democratic ideas of France, was the Liberal Party of Taisuke Itagaki and others, the formation of which took place in 1881. The Liberals, for the most part, were of the lower middle class. And the next party, connected with the sounder free thought of England, was the Constitutional Reform Party formed in 1882. Though it was also an anti-governmental party, the members of it were mostly men of the middle and bourgeois classes, and inclined to less radical ideas than the Liberals. In those times, some indeed had a creed of terrorism.

Lastly, German ideas were introduced somewhat later than the above-mentioned two currents, and have exercised great influence since the twenties of

the Meiji period. A nationalistic tendency in this German thought would naturally be welcomed by the people, for it conformed to the demand of nationalism at that rather reactionary time when the radical democratic ideas of France were passing away. The philosophies of Schelling, Hegel, Lotze, Herbart, and Hartmann were introduced; at this time, pure speculation upon the philosophy of life, apart from mere political tendencies, began more or less. Hiroyuki Katō, having changed his position, became imperialistic; and Tetsujirō Inoue started to advocate the philosophy of German idealism. The Government which was formed by the bureaucratic politicians also welcomed this German absolutism, and exerted an undue restraint upon democratic ideas among the people. Premier Hirobumi Itō and Home Minister Aritomo Yamagata, following the example of Bismarck's high-handedness, issued the Ordinance of Public Welfare in 1889, and exiled from the Capital about 570 of the agitators including all their leading statesmen. The Ordinance of Public Welfare was enacted to suppress and extinguish almost all social movements under the form of an undue anti-democracy. Since then the development of free, democratic thought has been greatly injured, and bureaucracy has been gradually laying strong foundations for itself till recently. In other words, German ideas grew to be the orthodoxy of political philosophy, while active democratic ideas withered away.

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As has been stated above, Japanese thought up to the third decade of the Meiji period developed along lines intimately related to the construction of the Japanese State and the political rights of the people. The pure contemplation of life apart from this was seen very little during that time. But it must be said that, however much Japanese thought imitated that of foreign origin, the truth is that it was not imitation of thought because it was merely coming from abroad, but because it was thought sought in answer to a demand of the Japanese people. Accordingly, though it has been called blind imitation of foreign thought, there was something beyond mere imitation in the positive welcome itself. If that demand had had frank development, it might have been recognized as really a conservative resistance to foreign imitation in favour of the national tradition. The resistance to Europeanization was given the name of the "Preservation of National Virtues." But in the last analysis there is no choice between them in their inward demands. The movement by the Politico-Cultural Society (the *Seikyō-sha*), which was founded in 1888 by Setsurei Miyake and others, was a clear expression of this conservative tendency. The society, publishing a magazine, entitled "Japanese," placed an emphasis upon the above-mentioned preservative tendency. This magazine afterward amalgamated with "Japan," a newspaper representing the same tendency, and under the new name of

"Japan and the Japanese" still continues publication. At that time, as seen above, this nationalistic conservative movement was engaged in conflict, on the one hand, with the Europeanization movement, and, on the other, with the German absolutism of the Government. Several magazines which advocated the preservative mind were published; and societies which followed the same direction were also initiated. *Sohō Tokutomi* founded the *Society of Friends of the People* (the *Minyū-sha*), almost simultaneously with the formation of the Politico-Cultural Society, and also issued a magazine, "Friends of the People," which advocated free, progressive thought in politics, literature, religion, and in other directions. Its influence was also remarkable, and even a socialistic advocacy began there to sprout. Setsurei Miyake and Sohō Tokutomi are two great free thinkers in the circle of editors, and are exerting influence upon the thought of the people at large. Tokutomi, who had at first been a progressive, afterward turned rather to be a conservative, while Miyake, who had at first been a conservative, afterward turned rather to be a progressive. Accordingly both, standing on the same level of ideas, are always good representatives of sound common sense in Japan. In 1890, an Imperial Rescript on Education was issued. In those days the people were especially puzzled as to what to think of everyday morality and stood surrounded by a chaos of ideas. The Imperial Rescript on Education, comprising foreign ideas in

good harmony with the original, historical tradition of morality, teaches such moral laws to the people in general as "Keep away from extremes of both conservatism and progressivism." In 1892, Tetsujirō Inoue delivered an attack against Christianity, saying that it could not conform to traditional Japanese ideas concerning the State. These things were to be seen as expressions of reactionary thought against civilization from abroad. And a conclusion was suddenly put to this collision between the national, historical traditions and foreign thought: it was the Sino-Japanese War. This furnished an outer expression to Japan's national romanticism, *i.e.* its demand nationally to grow up to the steady life of the State while absorbing Western civilization as fast as it could. And at the same time, the War was the test of national romanticism to see how far such romanticism had developed.

When it was proved in the Sino-Japanese War that the national romanticism of Japan had to a certain extent succeeded, at last Japanese thought could leave behind its nationalistic characteristics and advance to a pure philosophy of life. But, at the same time, industrialism in Japan so expanded, in accord with the development of capitalism, that thought became gradually tinged with social questions to a remarkable degree. Therefore, it must be said that, from then on, Japanese thought advanced in the direction of the emancipation of individuals from the absolute restraint of the State

to a new position of control over society. At present, Japan is advancing along this road. The first thought which grew up after the Sino-Japanese War was subjective individualism as the first step in the above-mentioned direction. A champion in this course was Chogyū Takayama, whose thought was influential in inspiring young men in those days. Takayama, who died young, varied his thoughts bewilderingly, to be sure; but, after all, in his mind there was burning a fire of romantic individualism. Nietzsche's philosophy was introduced and enthusiastically followed by certain men. Voices of individuals struggling and wrestling with the problems of life, of belief, and of other things, were heard from every corner of society. Now men, emancipated from the sphere of mere social ideas, began to find the wide problems of the philosophy of life. In another corner of society there was socialism growing up. But in those days even this socialism inclined rather to the spirit of romantic individualism notwithstanding its outer form. The Russo-Japanese War commenced in 1904; and, after this war, a powerful movement of naturalism was started in the spheres of thought, literature, and even practical life, the effect of which was remarkably destructive of personality. But if we give careful attention to naturalism in Japan we can see that it was very complex, comprising two inclinations, *i.e.* subjective individualism and social realism. The order of development of the philo-

sophy of life was, first, that such subjectivity as had been emancipated from the Government's restraint passed through a refining process. Pragmatism became the main problem in those days on which philosophical discussions concentrated. But, by the end of this period, there had begun a study of the Neo-Kantian philosophy. The philosophy of Bergson, Eucken, and Tagore, in succession, also came to be popular among the people. These were signs of the general popularization of philosophical interests.

Lastly, Japanese thought after the European Great War took two distinctive directions. One of them, mainly in academic circles, rather inclined towards present German philosophies, especially to Neo-Kantianism; and the other, mainly among a circle of progressive young men, especially comprising scholars of the social sciences, rather advocated socialistic ideas. At this time, Kant and Marx became the most important names to indicate the centres of contemporary thought in Japan, as well as in the rest of the world. Why these thoughts came into power has been stated above. The problem of how to combine these two elements of thought, though so important for the Japanese, has not yet been studied. Academic philosophy which follows Kant, originally developed from the above-mentioned romantic individualism, so that even now it is rather individualistic, lacking in social character, and having little interest in the problems of society,

notwithstanding its view of super-individualism. On the contrary, socialistic discussion has arisen of necessity on a foundation of the socializing demands which grow out of the development of industry; so that it always hates the individualistic inclination, and, on the same ground, wishes to exclude academic philosophy which preserves that hateful inclination within it. Thus we see a distinct rift traversing the world of thought. But the condition of contemporary thought belongs to the phenomena succeeding the Great War. I shall, therefore, defer detailed discussion of them to later chapters.

Now I will state in brief the problems of Chinese thought. China is the mother-land of the characteristic ideograph which is commonly used in China and Japan. In the eyes of the West the contemporary thought of the two countries would seem intimately related, perhaps even forming one common sphere of thought. But the relation of the two has never been so during the past half-century. They are in fact developing separately, and are not necessarily related in any common interest, to the extent they are in political affairs. Many men of position in various sections of China have indeed been in Japan for study, but that is all. I must, therefore, premise that a common description of contemporary thought in the two countries is no light task. I shall state the Chinese part, completely separate from the Japanese part, in two later chapters.

Probably many Westerners know that Chinese thought has played a great and characteristic part in the history of the world. But the words "characteristic thought" of China apply mainly to the classical philosophies that were created thousands of years ago, the value of which will be increasingly understood in the West hereafter. As for China, all the conditions for producing great thought and civilization there, unlike Japan's, exist. There is one great area with somewhat unified natural features; and the Han race which constitutes the main part of the Chinese people has race-characteristics which completely distinguish it from the other races, and also has a very large population. Therefore, I certainly think that China is one storm centre for the production of a great distinctive thought and civilization. Undoubtedly she will be able in the future to create such distinctive qualities as to be admired by all as she has been in the past. But Chinese thought during the half-century past, confronted by the same conditions as in Japan, has rather been depressed and unable to develop in an appreciable manner; *i.e.* to China also, Western thought and civilization have been introduced. How, then, can China's original philosophy absorb that of foreign origin? There lie to be solved the same problems as in Japan. When China came into contact with these, the West came upon her with fully developed industrial civilization and also with imperialism which is industrialism's necessary out-

come. China, with her deficiency in both these respects, was seriously menaced, lest she at once became the field for colonization by Europe. China had waged war many times against foreign countries indeed, but every time had lost some portion of her national strength. China was compelled to adopt national romanticism in every phase of civilization as Japan had to do. Accordingly, Chinese thinkers, even though they advocated divergent opinions, always had one common end : to gain the unity of the State, comprising all the people of China. Even the Marxists are supporting this common ideal ; and I think it very reasonable. It is true that China has a spiritual tradition to develop ; but I cannot myself find any means to develop the tradition except through the completion of material equipment ; and this, I think, can only be achieved upon a firm national basis. Japan has been able to solve the same problem for the most part in the past half-century. But the road of Japan towards gaining a unity of the State has been rather easy because its position is insular and its area is not too wide. China, on the contrary, has an area so great and a population so large that it might more appropriately be called one great continent by itself. Thus the road before China is not so easy as Japan's road. Therefore certain men advocate that China should be made a confederacy. But even so, there still remain the following problems : first, is it better to construct a state of the Han race alone at first, and

abandon the rest for the present? Secondly, should the whole of China be arranged as a federation of States? Or thirdly, should the unification of all China be gradual? These are all important problems for China which should be promptly solved. The more delay she makes in the work of the unification of the State, the more loss she will suffer. Chinese thought will be unable to develop to a great extent until this work of unification has been accomplished, and until she has attained this unification Chinese thought will remain confined to social and parochial considerations, and not be able to attain completion with the philosophical problems of life in a broad sense. In China, from ancient times, social thought developed splendidly, one reason for this being that the unification of the State was for China, with its extraordinarily vast areas, always difficult. Whatever of philosophical speculation on life did develop in China, it was limited to one of the following conditions: where the unification of the State was partially accomplished, either widely or locally; or where, despairing of actual life and desiring utterly to transcend it, men became negative or even anarchical in their attitude towards life. Contemporary thought in China cannot be said to have fully developed. It remains at present in a cruder state than that of Japan. It happens that the unification of the State in Japan has been more fully completed than in China. Whenever the whole of China shall have become finally

united there will appear such an important philosophy as to attract the admiring gaze of the world. The possibility of the ideas of China and Japan going hand in hand must wait for the day when China shall have in some degree achieved national romanticism.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY

I HAVE described in the previous chapter the general features of the development of Japanese thought since the Restoration. Now, at the beginning of my detailed consideration of those currents separately, it is necessary to outline an objective trend in philosophy.

In this direction, we find the philosophy of the natural sciences and especially evolutional philosophy. Apt examples of those philosophies are found in the writings of the late *Hiroyuki Katō* and *Asaiirō Oka*.

Hiroyuki Katō's great service to the civilization of the Meiji period should be, and always has been, appreciated by all the Japanese. His thought was established on a basis of radical egoism, in interesting contrast with his lofty and self-sacrificing character. How he reconciled this contradiction between his theory and character for himself seems to me very interesting. His theory of evolution was rather eclectic, but seemed to be much influenced by Spencer. Later he distinctly inclined to Haeckel's monism, and in the main adhered to Haeckel

almost without change. Nevertheless, it should be said that he was independent and frank in confessing his own belief, and had many original ideas of his own. It is true, as we shall see later on, that in a strict sense he was the first man in Japan to construct a system of philosophy of his own.

He declared boldly, at the beginning of his philosophy, that there were several pairs of philosophical antagonisms, but that in each he adhered to a necessitarianism position. According to him, the many philosophical tendencies could be summarized under the following three heads: first, an antagonism between the teleological and the causal views of the Universe; secondly, that between dualism and monism; and thirdly, that between the theory of free will and that of necessity. He consistently adhered to the second alternative in each of these pairs of antagonism, denying the first. Thus his theory was founded on that form of the evolutionary theory which denies a Creator. Evolution comprises cosmic, inorganic, and organic evolution; and organic evolution again comprises that of the body, the mind, and society. There are three kinds of organisms classified according to their lives: first, the unicellular; secondly, the multicellular (ordinary plants and the animals); and thirdly, the duplici-multicellular organisms (the groups of ants and bees and the human State). Now, the important point for us is that all organisms which belong respectively to these classes have a constant

tendency to preserve and develop their lives; this tendency was called by him the all-exclusive radical tendency or egoism. Egoism is divided into physiological and psychological. The physiological is usually unconscious, the psychological, either conscious or unconscious. This one tendency, in the last analysis, reduces itself to self-preservation and race-preservation. It is said, to be sure, that in human society there is altruism as well as egoism. But, he said, there is no such thing as pure altruism other than some form of pure egoism. The theory of evolution justifies the production of altruism from egoism as arising when organisms have varied their modes of life from isolation to association. First, what was produced from the affinitive emotion which thinks of another as a second half is no more than a variety of pure egoism named emotional altruism. Secondly, there is sagacious altruism. If man in his associated life is kind to other men, he will be esteemed by others, finally to his own advantage. And, thirdly, there is cultural altruism, which is purposely cultivated by religion and moral instruction. Ethics teaches us that goodness is our duty. But the truth in this is no more than that man should be educated to true manhood. And for us, there is no greater self-advantage than to become true men, so that even ethics cultivates altruism by means of egoism. After all, he rejected the dualism that regards man as a separate being from the animals, and which

thinks that the egoistic, as a radical tendency, is attributed only to animals, while to man are to be attributed both egoism and altruism. Besides this theory of egoism as the original tendency of all organisms, Katō held the other theory mentioned above, namely, the so-called theory of three contradictions in the world of nature. That theory was: first, on this earth, the natural supply is too poor to support the whole sum of organisms, because they multiply extraordinarily. Secondly, in the animal world, there is present a contradiction between the survival of animals and their food. There is no means for animals to be fed but on their more closely allied other animals and indirectly allied vegetables. And, thirdly, a contradiction between the original inclination of organisms to develop their powers of both body and mind and the ability to do so. All the organisms have this tendency; but all cannot make use of it at the same time, because of the differences in their heredity and environment. Thus, according to him, we find, in the world, a severe struggle for existence as the effect of these three contradictions. Of this strrugle for existence, two sorts are distinguished as unconscious and conscious; or physiological and psychological; or, with regard to selection, natural and artificial.

The reason for the evolution of organisms having been stated above, we must now consider how it is expressed in the case of each animal. We distinguish three sorts of struggle for existence:

first, the struggle within a State; secondly, that between the States; and, thirdly, that of individuals and groups irrespective of State limits.

First, concerning the struggle within a State, the struggles between the several classes are the most important. This sort is named the struggle for power or for the right of the strongest. It comprises such struggles as those between the rulers and the ruled, the nobility and the masses, the freemen and the slaves, and further between men and women. Secondly, concerning the struggles between States, we shall see those between superior and inferior nations and those among the civilized States with each other. These struggles are necessarily indispensable, because without them human society might have remained in its original condition. Although civilized men consciously misuse the uncivilized and capture from them their wealth such as territory and goods, it is still but the necessary action of natural law. For morality to be practicable, the associated life of society is essential; so that the above-mentioned immorality is indispensable for the evolution of mankind, because uncivilized men cannot live in an associated society with us. And also true morality is not practicable in a great incomplete society, but only in one organized as a State. Charity and humanity which transcend the State cannot be our absolute ideal. Civilization in general is produced directly or indirectly by the struggle for existence. War is

most important to civilization for its development. If one State wages an aggressive war against the other for the sake of its own interest, it cannot be condemned as immoral. And if there had been no war from ancient times, present civilization would probably not have been what it is. The struggle for power also is, of course, helpful to advance civilization. The sole source of right is power. When the weak, having been overmastered by the strong, acknowledge the superiority of the latter concerning power, the right of the strong is thereby established. Morality and law have always been developed by the struggle for existence. In ethics, we have had to see apriorism as well as aposteriorism; the former means intuitionism, and the latter means artificial and utilitarian moralism. Among these, aposteriorism is correct and apriorism is not; but again, under aposteriorism, artificial moralism only inheres in artificial and not in natural selection, while utilitarianism, being merely individualistic and not nationalistic, takes no account whatever of either artificial or natural selection. If the interests of the individual conflict with those of the State, they should be sacrificed for the latter, as the actual existence of the organism shows its claim upon us. In short, morality is evolved by both natural and artificial selection. Morality was in its origin no more than custom or manner. Wherever there is social existence there must be customs or manners. In other words, whatever of life becomes adapted to

society gradually becomes custom or manner. This is natural selection. Being in turn acted on by this natural selection, morality is modified so as to preserve the welfare of that society. This is termed the evolution of morality. In addition to this natural selection, we also find artificial selection acting. Of the latter two kinds are distinguished: heteronomous or religio-ethical type and autonomous or pursuit of the higher self-interest.

In conclusion, what is the future of the evolution of law and morality? Law and morality are indissolubly related to the natural sciences. Mankind must reform itself by means of artificial selection, depending upon a knowledge of the natural sciences. There ought to be some law applying this principle of improvement to men and women who marry. In certain special cases abortion even should be permitted. In the future, the sphere of law will be so expanded that whatever is hitherto comprised within the sphere of morality shall henceforth be comprised within it. If this tendency is carried out, the State would gradually become socialistic; but this was a great problem requiring further study. Next—also in the future—probably all the States would give up their separate rights in their own territories and dependencies and construct one great republic comprising the whole world; and then, for the first time, would humanity be realized. But he would "leave this problem also" to future adequate study; because it is very doubt-

ful whether this situation could be attained in the presence of the powerful egoism of States.

I have outlined above Katō's thought. The construction of his thought, I think, is rather radical and bold, and wholly free from obscurity in argument, in spite of the contradiction exposed here and there in his thought. This must be the outcome of his pure character. In his thought, we of to-day can see how pronounced was the expression of the people's demands at the end of the nineteenth century. In the first place, he everywhere expressed admiration for civilization and enlightenment—the very voice of the people's demand after the Restoration. The reasonableness of these demands for the Japanese in those days, I think, should be fully acknowledged. But to what future abuses they would lead, it did not enter his mind, though he had true glimpses of the future of this civilization. But even in Europe, the future of industrial civilization has been regarded in general as a matter of grave concern only since the Great War. In the second place, his philosophy was constructed wholly on the knowledge of the natural sciences. This scheme was in accordance with the popular demand of the time because Japan's special weakness was in this direction. But the philosophies of to-day in general are not following his method. In the third place, his ultimate position was nationalistic, though his course was not steady and at times inclined to the contrary. This nationalistic tendency in his theory

was a necessary expression of the national romanticism of those days. Japan is never inherently imperialistic. The Red Guards in the socialistic State of Russia are furnishing a good key to the condition of affairs in Japan after the Restoration. Of course, I must say that this nationalism, on the other hand, did in some ways seriously injure the mind of the Japanese people. But at present, the young men are earnestly preaching an internationalism quite different from the narrow-mindedness of nationalism. But surely it must be significant that the Japan of to-day has reached such a state as to make this change possible. Ethics in Japan before the Great War was in general nationalistic. For instance, Seichi Yoshida's system of ethics which has been widely accepted in the educational world was ultimately nationalistic though its foundation is laid on a personal philosophy. Masayoshi Kihira and Shinichirō Nishi's ethics are specially so. But the people since the Great War have been and are turning to a new moral philosophy, the ideal of which is the good of the whole community. In the last place, Katō's philosophy aimed at the capitalistic morality, as did philosophies generally in the nineteenth century. For instance, he justified competition as well as invasion by the civilized State of the uncivilized as moral. I cannot refrain from remarking that this is but an instance of the justification of capitalistic imperialism prevalent all over the world in the nineteenth century.

The profoundest fallacy in Katō's theory was, I think, that he confused the problem of the *validity* of morality with that of the *genesis* of morality. The consideration of these problems was afterwards divided into two parts. For example, Kenjirō Fujii divided ethics in general into two parts: the subjective theory of ethics and its objective theory. As an example of the objective theory of ethics, Katō's theory was boldly constructed. This naturalistic inclination was surely the source of naturalism as well as of socialism which afterwards rose into power. Nay, Katō's own ethics was saved by only a step short of socialism. He acknowledged the struggles between the opposing social classes; but in justifying such struggles for power in the classes as not immoral, he escaped being a socialist. Nevertheless, on inquiring into his theory closely, he could not help approaching towards State socialism, because the sphere of law in the future will be widely expanded as the consequence of the narrowing distinction between morality and law. He was compelled also to suppose the establishment of a World State. But the solution of those problems was beyond the thought of a man living in the atmosphere of those days; therefore he left it to other men for future study.

Asajirō Oka is purely a zoologist. Hence his greatest contribution was mainly to the advancement of zoology in Japan. His service to the theory of

evolution is well known, and has won him the well-deserved name of "father of the Japanese evolutionists." Oka's thought is constructed on the foundation of evolutionism; and his inclination is towards radical democracy, thus presenting a very interesting contrast to Katō's above-mentioned nationalistic tendency, though both started from the same standpoint of evolutionism. Oka always held an abstract, idealistic argument in contempt, naming it the "keeping-hands-in-pocket type of reasoning," and strove to prove his theory merely with the most solid facts. His thinking is very free and also cosmopolitan. Surely he is a good representative of the free thinkers of Japan. An anarchist, Sakae Ōsugi, owed much to Oka in his evolutional and anarchistic arguments though he was not a direct pupil of Oka.

Most noticeable in Oka's work is a theory concerning the future of mankind. The theory is purely his own, and cannot be classed with any other theory in the world. The following is a synopsis of his theory which was prepared by himself:

(1) The fact that man has conquered all animals is to be attributed to his use of tools. Man invented tools with his brain, and managed them with his hands. Therefore we may say that man conquered the other animals with both his brain and hands.

(2) Man in a solitary life could have no power. When gathered in social groups, men could defeat even tigers or elephants. Hence the cause of man

becoming the strongest creature on this earth is found in his specially-developed brain, his free-moving hands, and his social life.

(3) After defeating animals men fought with one another. In the same way, groups fought with other groups for existence; and only the group fittest for existence won the power to survive; and the unfitted groups were defeated and fell.

(4) Thus as a result of natural selection human traits which were useful to the group-life developed step by step. The most necessary thing for the group-life is an inherent spirit of co-operation and agreement. These characters continued to develop so long as natural selection continued in force.

(5) In animals there is an important limit to the size of the group; and if this limit is passed, the unity of a group is destroyed. When a group has come near to this limit, it is necessarily divided into sub-groups, and the newly-produced two groups combat each other for existence. Thus the process of natural selection ever continues.

(6) But man is a unique exception to this law. Man has always used tools in his fighting. And because the finer the tools he used were, the greater was the promise of victory, and the finer and finer the tools became for future enterprises. In consequence of the higher development of machines for communication or transportation man's groups extended.

(7) If a group enlarges its size to an extraordinary

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degree, the effect, within it, of the struggle for existence cannot be so radical as in a small group. In the defeated group even the majority may survive and produce offspring. This gradually weakens and finally stops the process of natural selection. Thereafter there is nothing but steady deterioration for the inherent spirit of co-operation and agreement.

(8) Animals which lead the group life are divided into two classes: the equality-type and the class-type. A distinction of classes, say between masters and servants, is absolutely lacking among animals of the equality type. But in a group of the class type the strongest and cleverest one among them appropriates the position of head, and all the others submit to it. For animals such as mammals which may become clever through acquired experience, the best policy for making use of the experience of the head most efficiently is to adopt the class system.

(9) In a group of the equality type, natural selection produces such an amazing associative instinct as is seen in bees or ants. In a group of the class type, it produces a nature of absolute submission as a means for realizing co-operation and agreement.

(10) From the beginning, mankind has formed a group of the class type. As long as a group was so small that it was acted upon by natural selection the nature of the absolute submission constantly advanced. But from the time when a group grew so

large that the action of natural selection ceased this nature weakened gradually.

(11) When a group became so large that a head could not directly preside over the whole there were needed certain supporters besides the head. Then the group was divided into two classes, namely, the governing and the governed.

(12) So long as the inherent spirit of co-operation and agreement was so maintained there could be no struggle between the classes. Because whoever belonged to the governing class would order only what was useful to the whole of the group, and there could be no cause of complaint from the governing class.

(13) With the weakening of the inherent spirit of co-operation and agreement the governing class began to abuse their privileges and selfishly oppress the governed.

(14) When the inherent spirit of submission weakened to a certain degree the governed felt the oppression painful, and consequently with exhausted patience they cried out for more freedom.

(15) According to the above observation the history of mankind resembles a parabola. The ascending part represents the period when the size of the group was still small, so that natural selection was still effective; and the descending part, the period when its size was too large for the action of natural selection.

(16) Mankind in the present has its nature

developed both in the period of ascent and in the period of descent. Altruism is a representative of the former; egoism of the latter. The infinite contradictions in man's actions furnish the proof that man has passed through this course.

(17) It is generally acknowledged that man's constitution has grown constantly weaker, because by means of his brain and hands he has created for himself an unnatural life.

(18) The brain and hands which gave man the victory over all the other animals are now causing his descent both in mind and body. There is no hope, therefore, of again acquiring the inherent spirit of co-operation and agreement exactly as it was when he was at the apex of the parabola.

As indicated above, Oka's theory is a sort of scientific pessimism concerning the future of mankind. It was well shown by the title, "Pity for Posterity," given to one of his essays. Oka's essays always dealt with free thought in Japan on the basis of the natural sciences. As to the evolutionary theory, he seems, like Katō, to believe acquired characters to be hereditary. Oka's theory could not become a subject for general discussion among the Japanese, with the exception of criticisms by *Sakae Ōsugi*, *Tamiji Kawamura*, *Shunichi Ono and the present writer*, because it was based on a special knowledge of the natural sciences.

Kawamura's biological criticism of him concentrated on two points. Kawamura said, in the first

place, that Oka's theory of natural selection had already fallen into disuse, and natural selection could not be the agent for creating new characteristics, hence the presence of such qualities as " co-operation and agreement " or " submission " could not be explained as products of natural selection. In the second place, that recognition among the groups of animals of an equality type and a class type was an unreasonable distinction. Then Kawamura drew a hard and fast line between instinct which is an inherent nature, and intellect which is directed by experience *aposteriori*, and he attached especially great importance to this distinction in the life of mankind.

For myself, I am for the most part in agreement with Kawamura's view. I must say that Oka's scheme of dividing the groups of animals into two groups confuses analogy with induction. But the fundamental fallacy of Oka's theory is found in his unduly wide expansion of biological theory in its application to human society. Though man is, to be sure, from first to last governed by biological natural laws, the laws that determine human social life do not comprise the biological ones alone. Does not Oka himself acknowledge that conditions were not the same for man as for the other animals on the road of evolution, and, standing on this acknowledgment, seek a special law for the evolution of mankind ? But the special conditions are too complex for Oka's observation to explain all of them

biologically. For example, the monetary system is an element in human social life undoubtedly important in determining its course; but it is clearly impracticable to explain the phenomena completely by means of biological laws. Such special phenomena in human society were often overlooked in Oka's theory. For instance, he did not observe the pluralistic formation of human society, but merely said that the size of the human group is too large. He said that "a son is preferable to a parent in his material civilization, but is inferior in his associative spirit"; but the truth is that material civilization cannot advance merely by means of tools in man's hands, but is in an inseparable relation to the associative life. Hence Oka's theory must be declared self-contradictory in this respect. In general, biological philosophy comprises a fallacy when it attempts to apply the biological laws beyond their proper limits. Kawamura's criticism was valid in the main points, but his distinction between instinct and intellect seems to me too strict. Men's social lives are of course governed by intellect; but we should not overlook the extremely powerful influence which dark instinct also exerts upon them. After all, man's life is originally a creation determined by joint action of instinct and intellect; and we must not forget that the force of instinct is still intensely present. In the province of evolutionary philosophy in Japan, there is nothing thus far to be regarded of great importance besides the teachings of Katō

and Oka. But as somewhat related to the theory of evolution, the birth-control movement, as a development of the eugenic demand in Katō's philosophy, is at present to the front, though the real inception of the present movement came from Sanger. Socialists often invoke the theory of evolution, but not in the scientific sense. In Japan, at one time, Pragmatism, as I stated above, had a power. Indeed it was supported by Japanese thinkers because the theory of evolution had been welcomed by them, and the two theories seemed to have something in common. At present, however, Pragmatism has almost disappeared from the circle of academic thinkers. But evolutionary thinking and the pragmatic view of life are still powerfully influencing the popular mind. And the scheme to divide man's instinct abstractly into two kinds, *i.e.* into that of self-preservation and that of race-preservation, is still prevalent in the circles of social thinkers.

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CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEALISM

THERE is still a great demand in Japan for material improvement by means of the natural sciences. But the philosophy that is based directly upon natural science is no longer important in academic circles, where what is actually most important is Neo-Kantian philosophy. This tendency originally followed a subjective direction, whilst naturalistic philosophy followed, on the contrary, the objective direction. It is, therefore, necessary to look for this subjective philosophy as far back as the illuminating movement of Masanao Nakamura, whose endeavour, more than Fukuzawa's, was directed towards new character-building among the people. However, the thought that was originally influential in Japan—Confucianism or Buddhism—was in general rather subjective, so that, for the Japanese, it has been more easy to follow the subjective tendency than the objective. But the new subjective tendency was at first individualistic rather than super-individualistic. However, as the philosophical tendencies in Confucianism and Buddhism had by nature a super-individualistic side, the later

transition from individualistic to super-individualistic was naturally easy. Individualistic subjectivism was originally introduced from the West. But, at present, this individualistic tendency is influential in the popular mind; so that the so-called transcendental philosophy cannot be regarded as of great importance. In fact, only academic philosophers are occupying the standpoint of this transcendental philosophy. So that at present there is a distinct gap between the two tendencies. During the ten years between the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars, as I have already stated, a tendency towards subjective individualism arose. The highest point of this tendency was reached in the teaching of *Chogyū Takayama*. Although Takayama died young, and his thought was not only very simple and also unsystematic, it nevertheless made upon young men a great impression by its sceptical argument mixed with some sentimentalism and a passionate literary style. Truly the days were as troubled as were those of Hamlet or Werther; and he seemed to express the spirit of those days. His thought shifted busily to and fro during his short life. The objects of his criticism were mainly in literature and art; and artistic individualism was its key-note. But his works on criticism and on the history of civilization, in general, should be acknowledged as being very reasonable when taken in connection with the unsettled course of Japan in those days. The fact that, in ethics, he some-

times approached to nationalism somewhat in contradiction of his own character, is to be accepted as an expression of the spirit of the times. But what moved the people most deeply were his writings in praise of genius and of the beautiful life. In one of his essays concerning this theme, he says, " To obtain a really happy life in these days, our morality and knowledge are too commonplace and stupid." " Were the natural demands of human character once satisfied, it would be, though in a beggar's life, a paradise to be envied even by a king." " Poor man! Do not be sorry. For the kingdom is always in your heart: it is the beautiful life that will give you an understanding of the Gospel." Therefore his nationalism could not be said to mean any sort of formal bureaucracy but was a nationalism of ethics and genius. In those writings in which he praised genius, he said, " How long the time while I weary of commonplace men! " " Give me one Nichiren! I will give ten million commonplace men for him. Give me one Buddha! I will still give ten million men in exchange." Thus he found his path in the midst of all the labyrinths of scepticism and of trouble, and finally got Saint Nichiren as the object of his undivided adoration. In this last adoration the candle of his life burnt itself out. No man will probably again be able so powerfully to influence the people, and so to represent his age in so short a lifetime as Takayama. Sentimental heroism, scepticism, lack of

system, transcendentalism, and æstheticism were the general characteristics of the thought of those days.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Pragmatism or Humanism was the most conspicuously influential thought in the sphere of philosophy. The unsystematic romanticism which had been seen in Takayama's thought was much systematized in those days. Philosophical speculation gradually became academic, and the gap between academic philosophy and popular thought began to become more distinct. There was a great controversy between personal idealism and absolute idealism in 1908–10. The main disputants in those days were young philosophers, namely, Seichi Yoshida, Teikichi Kitazawa, Sanjurō Tomonaga and Masayoshi Kihira. In 1910, *William James's* "Pragmatism" was translated into Japanese. It was probably the first book in the sphere of pure speculative philosophy to be translated which was able at the same time to arouse a speculative interest in the popular mind. This controversy was, in short, between personal Self and absolute Self, or between the Pragmatism of Schiller and James, and the Idealism of Green and Bradley. And the former, namely, Pragmatism, was much welcomed popularly; because it conformed to the individualistic spirit of those days. Of course, from the historical point of view, it was not literally correct for Kitazawa, in his preface to the Japanese translation of James's work, to say:

"For instance, the Naturalism prevalent in our recent literature is also a literary expression of this thought of James." But, for those days, Kitazawa's observation need not be regarded as necessarily false, because the one demand of the times was expressed, however differently, in both. And it was true when Tomonaga said, "So far as the present situation is concerned, the controversy of absolutism *versus* personalism, of non-individualism *versus* individualism is nothing, in our country as well as in the West, but that of the old *versus* the new." It was quite reasonable for personal idealism to be popularly welcomed. But in the circle of academic philosophers, the tendency that wanted to give precedence to absolutism and to assimilate individualism into universalism, was still, as Tomonaga said, calmly burning, even if its popular influence was not great in those days. And after long patience, absolutism won a complete victory over personalism and assimilated it. Thus the subjectivism which finally sprang up was the transcendental idealism of the Neo-Kantians.

As a matter of fact, German Idealism was introduced into Japan in fairly early days by *Tetsujirō Inoue* and others. Inoue is not only a representative of the Japanese philosophers of the early days of the Meiji period, but, with Hiroyuki Katō, Rikizō Nakajima, and others, he is also a founder. Inoue followed idealism while Katō, on the contrary, followed materialism, a fact which made a good

contrast between them. In fact, Inoue, many times, attacked Katō's materialism. But Neo-Kantianism came to be studied in its true meaning by academic philosophers at a later period, and since then German idealism has emitted a new light. We must not forget the services of *Genyoku Kuwaki*, *Sanjurō Tomonaga* and others in bringing about this turn. *Kuwaki's* "Ten Lectures on Modern Thought," published in 1913, still criticized Pragmatism and the New Realism of Perry, Russell, and others, as though they were the newest currents; but he also stated, in his conclusion, that we ought to adopt such new idealism as was founded upon the School of Windelband and Rickert. *Tomonaga*, in one of his works, "The History of Self-consciousness in Modern Times," published in 1916, skilfully described the history of modern thought from the viewpoint of man's self-consciousness, and ultimately reached the philosophy of the Neo-Kantians. Accordingly, the turn from individualism to super-individualism in Japanese philosophy must be dated from those days. But the treatise of *Kitarō Mishida*, "On Some Observations of Pure Logic in Epistemology," was written in 1911; and in this, the philosophies of Windelband, Rickert, Husserl, and others became the objects of his criticism. When *Nishida* wrote the treatise in 1916 entitled, "Present Philosophies," he classed Windelband, Rickert, Cohen, Natorp, and others, as followers of Kant, and Twardowski, Meinong, Husserl, and others, as

followers of Bolzano and Brentano, and most rightly criticized and systematized them.

Academic philosophers in Japan are now inclined, with a few exceptions, towards German philosophies, whilst English, American and French philosophies have more or less lost their influence. The study of Western philosophy has moved forward in this direction. I sincerely believe that there are now a few among Japanese philosophers comparable with famous Western philosophers. The characteristics of contemporary philosophies in Japan are as follows:

First, the range of vision of the philosophers has been much enlarged; so that they can study special Western philosophy on a plane of equality. Secondly, scholars of natural and cultural sciences are studying philosophy in order to give their scientific methods the stability of a philosophical basis. Thirdly, a small number of great philosophers have already systematized their metaphysical thinking, and have gradually begun to display Eastern characteristics; hence Japanese philosophy promises to play an important rôle at no far distant time in the metaphysical thinking of the world. I shall describe these three points somewhat in detail below.

In the first place, the range of vision of the philosophers has been greatly broadened in all the branches of philosophy. But the most influential is, as above mentioned, German philosophy. The philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel constitute

the background of this tendency, but are now studied mainly from the standpoints of the Neo-Kantians. Most of the philosophers are more or less allied with the Baden School of Windelband, Rickert, and Lask or with the Marburg School of Cohen, Natorp, and Cassirer. Their chief efforts are abandoning the former metaphysical tendencies in order to construct a strict epistemology. That is to say, philosophy has come to be a strict science of knowledge apart from being a view of life. The reason for this turn is to be found in the fact that the work of the State unification of Japan has been almost completed, and national romanticism has nearly accomplished its mission; that is to say, Japanese thought has freed itself from the shackles of nationalistic metaphysics. As to a view of life, Japanese philosophers are thinking along the line of combining radical empiricism such as Bergson's with transcendental idealism such as the Neo-Kantian. But many young philosophers are studying Husserl's and Meinong's theories of knowledge also, and are accordingly going back to Bolzano and Brentano as the originators of this School. Whoever considers himself a Neo-Kantian also deals with the latter School; so that, in the future, the study of this School will be very influential. Originally the Japanese people were accustomed to the delicate empirico-logical speculation of Buddhistic philosophy. If Neo-Kantianism succeeds in combining itself with Confucian ethics, then of necessity Husserl's and

Meinong's theory of knowledge will be in the same relation to the Buddhistic philosophy of religion.

In the second place, the tendency to study philosophy in order to make the foundations of special sciences philosophically sound is mainly seen in a circle of young students of those sciences. This tendency will become increasingly influential in the future. To the sphere of mathematics and natural science, *Hajime Tanabe's* "Studies in Mathematical Philosophy" have made a great contribution. He also treated the foundations of all the natural sciences in his work, "An Outline of Science." In the biological sphere we cannot yet find such a work. The same studies in the spheres of the cultural sciences were started with that of Economics, and this service must be credited to several works by *Kiichirō Sōda*. He was under the direct instruction of Rickert, and wrote two books on such problems in German, namely, "Money and Value" and "The Logical Nature of Economic Laws." These works aroused great interest among scholars of both philosophy and economics in his mother-country. Sōda's standpoint was originally based on Rickert's philosophy. Of late, *Shigeyoshi Hijikata* has written a work, "Elemental Concept of Finance" (1923). He strives in this to interpret philosophically the essential meaning of public finance, and though his standpoint to some extent differs fron Sōda's, in its general features the work is based on the Philosophy of

Values. Besides these, methodological studies of the sciences of politics and law are also getting to be active; and the philosophies of Stamler, Lask, and others have been studied. Recently, this tendency has been extended to the sphere of pedagogics. The philosophies of Natorp, Spranger, and others have become centres of interest. On these lines also some such achievements as Sōda's will be possible in the near future. And finally, in the above studies, those philosophers will probably pass beyond Neo-Kantianism more deeply into the study of so-called *Phänomenologie* and *Gegenstandstheorie*.

In the third place, it is especially noticeable that a few have already constructed their own original systems of philosophy, and have gradually come to display Eastern characteristics. It is not very long since Japanese thinkers began to study Western philosophy, and the progress of philosophical studies is not so fast as that of natural sciences; but it must be said that in these ten years they have burst into full bloom. In 1916, a series entitled "Philosophical Library," consisting of twelve little volumes, was issued, and this series has been and is still the only organ by which to gain philosophical knowledge systematically. It was probably in those days that philosophical interest became popular among the Japanese. Truly these ten years have been the fine days of autumn which have brought the scattered buds of philosophy into a wealth of sudden

bloom. And finally these thoughts showed such depth as is beyond comparison with the former achievement.

As the philosopher who contributed most to this development of academic philosophy, we must not forget, first of all, the name of *Genyoku Kuwaki* and his great merit. But what gave confidence to the Japanese people that their thinking is destined not to be inferior to that of the greatest philosophers of the West was the famous work of *Kitarō Nishida*, entitled, " Intuition and Reflection in Self-consciousness," which was issued in 1917. Before the issue of this book Nishida had written some valuable treatises and books along several philosophical lines, and was honoured by a few special thinkers. But by this work his name for the first time became popular among the people notwithstanding the unpopular style of all his works. This has been read by everyone in any class who speaks philosophy; and whenever philosophy becomes a theme of conversation his name is always mentioned. Nishida's fame was at one time extraordinary. His works were never written systematically; they are, in a way, monologues along his roads of thinking. Accordingly they are not for the general public at all easy books to understand; but for Japanese philosophy they must be always most valuable books because they showed by example the depth which philosophical thinking ought to reach. Then at last philosophical studies could free themselves

from the domain of enlightenment, and completely establish themselves as a special science. Moreover, I must say that Nishida's thinking increased in originality and began step by step to gain Eastern characteristics. From the start he could not remain bound to mere epistemology. There lies a good reason for his characteristic thinking. Hajime Tanabe is a successor to Nishida's work. *Masayoshi Kihira's* " The Philosophy of Gyō " and *Shinichirō Nishi's* " The Fundamental Problems of Ethics " were successively published. These books also contained many original ideas. Both men are creative thinkers. Taking up the general features of these two philosophies they showed the same characteristics as were found in Nishida's philosophy; because, first, both were essentially metaphysical, and, secondly, both showed Eastern characteristics. I think this must in part be attributed to the fact that they were once trained in Hegel's philosophy, though they have since been baptized into Neo-Kantianism. With regard to their Eastern characteristics, Kihira and Nishi show these characteristics more clearly than Nishida in their thinking and especially Kihira. It seems that they have strong conviction and a Japanese self-consciousness for the construction of philosophy. For instance, Kihira ended one of his works in bold type with the following words: " *I am a Japanese* "; and Nishi said, in the preface to his work, " I think it is the duty of the circle of scholars to expect the present

studies of philosophy and of morality by the Japanese to get an inside view of the great thoughts which had been achieved before the Restoration; and as for myself, how I may contribute the most to this is my problem." Respecting philosophical terms, Nishi said that Japanese philosophy should use its own independent terms, and Kihira went so far as to say that a philosophy which can only be expressed in foreign languages certainly cannot be true philosophy.

While the metaphysics that shows Eastern characteristics has been active on the one hand, on the other, the pure epistemological studies that strive strictly to give up all metaphysical views whatever have been active as well. Kuwaki always presented such an epistemological view in his treatises, though he has not systematically written a philosophy of his own. It seems natural that, with this tendency, they have reached philosophical problems which are common to the whole world. In fact Kuwaki himself has said it many times. One who made a great contribution to this tendency was *Kiichirō Sōda*. His first book in Japanese, "The Problems of Economic Philosophy" (1917), was also widely read in general, if not so widely as Nishida's, and was truly in good agreement with the latter in its philosophical meanings. He has been and still is endeavouring to construct a new system of philosophy on the basis of pure epistemology, strictly excluding any dualism of metaphysics and empiricism in

philosophy. But in this Eastern characteristics cannot be found. *Tanabe* wishes faithfully to adhere to Nishida's philosophy, but his literary style and also his problems resemble more those of Sōda in not yet showing Eastern characteristics. The author of "The Essence and the Fundamental Problems of Religious Philosophy," *Seiichi Hatano*, also belongs to this epistemological tendency. Then the fact that Japanese philosophy is freeing itself from a metaphysical tendency, surely means, as above mentioned, that the road of Japan to national romanticism has made an advance towards completion, and accordingly air breathed by Sōda, Tanabe, and others is fresher. But this completion is never full, and a tendency to venture into the sphere of metaphysics, though it does prove itself not strictly scientific in being unable to endure the weariness of pure science of life, cannot be forbidden to human nature even were it not for the cosmopolitan tendency. Therefore, in the future, Japanese thinkers will construct a pure epistemology which can bear strictly scientific criticism on the one hand, while they will create powerful and originally Occidentalized philosophy of life on the other. I think both tendencies are equally necessary for contemporary Japan. Thus we see that remarkable works of philosophy have been issued in these past ten years, and none of them except those of *Kihira* were written systematically with already finished thoughts, but rather in the form of monologue, as

shown in the case of Nishida. Japanese philosophy, which has a vast area of virgin soil ahead of it, seems to direct its interest almost solely to the work of entering upon this new soil, and not to be capable of sparing some amount of energy for the systematic cultivation of the ground already gained.

CHAPTER IV

NEO-KANTIANISM AND NEO-HEGELIANISM (*a*)

We have already briefly described how a subjective tendency in Japanese philosophy developed after the Restoration. But it might equally be called a description of academic philosophies in Japan because at present these belong almost without exception to this subjective tendency. I shall now outline each of these subjective philosophies.

Genyoku Kuwaki is actually an elder in this circle of Japanese philosophers who have contributed greatly to the initiation of this tendency. His constant endeavour is to rear up a good intelligence of philosophical thinking among the people. But he has never confined himself to the movement for the enlightenment of the people, but is also a distinguished academic philosopher. No philosopher can be compared with him for impartial criticism and warm sympathy for every thought and matter. He seems to be more interested in relishing the good in all ideas than in fighting for his advocacy of any particular idea. His culture is many-sided in its outlook on life. He appreciates all forms of art on the one hand, while he directs

his attention to social problems on the other. This sympathy has freed him from narrowness of outlook; and his literary style is clear, intelligible and witty. But he has not so far set forth his own system of philosophy in any specialized form, so that it is impossible to follow the construction of his thought in detail. But I can state concerning it that it is always based on German Idealism, and, adhering to the last to Kant's position of the Critical Method, he undertakes to exclude the two extremes of empiricism and metaphysics. For example, his lecture, "Present Philosophical Problems" (1914), insisted upon that view most clearly. He is famous as a student of Kant, and his work, "Kant and Present Philosophies" (1917), is especially valuable. Besides this he has written many essays which have been since issued in book form.

Kitarō Nishida is a philosopher always to be noticed whenever the highest type of philosophy in Japan is mentioned. He is a philosopher who is more prone to go to the depth of thinking than to be proud of his wide knowledge; so that he was the first to show to the people that philosophy constitutes the most fundamental form of thought. Nevertheless his culture is by no means narrow. In his essays he often treats fundamental problems of mathematics or physics, and also often concerns himself with the newest schools of art or poetry, and often refers to the works of Eastern saints of

the past. His only dislike seems to be to act as a philosopher of the enlightenment for the people; and he does not take any interest in such outer problems as social movements. His eyes are always turned within. The form of his writings is just like a poetical monologue in spite of his strictly logical thinking. Therefore he seems like an Oriental puritanical monk. When he reviewed Poincaré, saying in the words of Schopenhauer that Poincaré's work " is as clear and penetrating as the lakes of Switzerland," it seems to me the words can be applied to his own works as well.

His first study was probably on Hegel; therefore, in the foundation of his metaphysics, there always remains a flavour of Hegel's dialectics somewhat Easternized, though, of course, he never disregards present philosophies. Of these present philosophies, the works which first moved him seem to be the pure empiricism of James and Bergson. This philosophy probably best suits his character. But he could not bear merely to penetrate into pure experience at the expense of keeping his eyes off pure logic such as is found in Rickert and Husserl. He has thought for himself in order that he might pass through strict logical criticism in the company of pure and deep experience. In other words, he thought that the combination between Bergson's philosophy of pure duration and the so-called critical method of the Neo-Kantians was the main problem of contemporary philosophy. In

his work, "Thinking and Pure Experience," he said, "When I first came to Kyōto what most impressed me was the so-called pure logic of Rickert and others, and Bergson's theory of pure duration. I gained much from them, especially through my agreement with the latter, and my reflection on the former. But, for myself, I cannot follow Bergson in the entirety of his point of view, while I am not convinced that Rickert's thinking is impregnable. I think rather that a synthesis of these different conclusions is the demand of present-day philosophy." The title of this book most fittingly expressed the character of this tendency. In other words, he is a philosopher who experiences thoughts and who thinks through experience; and the task of experiencing thought and of thinking through experience is exactly what was done in former Buddhism and Chinese philosophy. He is at bottom an Easterner. In the preface to "Intuition and Reflection in Self-consciousness," he said, "I cannot be confined to epistemology. What I require is metaphysics"; and this is the road he always takes. To experience the act of thinking, from a certain point of view, is nothing but Hegel's dialectics; and accordingly his effort to combine empiricism with rationalism may in a way be said to be the result of Hegel's dialectics. But afterwards he was convinced of the superiority of Cohen's interpretation of the philosophy to Hegel because it was a valid revision of Hegel's teaching. Since

then he has been able to absorb much from the Marburg School in the matter of Logic, especially with his conception of the categories in the natural sciences.

Contemporary philosophy always separates "ought" from "is." If we remain in the region of pure epistemology, this dualism will not need to be superseded. Indeed, it is the standpoint of strict epistemology to keep these for ever separate. But essentially "is" can be "is" only by "ought," and "ought" is "ought" by presupposing "is"; hence to combine these two elements in thought must be considered a necessary demand of our minds. But of course this thinking as such is nothing but metaphysics; and this demand is a metaphysical demand. But such metaphysics for one who has passed through Logic should be constructed not from the dogmatic but from the critical view in epistemology. Nishida was, for a long while, seeking such a standpoint for combining these two elements, and ultimately attained it in "self-consciousness." He must be said to have been fully preparing for the foundation of this ultimate thinking in his studies of Fichte and Hegel; and when he read the "Supplementary Essay" in *Royce's* "The World and the Individual," he definitely arrived at this standpoint, and made a start for thinking all realities in the form of his so-called self-conscious system, and, by its means, combining the "is" with the "ought." Now,

what is Nishida's so-called " self-consciousness " ? His " self-consciousness " is, of course, in his own words, " by no means the so-called self-consciousness of the psychologists, but consciousness of the transcendental Ego." " It is similar to Fichte's so-called *Thathandlung*." " Intuition is the consciousness wherein subject and object are not yet separated, the knowing and the known are one, *actuality as it is*, *i.e.* duration is unbroken. Reflection is a consciousness which sees intuition reflected by looking back from the outside upon this duration." That which makes clear the inner relation of these two, is, according to him, our self-consciousness. " In self-consciousness, self receives its own act as an object and reflects on it ; and thus to reflect is immediately an act of self-development ; and so on *ad infinitum*." That self reflects on self is according to him that self creates a copy in self. By it, self, adding something to self, gets a knowledge of self, and also executes an act of self-development. Again, knowing is possible by consciousness of valuation ; and in self-consciousness, in which thinking thinks of thinking, knowing is an acknowledgement of consciousness of valuation by consciousness of valuation itself. Thus Nishida thoroughly followed his system of self-consciousness which infinitely develops when consciousness of valuation reflects on self itself in self-consciousness, and he undertook also to make clear the mutual relations of the several systems of self-consciousness.

His work, "Intuition and Reflection in Self-consciousness" (1917), was indeed a detailed record of this thinking, as he said himself; "a record of the desperate battles of my thinking." But the fundamental idea of this thinking was already expressed in his former works, "A Study of Goodness" (1911), and "Thinking and Pure Experience" (1915); so that the latter work was plainly a certain refinement of the former. He said himself also that he already held this idea when he wrote an essay, entitled "Logical Understanding and Mathematical Understanding" (1912), which was afterwards included in "Thinking and Pure Experience." In this essay he wrote: "Our every act of thinking is a process of the *actively general* developing itself: and the advancement of this development becomes our understanding." But in an earlier work than this essay, "A Study of Goodness," the ground-construction of his system of philosophy of to-day was for all practical purposes already set forth. In this work, dealing with the relation between thinking and pure experience, he mentions that "true pure experience is not merely passive, but, on the contrary, active; and comprises a general side, *i.e.* includes *thinking*"; and that thus the two are "essentially the same fact viewed from different sides"; hence, "pure experience may be said to be thinking in its immediacy"; and further that "as our pure experience is a systematic development the unifying power that is

acting as its 'ground' must be the immediate generalisation of concepts": and thus he stated an outline of his thought concerning so-called self-conscious systems. It was natural that this kind of thought became voluntarism. In fact he states in this book that the summit of the unification of consciousness on the inner side is *will*. Also in the same work he states that thought as such is not unrelated to feeling and will; but feeling and will, in comparison with knowledge, are our object itself, so that they lie rather close to the ultimateness of the development. Afterwards this thought was more fully developed in a plan to arrange various values metaphysically in several stages.

Thus according to Nishida only in self-consciousness both intuition and reflection, the "is" and the "ought" constitute a oneness; and all this is an active, creative unification. In this cognition the true subject of cognition must be thought of as an act of unification that constructs a certain object. The psychologically introspected Ego is nothing in the eye of the subject of cognition but an object that in fact belongs to the sphere of the object of cognition, *i.e.* a phenomenon that stands in company with the outward objects in a causal relation. Cognition is a unification of experiences from a certain standpoint, *i.e.* from a certain *apriori*; and this *apriori* is not in a relation utterly indifferent to the objects that have been constructed by means of such an *apriori*. A circle and a polygon are

essentially different concepts, *i.e.* are concepts that are constructed from different standpoints, or from different *apriori*. Though we shorten each side of a polygon, a polygon is always a polygon and not a circle. Nevertheless a polygon can coincide with a circle only at its limit. Then what is the limit by which such a transition from one standpoint or *apriori* to the other is made possible? At the bottom of the thought of limit must lie an intuition of a certain new standpoint. Behind a certain concrete thinking (for example, thinking of a polygon) lies immediately a certain concrete pure experience, and this again demands a more concrete standpoint; thus our thinking goes on *ad infinitum*. The new standpoint which underlies the idea of limit "cannot remain unaffected by the former standpoint, but must be such as to comprise the former within itself. Where a certain standpoint has reached its limit, a new standpoint in the higher order is demanded; and then the former is comprised within the latter: it is this fact which constitutes the idea of a so-called limit." In the limit must be sought Lipps' *Einschnappen* or Bergson's *élan*. Then the higher standpoint, *i.e.* the higher *apriori*, in being a limit for a lower standpoint, *i.e.* for a lower *apriori* than itself, can be combined with the latter. *Apriori* is an inner power which creates its own world, as Ego creates its own world by reflection upon itself. In case an experience is unified from a certain *apriori*,

this *apriori* is the subject of cognition, which in truth cannot be reflected, *i.e.* which cannot be treated as an object. But in case this *apriori* is confronted by a still higher *apriori*, as the lower or the more abstract, it must now be thought of as the object, while the higher or the more concrete as the new subject. Thus the subject must be said to be a centre of the construction of a "world"; and accordingly, from the several standpoints, several "worlds" are constructed. On that account, the physical world, *i.e.* the world of nature, which is usually regarded by us as the only world, is merely one of the "worlds" that are formed by this process; so that it cannot be the only world.

Then what is the "world" where all these standpoints are entirely superseded, the "world" where no standpoint has yet been taken, the world of immediate experience that is truly given—Kant's so-called *Ding an sich*? It is, according to Nishida, a mystic world which completely transcends our speech and thought; and accordingly, it may be thought of, from the standpoint of philosophy, as a world of absolute free will. Our wills are independent and free not only individually but also by inclusion within the standpoint of absolute free will. Then by what process are several worlds of objects produced from this world of absolute free will? To be free comprises negation in affirmation and also affirmation in negation. The

standpoint of negation of absolute free will is thinking. Where thinking is independently thought as an act of negation of the absolute free will, thinking itself can have a world of objects. The mathematical world is a world of objects of pure thought; and the unification of all experiences from the standpoint of thought is the only true world of reality. The view of this world of reality ranges in gradation from the view of history to that of physics. But thinking is merely an act of absolute free will. Therefore if we stand on the level of an absolute free will which negates the negation, and believe that we can be independent and free in any standpoint (*i.e.* on the standpoint of absolute free will), that is, an *apriori* of the *apriori*s, or an act of acts, we can again reflect on thinking itself, thus making it an object. This absolute will can transcend the so-called world of reality, and can have several other worlds besides. The world of the objects directly presented to the standpoint of absolute free will is the world of free will where every act of thought is an independent act; and in "this world," the things are all symbols. The world of nature also is, in "this world," merely a sort of symbol, and every phenomenon is a free personality. The direct object of this absolute will, *i.e.* the world in the first order, is the world of art and the world of religion. Although the historical world is a more concrete reality than that of the natural sciences, the worlds of art and of religion, in comparison with it, are a deeper, more

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direct reality still. Thus, we belong to, and go in and out of, these several worlds. The so-called object essentially means from the standpoint of the abstract the concrete whole that lies behind it. For example, mathematics becomes the object of logic. Then the standpoint of absolute free will is the most concrete standpoint on which all other standpoints besides it are standing, and accordingly is the object of all the standpoints. To fulfil the object of life means to turn from the abstract standpoint to its concrete root. The true life cannot be thought of without the consciousness of culture (*i.e. die Kultur*, in German). "Will to live" should be "will to culture."

Nishida's "Intuition and Reflection in self-consciousness" contained the above-stated arguments, and in especial detail the arguments concerning the *apriori* of the world of thought. This work of Nishida, therefore, may be called his criticism of pure logic or his theory of categories. Nishida wrote afterwards two books: "The Problems of Consciousness" (1920) and "Art and Morality" (1923), but in these books, Nishida still endeavoured to deepen his introspection into absolute free will and to seek for the reciprocal relations among the fundamental standpoints of thought, art, morality, and religion. But no alteration was made in the former fundamental standpoint of his philosophy: it was merely developed more thoroughly. According to him, will is the concrete

ground of consciousness, and consciousness is only possible on the ground of will. Will is the point of limitation for consciousness. In will the subject and the object agree in oneness, and also consciousness touches the *Ding an sich* which is true reality. The act of unification comprises within itself a unification drawn from a pure *apriori* as well as from an *apriori* of the *aprioris*, *i.e.* it comprises a unification of unifications. This unification of unifications is the Ego; and the system of the unification of unifications is the system of the phenomena of consciousness. Whatever can in any sense be received as an object becomes thought; but the surplus that cannot be in any sense defined is feeling; "that is, feeling is the state of Ego, the attitude of Ego, as the *apriori* of all the *aprioris*, or the act of the unification of all the acts." As feeling is the *apriori* of the *aprioris*, it is a mental phenomenon that differs from sensation and from all that is akin to sensation. Then what is the difference between feeling and will? Feeling is the subjective attitude of the Ego, a consciousness of the acts, or a consciousness of the *apriori* itself. Hence feeling disappears in case it becomes the object of attention; but it may be greatly deepened in case its object is deeply attended to. Consciousness terminates in will. We cannot transcend that will which is itself the act of the acts. In will we touch the *Ding an sich*. The absolute infinite will which lies at the

root of consciousness cannot be reflected upon by us, and accordingly it is a free will which may be thought of as without content; and the content of consciousness on the standpoint of will is feeling. The content of personality is expressed by the words of feeling. What is called the content of art comes in sight in case a partial act has got out of the domain of the act of thought, and then wills to express the unification of the whole personality. But the standpoint of absolute will, in case each part directly comprises the whole in it, is the standpoint of religion; and on the standpoint of religion, "ought" and "is" truly agree in oneness with each other, and accordingly each reality becomes pure art. "The standpoint of religion is the standpoint of art within the centre of personality, *i.e.* within absolute will." Then what is the difference between such a world of consciousness and that of nature? On the standpoint of the unification of the Ego which is an act of all the acts, the act itself can become the object and be reflected upon. Hence in standing on this standpoint of the unification of the Ego we have, on the one hand, the world of objective facts which consists of the combination of the contents of all the acts, and, on the other, the world of the subjective acts which consists of the combination of the contents of all the subjective acts themselves, *i.e.* we have the so-called world of consciousness.

Then what does Nishida think of art and morality?

My description comprises many repetitions indeed, but the same is true of Nishida's original writings. However in this it was rightly comparable with the works of Cézanne or Renoir who always painted the same landscape or models repeatedly. Through those repetitions his thought was much systematized and his expression clarified. At first he said about cultural phenomena as follows: "God who is One and the All can see Himself in His creation." "Our cultural phenomena are the products of creation as such, *i.e.* a world of objects for the creative will" of man. The cultural phenomena cannot be reduced to the mere laws of nature nor to the mere laws of consciousness. They are only understood from a concrete standpoint which comprises both in it. The cultural phenomena therefore are not an addition of the physical phenomena to the mental phenomena, but stand on an *apriori* utterly different from them in kind, *i.e.* on the *apriori* of a unification of both. "Culture does not mean to receive nature as a means for self. It means to regard nature in self. Nay, culture means to find self at the deepest root of nature. To this object belong the phenomena of philosophy, art, morality, and religion." Then he repeats the same ideas as follows:

"The world of true concrete reality is nothing but the infinite process in which absolute will as such develops itself. Our consciousness of self-consciousness which is innerly provable in ourselves

is nothing but a form of absolute will as such. Our reason is the negative side of such absolute will. Reason is not an act co-ordinate with the visual and acoustic sensations and the like, but is an act of many acts; and accordingly reason lies at the centre of personality. As worlds of the objects for such acts there are the worlds of mathematics and logic. In case absolute will, in affirmation of itself, sees the standpoint of all its acts, as above mentioned, there are, in the first place, the world of natural phenomena as its own world of objects; in the second place, in reflection of the acts themselves the world of the conscious phenomena; and in the third place, the world of the cultural phenomena in which the subject and the object agree in oneness as the world of objects of will itself; and this happens all at once."

Feeling is, notwithstanding the general view of psychologists, not a side of the mental phenomena, but rather a fundamental condition of the existence of consciousness. A direct combination of various acts with one other, from the standpoint of absolute will, is our consciousness of feeling; and the world of objects from the same standpoint is our world of objects for art. The *apriori* of art is the *apriori* of pure consciousness. It cannot be thought that in feeling there exists a special feeling of art: the truth is that pure consciousness, pure feeling, is always artistic. Even joy and sorrow are endowed with their appropriate beauties. It is

the æsthetic feeling that is truly the real feeling. "Our self is an unification of infinite acts. At the foundation of our self, there lies an unattainable depth." "No light of reason can illuminate the ground of reality in its entirety. Self is not only an understanding but also a grieving self and a rejoicing self. At the ground of self there is infinite sorrow and infinite joy." Then what is the relation between art and morality? On the level of the moral act personal contents become conscious. The content of art is capable of being thought of as "*mē on*" as opposed to "*on*." At the base of artistic imagination there exists ever a dark something. That which is latent on the level of art becomes expressive on the level of moral will, and also self becomes truly personal, whilst it acknowledges as well a distinctive personality as the ground of that which is opposed to the Ego. Only in moral will can we get to the very ground of all reality. Therefore art contains a presupposition of moral development. The ground of all things is only one life, one free will. Artistic content, in case it is reflected upon, is deprived of its super-conceptual qualities, yet it receives the world of objects of reflective thought as the field of its expression. The world of objects to knowledge consists in the content of the moral will. Life is static in art, whilst it is dynamic in morality. Values seem, in the case of art, as if they were completed; but they are, in the latter case of morality, in the

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process or movement of their completion. In conclusion, when we view the infinite depth of self from the level of absolute free will we first survey the infinite objective objects in the direction of its development; next, we see the infinite mental acts by means of the reflections directed upon self; and last, we have the worlds of art, of philosophy, and of religion, which are infinitely deep and infinitely free in the direction of the concrete self itself which is at the same time the combining point of all contrary directions.

Thus in Nishida's philosophy all values are graded severally in classes in the same way that all *aprioris* are combined with one other in class form. For since it is thinkable that one value is situated in a higher order than the other so as to subordinate it there must be a condition such as that the two stand in teleological unification, and the higher, as a concrete whole, comprises the other within itself. Moral good, synthesizing the worlds of other values, is the supreme value, and is situated above all other values. The unification of morality at its ultimate point must be religion.

In the end, Nishida completed his construction of the three branches of philosophy: logic, ethics, and æsthetics. Truly such a great construction was never seen in the sphere of Japanese philosophy. But his efforts have not extended to a special treatment of social and religious philosophies. But as regards religious philosophy, it seems to be unneces-

sary to treat it separately, because his philosophy is always metaphysical and religious. Society, according to him, is a combination of person with person, and stands on the moral *apriori*. The full content of personality can be thought of as realized only in society. In the moral world, the more highly every man may become a free, independent reality the more intimately will he be combined with every other. This thought of Nishida's concerning the essential meaning of society may in short be regarded as an extention of his thought concerning individual consciousness. If we think of our respective moments of consciousness each as an act of a free person, we shall be able to recognize at the bottom of the individual consciousness a sort of society. In other words, between act and act within ourselves there still exists a relationship of *Me* with *You*. This free inner combination of independent acts with each other is the very essence of self-consciousness. "Thus, as the individual can be called a society, so society can be called an individual." In Nishida's philosophy socialism or social reconstruction did not come to be a problem for his speculation. In one place in his writing he said: "Speaking of true moral acts, there is no nobler thing than the reform of personality itself. The socialist who cries in the street, though he may supply men with food and clothing, will be unable thereby to reconstruct the human mind from within." This is the only mention throughout his works of the

term " socialist " ; and the above expression seems to me to be unjust. The socialist movement contains many idealistic meanings within itself, and cannot be adjudged as merely materialistic, his dictum to the contrary notwithstanding. But to consider the mass of men was not originally his task, and also we should not expect it of him. What he teaches us lies in quite other domains of life. Nishida's philosophy is the very highest perfection of reflection that Japan can boast before the world.

Hajime Tanabe, as a successor to Nishida, is most noticeable as a coming philosopher. In strong contrast to Sōda, who from the first reflected upon the methodology of the cultural sciences, Tanabe started from the methodology of the natural sciences, in the endeavour to construct his system of philosophy. Though he has not set forth his own system up to the present, we can probably see his future orientation from the books and treatises already issued. In his main work, " An Outline of Science " (1918), he writes as follows regarding his relation to Nishida : " As to the philosophical thoughts which I have stated in this book I owe much to the influence of my teacher, Nishida. Even as to Western philosophical ideas, my ultimate understanding of them was largely through his teaching." Concerning his own philosophical standpoint, Tanabe also states : " In this book I want epistemologically to adhere to such transcendental constructionism

as has descended from Kant, and to give it a realistic foundation which stands on intuition; then, I arrive at a sort of idealistic metaphysics." But this ultimate standpoint must be immediately that of Nishida, as stated above. What Tanabe states as the conclusion of his book is really an abridgement of Nishida's thought in "Intuition and Reflection in Self-consciousness." But in his former book, "Recent Natural Sciences" (1915), Tanabe states: "I want to state here, in a word, that, although my arguments in this book have been imperfect, I have endeavoured, for my part, to reconstruct and develop by means of phenomenology Kant's transcendentalism, which I think to be the only just standpoint for the philosophy of knowledge—to give a foundation of intuition to reasoning, and to find a realistic foundation for the idealism of values."[1] And again: "The ground on which the ideal products of general culture stand must be taught through the branches of that philosophy which undertakes to construct as a basis the phenomenology that seeks the truth of intuition." He seems then to endeavour to interpret the truth concerning the system of Nishida's so-called "self-consciousness" more phenomenologically. In general he endeavours to prevent Neo-Kantian idealism from terminating in mere logism, but to find its ground by the aid of Husserl's phenomenology, or, speaking more broadly, by the aid of transcendental psychology to find the "ground,"

and thereon to construct a kind of metaphysics with a new meaning. This seems to be the ultimate aim of the young philosophers who belong to the so-called Kyōto School, the founder of which was Nishida. Tanabe is truly an excellent representative of these young thinkers.

With regard to values, Tanabe like Nishida contemplates a metaphysical gradation of these. According to him, in order truly to understand the various meanings of culture we must comprehend the inner reciprocal relations of valid values *in a unity*. Among values, there are those that are related to the *essence of the realization* of valid values. These values, being in general the presuppositions or authority for cultural values as such and therefore not determined historically, must be eternal and unchangeable. To these belong moral value and the religious value. The former is not one special value taking rank alongside of the others, but a value of a *higher order* which, when all values are realized in a concrete person, takes the form of an individual content in accordance with the individuality of that person. At the same time, apart from the other values, the content of the moral value becomes void. Next, religion is the completion of morality and also the ground that gives it security. Morality consists in the attitude of a person to the realization of universally valid values, while the religious value, *i.e.* the sacred, is a value of a higher order which is acquired by every universally valid

value, so that the sacred itself is the content of moral duties; and religion, therefore, forms, in the end, the content of morality. Lastly, between morality and religion there lies an intermediate domain of beauty of character, in the sense of Plotinus' so-called "intelligible beauty." This is a domain where the essential agreement of moral law with will has been only partially experienced. Thus values of the true, the beautiful, and the sacred can form a class of the same rank.

Concerning social philosophy Tanabe has written but little. He defines cultural society as a community of every act which receives each duty of the moral personality as its content; but he sees, on the other hand, the ideal of the *racial State* which does not coincide in many respects with a cultural society which embraces individuals of all nations.

Tanabe's "Studies in Mathematical Philosophy" (1925) is a finished work of great value. His essential thought about mathematical philosophy also owes much to Nishida; because the latter had already in his works expressed his thoughts about the subject somewhat in detail. According to Tanabe "the rise of natural number is made possible by thinking of the series of logical objects presented to it by means of the two logical principles of agreement and contradiction returning on itself, and, by reflection, rendering concrete the intuitive unity which lies behind it. Therefore, in order to advance from logic to mathematics an intuitive

'something' must be added to logic. But such 'something' never comes from the outside of logic, but is an intuitive unity which lies from the beginning as the basis of logic. From the standpoint of logic alone it remains a latent presupposition; but when it is objectified to be a determination of objects there arises mathematics. Therefore, mathematics must be considered a product in which logic, while remaining abstract, becomes more and more concrete. Consequently thinking advances from logic to mathematics. The leap that occurs here is really a return of logical thought to its ground." Extending this original thought Tanabe followed the development of numbers in several classes. This development of numbers never means addition of something new but rather realization of what was present from the beginning. The most concrete is at the same time the most universal. The class-form development of numbers is essentially a process of thought growing more concrete in the turn upon itself. On the one hand, according to him, numbers are not obtained from so-called experience, but are transcendentally constructed by thought, and on the other, they are again not the development of logic alone, but are the product whenever thought makes the leap by the force of intuition—albeit this does not come from outside of thought but was at the ground of thought from the very beginning.

CHAPTER V

NEO-KANTIANISM AND NEO-HEGELIANISM (*b*)

The Philosophy of *Shinichirō Nishi* has certain points in common with Kihira's. First, there is the display of Oriental characteristics in his thought, and the earnest desire to succeed to the Oriental tradition; secondly, there is the construction of a metaphysics by developing Hegel's philosophy; and lastly, there is the emphasis upon the meaning of the State. But, regarding the form of the construction of his philosophy, Nishi rather resembles Nishida than Kihira. In fact the common characteristics of Nishi and Nishida concern the main points of their teaching. What was most important for Nishida was the system of self-consciousness whereby to combine the "is" with the "ought"; Nishi also makes this the centre of his thought. Nishi's main work is "The Fundamental Problems of Ethics" (1923), in which his main thesis was somewhat systematically ordered with regard to ethics. Besides this he wrote "Education and Morality" (1923) in which we may see his originality more distinctly.

In short, Nishi's philosophy is a scheme which, starting from so-called self-consciousness, proceeds

to ground morality in the autonomy of self-consciousness, and finally to arrange cultural values metaphysically and to make the moral value supreme. As a consequence of this metaphysical construction he came to attach great importance to history and especially to emphasize the display of individuality in the Racial State.

According to Nishi reality itself is consciousness, and so far as it is consciousness, it is reality. Therefore in proportion as consciousness realizes the *quality* or *real nature* of its consciousness, Reality, which is in itself perfect, expresses itself in various grades and forms. Further, consciousness is self-consciousness. So that he argued concerning self-consciousness as follows:

" If this ' self ' itself which is conscious of ' self ' should be anything that is separated from the *act* of being conscious, to be conscious would be impossible. Hence this ' self ' itself must be ' consciousness ' itself; *i.e.* that ' self ' *is* must mean that ' self ' is *conscious*. Thus, the ' is ' is one and the same with ' conscious,' is self-consciousness. In this case, ' consciousness ' is not what is later acquired but is originally ' self ' itself. It was formerly called ' fundamental knowledge '; but now I can also name it *pure consciousness*."

Nishi's adoption of this meaning of self-consciousness agrees with that of Nishida. Then what sort of relation exists between self-consciousness and moral consciousness? According to Nishi con-

sciousness arises by the confronting of subject and object with each other in an *original oneness*, in which subject and object coincide with each other. But, on the other hand, so far as subject and object oppose each other, the subject that knows must have something that distinguishes it from the object that is known. *This something is self-consciousness.* In impulse and sensation this self-consciousness is not clear or perfect; and the opposition between subject and object is at the stage when they are not yet separated from each other; because the opposition is not clearly known even though surely present. In other words, at this stage, the world of objects does not yet appear independently. In getting to the level of ordinary consciousness the object just forms an independent world of objects, which becomes the world of experiences, and subject becomes the subject of cognition. At this moment impulse, clearly knowing its object, becomes desire. But on the level of this stage of experiences the world of objects, being as yet independent from the subject, is the other existence which is over against subject, and is *given* to it; and, too, subject is subject only as towards this object; so that subject seems rather a *dependent* upon this object which has been regarded as *independent.* That is, desire seeks its object from the outside, and wants satisfaction from it. These two stages are named together the natural world, and are separated from the free world, *i.e.* the spiritual world, as will be shown later on.

The more consciousness realizes its quality of being self-consciousness so much the more consciousness knows that the world of objects which was formerly acknowledged as given to subject is after all nothing but one's conscious self; that is, the cognition of the world of objects becomes self-consciousness of subject. Then subject is no more subject merely by virtue of being opposed to object, but is subject and object in one, or " see " and " is " united. This is true self-consciousness and a return to an original pure consciousness. Subject is then for itself alone and is free because it does not acknowledge and is not dependent on something besides itself. This is the true world of freedom, that is, the world of morality, art, and religion. Pure consciousness is the basis; and all else is included in this self-consciousness. Accordingly the world of nature lies within the domain of the world of freedom. Then as regards the relation between morality and nature, the latter is an appearance of the former; and in the same way all lives are appearances of morality in the various stages of their development.

Morality thus belongs to the world of freedom; and this freedom which is realized in morality is realized as an acknowledgment of humanity, for all mankind are the possessors of what we ourselves possess. This so-called acknowledgment of humanity means the acknowledgment of that law or pathway of life to which all men should equally

submit, *i.e.* to submit to the relations between men and the realization of these. Thus to unify the world of objects with a *personal* relation is the standpoint of morality. From this point of view desire wishes not its satisfaction from others and from things but is the will to realize itself. Moral self-consciousness is consciousness of law, or consciousness of personal bodies which must be unified in accordance with norms ; and this is the true nature of social self-consciousness.

The reality of nature is originally based on the entire self-determination of the absolute. The absolute originally determines the content of every nature ; and the content of every nature is infinitely connected with every other. The pure mode of the self-determination of the absolute is the world of pure consciousness (the world of the *Idea*). If we name the unifying principle of the world of absolute consciousness, after Plato's term, *idea* of the good, the " good " is the root of all epistemological and moral truths. Here is acknowledged the meaning of the primacy of the practical reason. This means that the truth is, on the one hand, dynamical and creative, but on the other, eternal and unchangeable. The moral realization, though it is a free self-determination, is not an absolute self-determination on its primary levels, still it is included in the domain of the entire self-determination of the absolute, but as yet in its undeveloped form standing on the level of finite reason. This is so because the moral

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realization can never move even a step except by means of nature, while the absolute self-determination does not merely act formatively upon material but creates form and material together. As thus morality receives nature as its material it is the deepest and most concrete root of the nature of man, of the characters of peoples and races, and of the features of mountains and rivers in the physical world. It is realized in the institutions of States, and, further, it becomes the centre of the advancement of the world's history.

We have already noticed that consciousness of moral law is after all that of personal relations. Although those personal relations have ultimately to develop to infinite personal inter-relations, still, in order to do so, they have to pass through the formation of a special sort of concrete system capable of unifying these various personal relations. This concrete and special unifying spirit is nothing but the *folk spirit*. Just as other bodies are constructed from the abstract thoughts of a subject that has become free from the truth of the coincidence of subject and object, or of the unity of body and mind, and accordingly, belong to the so-to-speak artificial class, so the concrete moral life, or living morality, can only be expressed in the form of those virtues which possess a special fitness for the construction of the State. It is only by means of these national virtues that personal relations develop higher and higher to form the world's history. Nishi, going

still further, argued that in the world of pure consciousness, art and religion agree with morality in oneness, and that they all, in the world of pure consciousness, harmonize and never clash with each other.

Nishi's fundamental thought, which has been stated above, though it is deeply thought out, still cannot be said to be original or peculiar to him. But in many points of his ethics and criticism of contemporary civilization it is pleasing to find an original thought which has been cultivated by the age-long tradition of Eastern morality. For example, he described a certain formal feeling and an active feeling as the basis of moral acts. So-called nature is, in its *ground*, nothing but morality. Nature, not being originally rational, cannot be rationalized. Then between nature and reason there must lie a 'something'—say a rational feeling—by means of which a gate of possibility for the realization of morality shall be opened. Such a feeling is, on the one hand, innate, *i.e.* natural, but possesses, on the other, a supernatural quality, and is peculiar to men as rational beings. Of such feeling, he presented first the so-called 'four points' after Mencius, under the name of the formal feelings, corresponding to Kant's point of a devotion to law; and, secondly, *iki-hari* or spirit, with the name of "the active feeling," as corresponding to the virtues of the *Samurai* (the Knights) and of Plato's spiritual element. These ideas are very interesting

to us because the one came from Chinese thought and the other from " *Bushidō* " or the pathway for *Samurai* which was greatly respected by the knights of Japan in olden times. He also argued that by the use of force we set ourselves against others, while by morality we complete ourselves along with others, thus condemning the evil of the imperialism and the industrialism of the West. According to him the truly " positive " is only constructed upon a " negative." On the basis of " undone " we can " do." Hence he recommended Lao Tze's doctrine of " weakness " as valuable in his criticism of contemporary civilization. Nishi states that philosophy is a road of self-denial, so that philosophical thinking is only possible by our being emancipated from desire, and that our being unworldly should be the root of all our worldly relations. On that account his philosophy had many unworldly characteristics and showed many resemblances to Lao Tze. Eastern philosophy, always seeking the ever-creative root of life in the Universe, teaches us that the end or goal of human life is to be in agreement with the Universe, and recommends to us, as the means of attaining this end, the negative, unworldly virtues in general. Nishi seems to have followed this tradition. Even Nishi's so-called active feeling was found on a negative road, so that it cannot be said to be truly active. The vital and creative life of the Universe, as presented by Eastern traditional thought, must be

said to correspond with Nishida's so-called absolute free will, and to Nishi's so-called absolute self-determination, *i.e.* the world of pure consciousness.

Masayoshi Kihira originally started from Fichte and Hegel. Hence, he styled himself a successor of Fichte, and stated that it was also the object of his philosophy to adapt Hegel's philosophy to the present day. His thought much resembles Nishi's, but not Nishida's. Nishida's and Nishi's thoughts show much of an unworldly character and seem not to wish to discuss social reality, but Kihira's thought is notably social and realistic, giving treatment in his work to "principles of social reconstruction." Kyōto is the old Capital where mountains and rivers are remarkable for their beauty, so that everything there has a reminiscent and artistic character, while Tōkyō is the new political Capital, where everything is continually being created, so that those problems that concern social reconstruction are ever in motion there. So it is natural that, in general, the Kyōtō School adopts a super-actualistic character, while the Tōkyō School an actualistic one. Although Nishi does not belong to the Kyōtō School, he has a very similar environment. Kihira in his thought showed the Eastern characteristics more remarkably than Nishi. For me exactly to express his thought in a foreign language is very difficult. Nay, even he himself declared it impossible.

Kihira's main work on philosophy is "The Philosophy of Gyō" (1923). But here "*Gyō*" cannot be translated into English. Roughly it corresponds to Fichte's "*Thathandlung*," or Nishida's and Nishi's self-consciousness. He explained its meaning by an illustration as follows: "Here is an artist who is creating a piece of work. He may be compelled by circumstances to earn his living by painting though he is an artist. But in so far as he is a good artist he will have, when once he has faced his canvas, a motive working towards its completion without a thought of the pay. Line after line, the one determining the other, it will go on. Though, of course, in this process, the causality cannot be ignored, there goes an act of self-determining itself. This act I name pure *Gyō*." Therefore his philosophy is utterly metaphysics, and his so-called logism ultimately ends, on the one hand, subjectively in an individual judgment, and, on the other, objectively with a cognition of history. History is a great work of art which has been made by the greater subject, *i.e.* by the folk spirit. According to him, "The Philosophy of *Gyō*" is a new introduction into philosophy, but is at the same time a book of ethics, because it explains the meaning of man's action, and, further it also serves as an introduction to national virtue because the true object of ethics is national virtue. He further distinguished his *Gyō* from the *Gō* which means the *Karma* of Buddhism.

Gō is fatalistic, by which men will wander about the world of life and death, but *Gyō* is religious and has from the beginning a certain purity. In case these two are subsumed (better in German " *aufgehoben* "), this means, according to him, the completion of the pure doctrine of salvation of Saint Shinran.

If we say that both Nishida's and Nishi's philosophies are voluntarism, I must go a step further and denote Kihira's a philosophy of action. Therefore his philosophy does not start with " What ? " or " Why ? " but directly with " How ? " and it is the methodology of this " How ? " that determines " What ? " and " Why ? " We find ourselves as activists who have agreed to be in oneness with the self-productive, supreme God. In other words, we of to-day, who have started from the consciousness of our own power, are not inactive beings who merely receive what is given us in the past, but are men of the " great *Gyō* " who will continuously reconstruct the world of nature and of society by our own power ; and whoever thinks of the limits or the close of his work cannot in reality be called a man. Our great *Gyō*, based on the consciousness of our own power, is what has tied together floating things and ideas among the flux of phenomena by means of durable thoughts which are our own. In other words, it is something like this which has constructed such experiences, and it is this which Hegel meant by the " concept." In the construction of anything, construction alone can

construct. As construction is in itself an act of construction as well as a product of the constructive act, it means a process all in oneness. In true construction the self is not moved only mechanically by externals but it views outward things as completely assimilated by itself. That is, it makes them its own media, and realizes its own immanent principles, *i.e.* the whole. Then, the traces of self, in the strife for its free realization, *i.e.* the traces of history, are divided into three classes according to the attitude of the "How?" as follows: first the artistic, secondly the religious, and thirdly the logical.

In the first place, the artistic method is a struggle to connect the whole to the individual without medium, *i.e.* directly. Art is shaped by the material we use; for it cannot be parted from material, *i.e.* into a world of intuitive ideas. Accordingly in it subject must submit to outward control more completely than in science, which works with concepts as its material, or in philosophy which works with ideas. Therefore, art does not realize such pure freedom; and self-satisfaction by art inevitably has certain restrictions. Further, because art requires, for its creation, genius, and, for its appreciation, a certain amount of cultivated taste, it is appropriate to aristocratic rather than to democratic characters. Art is the first step of the free activity of spirit, and although its method is easy without a medium, yet for this very reason its connection

cannot be solid and eternal; and, furthermore, some elements are from the beginning excluded from its construction, so that, though it can give an escape or "salvation" to certain selves, yet it cannot save others. The method then in the latter case will have to be shifted from the artistic to the religious if escape is to become possible.

In the second place, the religious method is that which connects the elements by means of belief. When we have become conscious that the artistic method of harmonizing is perishable, and when, by the medium of artistic experiences, we have presented the whole in its perfection to the other side, and have reflected on the worthlessness and weakness of our power towards that presentation, we shall probably strive for an eternal union of the impotent Ego with the whole by any medium which is at hand. Now the medium itself becomes the desideratum. But since the situation has arisen from the presentation of the impotence of the Ego, we cannot obtain the medium by means of anything in ourselves but have to wait for it to be given from the external, *i.e.* from the whole. Hence the medium as such is still unable to discharge its function. Moreover, this method, having still some artistic elements, cannot construct all things from the standpoint of equality. When by belief we have recovered our own power, that power must be turned in the other direction; and as a result of that turn it will at once cease to be the domain of religion, and

become that of logic. This act ceases, from the standpoint of the mediator, to be that of the medium given from without, but it is being seized by itself, and is consequently at the same time subjective. The medium that may discharge those duties is nothing but the concept. Here begins the logical method.

In the third place, the logical method means that the subject who has already acquired power in himself by means of the religious method connects himself with himself as it were by means of the medium of himself; and thus there will be presented to him the formal goal of free realization. It must be named logical because of the three forms of thinking, that is the concept, the judgment, and the inference. The third is a free form of thinking, and the medium, in this case, stands as the active agent and exercises an absolute action. Of the concept as medium are distinguished two kinds, according to whether the concept is abstract or concrete. First, by means of the abstract medium, natural sciences are constructed; by means of this medium man can conquer and reconstruct the natural world, and bring about a completion of the *being* side of self. Secondly, concept may be thought as the system itself which goes on continuously synthesizing various elements. This is the concrete concept. When this concept becomes the medium the method is the great *Gyō* in its true meaning; and by this system man can reveal all mysteries. The concrete concept as such can

be termed the ideal from the standpoint of the act. In truth, the ideal is not a vague desire presented so as to be realized in some distant future, popular impression notwithstanding. It is a system of experiences; it is the *all in oneness*. In other words, it is, at the same time, both "is" and "ought," "ought" and "is," *i.e.* what is continuously realized—*the Gyō as it is*. Here abstract self has been turned into what is concrete, and the concretest self has returned to what is direct, *i.e.* artistic. "Since there is a beginning, there is also an end; but that which makes the beginning what it is, is the end itself." "A life which has no principle is empty, and a knowledge which has no ground in actual life is a 'desk theory.' A person who systematizes experience as it is, and gives it a turn, and ultimately is a creator of values, is, in truth, a *Bodhisattva*." Thus that which enters into the freest act of thinking at the ultimate stage of the dialectics which one has inherited from Hegel is in reality subjectively an individual judgment, and objectively a cognition of history. Truly each act can be accomplished by means of the individuality of the person himself, and conversely individuality can be what it is in such moments only by means of the pure act which does what it ought to do. Individuality is the creator of infinite truth and of infinite values. A comprehension of individuality as it is, is a unity of "*is*" *and* "*ought*" *in oneness*. History is, on the one hand, a product of indi-

viduality, but, on the other, history is the *content* of individuality which also determines history. Necessity by means of *values* creates history just as *causal* necessity creates the natural sciences. Then history is a self that has been extended in time; and conversely I am now here as one who has unified some material transformed into history. The State is self extended in space. It is not a simple, abstract concept, but the system of practical experiences, *i.e.* the system of the work of the concrete concept itself. In other words the State is a concrete thing that makes " *aufheben* " in the meaning of Hegel's philosophy of all elements, and in turn is made by us, and also demands our absolute submission, *i.e.* our real " is " of the " ought." It is a medium necessary to our being *ourselves*. Art and philosophy depend for their elements upon the State; and the State develops in autonomy. The methodological end is attained when the State has been made the medium of the concrete concept. This is the fulfilment of " the philosophy of *Gyō*—" " I am a Japanese."

As mentioned above, the concretest method being the logical one, it was regarded by Kihira as social reconstruction; so that his philosophy had some connection with and justification for the economic life. But this part of his argument concerning economic life along with his thought concerning the State is rather conservative, and even comprised some misunderstanding of new social ideas.

But this misunderstanding cannot be attributed to him alone because it was common to almost all the philosophers in Japan. Kihira attacked the socialists in his advocacy of the right of ownership. According to him, only in case of our being essentially ourselves, and of our possessions being the result of the labour of our real, essential self can our right to what we possess be acknowledged by others. It was on this that he based the right of ownership. But I think that the validity of Kihira's ethics should be restricted to the domain of the right to the unabridged proceeds of labour. His thinking on the right of ownership seems always individualistic as well as indifferent to the fact that at the background of the man who claims this right lies always the capitalistic system. To-day's socialism does not stand on the right to the unabridged proceeds of labour which Kihira attacked. Rather it was clearly acknowledged already by Marx that the claim to the right of the unabridged proceeds of labour is based on an acknowledgment of the capitalist right. Kihira also said that in order to conquer nature, a concentration of capital being necessary, the capitalist can claim the right to his share of the profits, and consequently the socialist's ideal is nothing but an Utopian idea.

We have already discussed Nishida's, Tanabe's, Nishi's, and Kihira's philosophies. An idea common to them all was to construct a new metaphysics that might unite " is " with " ought," and to arrange

several categories on the process of the development of this self-subsisting and self-creating self-consciousness. Ultimately they all in the same way arrived at a historism. I think this common idea to be excellently constructed to combine Eastern philosophy with Western. But, on the other hand, academic philosophers in Japan have been unable to contribute much to the progress of social philosophy. The whole tendency of their philosophies was not actualistic and not social, but rather ideological and individualistic, though so-called personality in their personal philosophy means that of the transcendental Ego; and also much importance was attached by them to society as a unity of its individuals. Social problems pressing for solution are lying before us; but those thinkers do not seem to present any principles for their solution, and though such principles should ever be presented, it is probable that these academic thinkers cannot, with their cool sympathy for the people's newly risen desires and with their conservative ideas, arouse any passionate impression and any sincere reflection among the people. The people, on their part, also seem not to expect such a message from those academic philosophers concerning any principle for the solution of social problems. On that account the concrete principles of social reconstruction will flow from some other source. I hope, therefore, that the academic philosophies of Japan, in their future development, will become more active prin-

ciples for social reconstruction. Nor is this new direction at root antagonistic to their former direction.

It has been another source of dissatisfaction to the people of the present day that the conclusion reached by all these academic philosophies is always a philosophy of the State. Undoubtedly nationalism has been an important aim for Japan in the course of her development up to some time in the past, but this course cannot for ever be supreme in the future development of Japan ; and, furthermore, the idea of the State among the people must, hereafter, by the aid of new social sciences, be greatly revised. Kihira attacked the sociology of the present day when it concerned itself with the State on the ground of the unclearness of its principles, and again attacked several such sciences as ethnography, ethnology, and archæology on the ground of the crudeness of their advancement especially when they applied the causal laws of the natural sciences to the interpretation of the facts of history. But the necessity for the study of the State or history from the viewpoint of those social sciences cannot be denied for ever, no matter how primitive their development may be to-day, and moreover their present development does not remain in such a primitive condition as Kihira's thought. The fundamental reason for the misunderstanding of the original meanings of the State, among the academic philosophers hitherto must be attributed, on the contrary, to their inadequate knowledge of these new

social sciences. Therefore, what is most necessary for them is the acquisition of such knowledge. In that way they will undoubtedly be able to rid themselves of many prejudices and individualistic tendencies, and to recover an actualistic interest in themselves that can entertain the people's constantly increasing desires. Of course this does not mean that philosophies should become popular rather than strictly scientific; for the very fact that present-day philosophies have come to be strictly scientific and not merely popular is certainly a great advance in Japanese thought; and this philosophical tendency must by no means be checked: but those academic philosophies need to have the flexibility to comprehend in the most comprehensive manner the new desires successively produced by real society.

In the academic philosophies, almost without exception, the end of historism was the State. But we must inquire for ourselves the meaning of the State, whether it should be absolute or not. This is surely a great question. Among academic teachers it seems to be held that the realization of personality cannot be separated concretely from nature, nor, therefore, from the individuality of the Racial State. This means that those academic philosophers seem to combine the two specialities of a *race* and of *history*. Nevertheless, I, who, like them, take the historical view, cannot understand their reason for seeking in race alone the natural basis for speciality.

Modern sociology always distinguishes community from association. To be sure, the State of the past must have been a typical form of the community; and, in the case of Japan, which has been almost completely separated from the other countries, by its geographical situation as well as by the homogeneity of its race, the State has been particularly capable of keeping that community form. But the State itself is a form of the social body which makes its contents continuously vary; and the modern State especially has continuously been and still is varying its social function. We cannot, therefore, comprehend a conception of the State as being absolute for ever. The domain of the State no longer agrees with that of the Race, nor can the State be the only form of the community. It must be possible for the State in its future development even to turn to an association. Therefore I cannot support a philosophy of the absolute supremacy of the State over all the values of a Race. If the community, as Nishida said, can have the same meaning as a unity of individual consciousnesses, I must name this idea of totality which combines individuals with one other as an ideal of the community. The whole community must be likened to Nishida's absolute free will, Nishi's pure consciousness, or Kihira's great *Gyō*. Specialities of races as well as other kinds of specialities are all included in this community and no exception should be made. *Of the standpoints for unifying this*

community free will by negation corresponds, in my opinion, to the advance towards socialism, while a unity of the whole community, by making it free from the rule of the negating unity, in the same way, corresponds to the advance towards anarchism. The development of personality by means of the medium of the State is a sort of development of the whole personality, and, as Kihira said, is never absolute. The distinction between community and association is after all one of degree; for, of course, association even in its ideal state must develop into community, whilst, on the other hand, even a community must have something, in the logical meaning of its formation, which shares with association. Hence, although Nishi said that every group except the State belonged, abstractly considered, to the artificial class, the distinction of whether it is artificial or not must be likewise a matter of degree. The personal development of the whole community must be attained within each group as well as within each individual since both are included in the community. And each association also respectively is forced to develop into a community with its respective speciality. For that substance on which our ideal is realized, whatever it may be, always holds a certain speciality of its own; so that what is regarded as the substance to which a speciality belongs cannot be restricted to any one race alone. All the specialities we can find can be connected at some point with the ideal of the community. The whole community is a unity which comprises many

pluralistic communities within itself. This can be compared with the fact that, in individual consciousness, many desires, though each of them is unified in its ideal condition, are again unified in a oneness as a whole personality. Those plural associations which are growing, separately and together, into a community, cannot be compared with so-called monads which have no window. Although each of those associations forms for itself an independent unity, still the unities can be completely connected with each other through their one whole unity. Hence Kihira's saying that our philosophy must be expressed only by our mother tongue, and Nishi's similar saying that the terminology of morality should grow up as a nation's special product and never as the translated terminology of any foreign language, though both of them can be acknowledged as the truth in a sense, still cannot be admitted to mean, on the other hand, that philosophy and morality, resting as they do on substances with plural specialities, cannot be fully combined or communicate with each other. The whole community, in truth, is nothing but absolute free will comprising infinite specialities.

Present-day academic philosophers almost universally are unable rightly to realize the meaning of to-day's new social thoughts and ideals. Not one of the academic teachers has declared himself as a socialist, and they all have seemed indifferent to new social movements. When they took rare occasion to criticize them, they clearly opposed

them, like Kihira, or at least were inclined in that direction. They seem to think that those new social movements are something to be despised, because they originally started from men's material desires, and that problems of those movements rather belong to an outward world which is quite irrelevant to inner personal problems. In this respect their individualistic tendency has been most distinctly displayed. The problems of socialism are, in my opinion, not confined to the individual relations among men who are necessitated to live in a certain social system. Rather they are problems concerning a morality related to the premisses of a social system which has been produced by mankind through their long history. They are the sort of problems that pertain to the social ideal. If we follow after Kihira's philosophy, they are problems of the concrete concept. According to those academic philosophers who have advocated historism, relations between individuals must create history with a speciality as its content. The social system is something which has been created in that way. Hence it necessarily holds a certain speciality as its content. The relations between individuals cannot be considered merely in an abstract sense transcending history. Socialism takes this historical speciality as its problem to solve, and carries its criticism to a practical issue. In spite of such reasoning the academic philosopher seems only to consider the meaning of the relations between the individuals in the abstract, and not to consider that,

in so far as those relations have been produced historically, a certain historical speciality has been created by them, so that all individuals are, in turn, reacted upon by this common speciality which has been already created, and, further, that there is no longer any way for the development of the relations between the individuals other than by yielding to this historical speciality. Let me here state one of my own principal conclusions, *viz.*: that *the fundamental meaning of the so-called materialistic conception of history is that a certain historical speciality, which has been produced by the relations of individuals with each other, reacts in such a manner as to determine all the individuals without exception.* Social system holds its own motive, and society holds its own will. On that account, though socialism sometimes concerns itself with our material lives, it does not follow that it adheres only to abstract and Utopian ideals, nor that the meaning of the labour movement is confined to the materialistic and outward side of our lives. The socialist's concern in the street is not restricted only to the question how to supply man with food and clothing, but is concentrated on the question how to reconstruct, by inward influence upon the free will of the whole community, the *historical speciality* of our societies which has been produced by the relations of individuals with one another. Unless academic philosophers are able to free themselves from their individualistic standpoint, their philosophies will probably never be capable of becoming real and genuine principles of their times.

CHAPTER VI

NEO-KANTIANISM AND NEO-HEGELIANISM (*c*)

THE above-mentioned Metaphysical School which in my description includes all the thinkers from Nishida to Kihira had in common the scheme to construct a new metaphysics from the viewpoint of the unity of " is " with " ought." In good contrast with this, there is a thinker, who, though he likewise belongs to the academic circle, differs from them in adhering strictly to the epistemological standpoint. He is *Kiichirō Sōda*. Japanese academic philosophies then can be observed as being separated into two great parts, namely, the Metaphysical School and the Epistemological School. Besides these there is a new scheme for getting a unity of " is " with " ought " phenomenologically; but the certain completion of this scheme will be at a far distant day.

Kiichirō Sōda has in the main developed the philosophy of his teacher, Heinrich Rickert. At the start he endeavoured to construct a system of economic philosophy; and in this sphere he wrote two books in German; namely, " Money and Value " (1909) and " The Logical Nature of Economic Laws " (1911, and its Japanese trans-

lation, 1923). Both these dealt with the methodological comprehension of economics. In this comprehension he endeavoured to exclude the two poles of thinking, namely, empiricism and metaphysics, and to keep strictly to the standpoint of pure logism. According to him the end of cognition in economics, since it takes economic life as its object, cannot be that of the sciences which have been reduced to natural law, because economics belongs to the scope of the historical sciences. Speaking of theoretical economics, though it deals with the construction of general concepts in the scope of this science of history, this construction of general concepts is not capable of advancing so far as to defeat the end of cognition in the historical sciences. Economic laws, therefore, cannot be natural laws, and can never pass beyond the nature of inductive empirical laws. The ground concept in economics is money. The economic life which gets its sanction from the economic cultural value must, as the object of economics, be strictly confined to the scope of that which can be interpreted by the concept of money. That is to say, the particular *apriori* concept in this kind of economics which concretely expresses the contentless formal cultural value is money. That Sōda dealt with a methodological study of economics according to the above-mentioned fundamental thought made a great impression upon the world of scholars in Japan. In former days no scheme for founding the method-

ological basis of the various social cultural sciences, such as economics, science of law, or sociology, upon philosophy was to be seen. This is true as Sōda himself said: "No man ever advocated the possibility of economic philosophy in academic circles." But since the appearance of Sōda's scheme many young scholars who had been studying those social sciences, stimulated by Sōda, have been earnestly endeavouring to lay the methodological foundation of those sciences upon Rickert's philosophy. It was surely a step forward for studies of the cultural sciences in Japan. But surely, on the other hand, the scheme was followed by an academic tendency that has enfeebled its efforts.

After the Great War social thought in Europe made such remarkable strides as were never witnessed before, so that Japanese thinkers concentrated their main interest upon social ideas; and various kinds of social movements arose all at once. During that time, Kuwaki, Sōda, Chikusui Kaneko and I advocated a new idealism of social problems, under the name of *Culturalism*, in which "culture" means, of course, "the *Kultur*" as formulated in German thought. Since then Culturalism has been an influential thought in general; and the word "Culture" (or *Bunkwa*, in Japanese) has been much in the air, and used for all sorts of subjects. According to Sōda, "culture" is a word opposed to "nature" to explain the facts of nature however such facts are given, and also means our whole

process of purifying the facts in accordance with certain norms, and more and more to realize this ideal. The metaphysical endeavour for the substantial realization of cultural values, which bear general logical validity, is designated as Culturalism.

Sōda's works in Japanese are " The Problems of Economic Philosophy " (1917) and " Cultural Value and the Concept of Limitation " (1922). But the latter was the one in which his own original view was most clearly expressed and which comprises his main thesis. In this book he revealed his original view of philosophy on at least two points; namely, first, he endeavoured to make a unity between rationality and non-rationality by the aid of the so-called concept of limitation; secondly, in his inquiry into the system of values he posited a new " creativity-value " in opposition to cultural value. With those original views Sōda was able to outline his own philosophy strictly within the scope of the science of cognition. It is plain that Sōda's position in Japanese philosophy will become far more important hereafter. Perhaps in the future when he has completed his own system of philosophy he will express it in German and thus win the admiration of the world.

Sōda first considered the cultural value as the concept of limitation for being, in a treatise, " The Cultural Value as the Concept of Limitation." According to Sōda, every special science always possesses (as in the case of economics, for example,

we may take the concept of money) its own *apriori* concept wherewith to express its own formal cultural value which has no content. Hence in order to see whether there is any relation between all the contents of a certain special science and a cultural value to constitute an *oughtness* for that science, we must examine the relation between this *apriori* concept and the oughtness of that science. Then, in order to make this relation clear, he took up the so-called concept of limitation, and examined its construction in detail. If we consider such a case, as

$$\lim_{n=\infty}\left(1+\frac{1}{2}+\frac{1}{4}+\frac{1}{8}+\cdots\cdots\frac{1}{2^n}\right)=2,$$

however small this $\frac{1}{2^n}$ may be, it will still be necessary, in order to reach the limit (namely, in this case, 2), for us to make a jump in thought. "The reason why we can think of the limit as a limit is that, while direction towards this limit has been given on one side of this mathematical equation, the other side by its ascending approach allows for it. This comes to be by the fact that a certain direction for it has been given, and also by the fact that there is one side ascending in the direction in which the limit is given." Now much the same relation as the above obtains in the relations between "ought" and "is," and between value and content. For example, in order to make the transition, as Rickert did, from the physiological Ego to the psychological Ego, and from a consciousness of judgment to super-individual

consciousness-in-general (*das Bewusstsein überhaupt*), this concept of limitation becomes necessary. Is not this mathematical idea therefore the same as the idea that a certain content, being brought up towards one direction, is ultimately able to reach a certain value as a form or as an oughtness? In other words, does not it follow from this consideration that each value should be thought respectively as the limit for an element, and that the philosophy of values may be explained, on the one hand, as the philosophy of the concept of limitation? In the philosophy of values the fact that the "ought" can make the "is" possible means that a definite orientation is given to the content by the concept of limitation, and then that the "ought" gives a definite orientation to the "is," and consequently shows us the meaning of the gap we have to cross in order to get to the concept of limitation. In other words, this jump in thought is possible because the "ought" possesses such an *apriority* that it makes the "is" possible and gives the latter the orientation, and also the "ought" can precede the "is" and give it an orientation. Thus it becomes necessary that we take into account the "is" in the "ought," and conversely the "ought" in the "is"; in other words, that we regard the "is" in the meaning of the "ought," and conversely, the "ought" in the meaning of the "is." Such a standpoint which innerly unifies the "is" with the "ought," is clearly expressed by setting a definite goal in front of

cognition. And when we see the relation between the "is" and the "ought" as above, "is" and "ought" must be seen necessarily as a whole forming an in-itself-enclosed body. There can be counted many sorts of self-sufficient systems, in which the "is" has been combined with the "ought" in accordance with various sorts of our cultural lives. For example, the economic cultural value, by being combined with the general economic life which becomes possible by the cultural value, forms such a self-sufficient enclosed system. Such various self-sufficient enclosed systems, however, which have been distinguished from each other, in case they have been thought of as having their root in a higher order, must be looked at in certain relations with the general cultural value. In this case between the various self-sufficient enclosed bodies and the general summary cultural value there is repeated the relation as that between "is" and "ought," the latter standing as a concept of limitation for the former. Those relations are utterly the same as in the former cases but carried further. Then another self-sufficient enclosed body formed by the cultural value-in-general, that is, the whole of the historical cognition, still further advances, and stands side by side with the whole of the cognition of natural sciences, giving the form of unity to the whole of scientific knowledge. This scientific knowledge, making another combination with the truth value, forms a self-sufficient body. And this

self-sufficient body, still further by standing side by side with the other self-sufficient bodies formed by such values as beauty, goodness, and the rest, at last reaches a definite concept of limitation such as a "value in itself." Thus "is" and "ought" advance by stages from the lower order to the higher by repetitions of the above relation by the concept of limitation.

Sōda, who made the above statement concerning the epistemological relation between "ought" and "is," had to advance another step to observe in general the relation between rationality and non-rationality from the same philosophical standpoint. This greatly resembles Einstein's situation when he had to advance from a declaration of the special theory of relativity to that of the general theory of relativity. Sōda's treatise on this much generalized problem was "The Philosophy of the Concept of Limitation as seen through the Problem of Rationality versus Non-rationality." The construction of this treatise was surely on a large scale, comprising much originality. For example, he argued in this treatise that, in the causal relation, the concept of time, contrary to the general understanding (though, of course, convenient for himself in his desire for the complete exclusion of metaphysical thinking), need not be taken into consideration. He maintained then that the causal relation could be resolved completely into a syllogistic form. It must indeed be called a bold position, but I shall omit it here

from our consideration and confine myself to noting the main thought in this treatise. We have already seen that all values, becoming successively the concepts of limitation for " is," make gradual advancement in such a relation. Now non-rationality in general as over against rationality by being thought of as something which has entered into the rationalizing process allows us the explanation that it is altogether, as it were, non-rationality that has been rationalized. In this case rationality gives to those non-rationalities definite meanings and clearly shows their respective positions in the rationalizing process, besides giving the terminus to the advance of non-rationalities in the rationalizing process. In this case, rationality, epistemologically founding non-rationality, cannot express itself by non-rationality. That is, rationality is immanent in non-rationality besides transcending it. This relation must be compared with that of a concept of limitation and the terms of a series in mathematics. In other words, rationality must be regarded as belonging to those terms and at once not belonging to them like the concept of limitation. When rationality has been regarded as something which belongs to the terms of non-rationalities, rationality, by reflecting inwardly, explains its own meaning over against non-rationalities, but when regarded as that which does not belong to them, though it is in itself rationality, again it forms a series of non-rationalities, even advancing outwardly, and then

it turns in the direction of the other higher and one-sided purification. It resembles the case where the infinite increase in the number of the sides of a polygon which circumscribes a circle brings it to a circle as its limit, and going further, where the lengths of two diameters of that circle intersecting at right angles are respectively reduced and lengthened infinitely till a line is reached as the limit of the circle. Thus the concept of limitation must be said to be, on the one hand, rationality, and, on the other, non-rationality, and still further, as the object of an unified meaning, to be an intersection of those two meanings: non-rationalistic rationality as it were. The object itself is single and unified as an intersection, but the planes of its meanings are different from each other, in its being the limit for one series, whilst one term in the other. Looked at thus, "every *apriori* is the concept of limitation in its own relative sphere." *Apriori* and *aposteriori*, "ought" and "is," must be regarded as the relation between the limit and the terms.

Thus Sōda found the form of the relation between rationality and non-rationality. But this theory must be confined strictly to the standpoint of epistemology. Sōda's advocacy does not tell us that we can deduce non-rationality from rationality. The latter thinking will mean the bringing of the philosophy of the concept of limitation into metaphysics, which is persistently excluded by Sōda. "The philosophy of the concept of limitation is

merely to make clear the structure of the problem of rationality *versus* non-rationality, within the domain of its meaning, uniquely defined." That is, it expresses only that no concept may be possible without some end of cognition, and also that the ideal construction of the *apriori* which is the end of cognition may be expressed by the concept of limitation for the preceding concept. This relation will be repeated, on the one hand, reflectively, and, on the other, forward, so that our thinking will not terminate till we have reached, on the one hand, the depths of the non-rationality of immediate experience, and, on the other, the vault of rationality, even up to God.

Sōda's advocacy as shown above is very interesting for us, for it proceeds as far as our epistemological thinking can go. But Sōda in his setting of the concept of limitation comes near to Nishida; because Nishida himself once said, in the preface to one of his main works: "This thought concerning the concept of limitation has become one of the important thoughts in this book." As Sōda explained the relation between *apriori* and *aposteriori* by the concept of limitation, Nishida also could appeal to it, in thinking every transition from one *apriori* to another. Thus the two have many resemblances between them; but still there lies a decisive difference in the fact that Nishida has been seeking for a metaphysics, whereas Sōda has been wanting strictly to remain on the standpoint

of a scientific epistemology. In Nishida the limit is a standpoint of the higher order (or the concrete root of what is abstract), to which one cannot get from the lower order, and "*apriori*" is an act which creates its own world or its subject of cognition, whilst for Sōda these have been thought to be immanent and transcendent at the same time, and yet still within the confines of epistemology. The gap to be jumped in case we get to that concept of limitation, in Sōda, was seen epistemologically to be possible by reason of the apriority of "ought" to "is," whereas Nishida thought that there must be as a ground a certain intuition. The particular manner in which we consider the jumping of this gap, however small the distance, will make a great distinction in philosophical thinking.

I have some doubts regarding Sōda's position. Rickert once mentioned two methods of transcendental philosophy, namely, the transcendental logical method and the transcendental psychological one, but added that both methods have definite limits, so that their efficiency lies in their supplementing each other. But I think that in this case Rickert's thought was incomplete; because, if, as he says, the two methods need to be supplemented by each other, we should expect to find some method possessing a standpoint able to include and unify these two methods. Sōda said that rationality is both immanent in, and transcendent to, non-rationality; but I think that for anything to be

immanent it must be regarded from the transcendental psychological view, but, to be transcendent, from the transcendental logical one. To make both those conditions possible, there must be a standpoint that is surely able to unify and to include them. In Sōda's thought the only object of meaning becomes an intersection such as to be a limit for one series and a term for the other. But I must maintain that, in order that this object of meaning which has been observed, by turns, on the different planes, shall be capable of being thought of as one and as unified, we must probably ascribe to such an object a nature such as is seen in Bolzano's "*Vorstellung an sich*," which Sōda excluded. That in Sōda's thought such a cognition has been admitted as possible is probably due to the fact that he dealt with the same object by both methods of transcendental philosophy at the same time. Hence I believe that *there is a third standpoint which unifies the two methods of transcendental philosophy*, and that an object regarded from this standpoint must be similar to a "*Vorstellung an sich*." When one value has been thought of as an oughtness and also as that which may give the direction of an ascent for the "is," the value already must be thought as an act, so that, from the standpoint of the pure transcendental logical method, the value can be said no more to be the same as the oughtness. In case, therefore, we observe, with Nishida, *apriori* as an inner power which creates its own world, we are observing

the value already as an oughtness from the standpoint of transcendental psychologism. I believe that when we stand purely on the transcendental logical method the " is " will be always separated from the value, whilst, on the contrary, when we stand on the transcendental psychological method, though the value may be anticipated to be the concept of limitation, still we shall be unable in the end to jump over that ultimate gap. I think it was reasonable for Rickert to acknowledge the limit of the transcendental psychological method in getting to the transcendental subject from the psychological one by the aid of the concept of limitation. If we observe the *oughtness* as the concept of limitation, I am forced to think that there lies a certain intuition at its foundation, as Nishida already maintained. But the admission of a concrete root, in which the intuition is included, does not mean getting at once completely into so-called metaphysics. That is not an act that means undetermined whole, but forms Sōda's so-called self-sufficient, self-contained body, *an act which by determining others at the same time determines itself*. Hence this self-sufficient body, which includes the act, by at once becoming, in turn, a member of the series, will be determined by the other *apriori*. The reason why one meaning-object is thus able to determine the other, and at the same time to be determined by the other, must be attributed to the fact that each meaning-object is at once meaning and act. To seek the relation

between one meaning and the other is to seek a reciprocal relation between one meaning-act and the other meaning-act. *A cognition of meaning in which act is included therefore must be the most natural cognition of meaning; and this is the standpoint of phenomenology which I want to take.*

Every concept has always revealed a definite meaning in relation with some object of cognition. Nevertheless, if what has been received as the substance of this meaning has not had a nature adequate to this object of cognition, the meaning itself would be unable to come into existence. Even though, by the aid of limitation, all the *aprioris* may have been arranged from a lower to a higher one, that cannot mean that one end of the series of this arrangement can get to immediate experience, and the other end to God. When we think so, surely we have got into so-called metaphysics of exclusion. Speaking generally, every act can be dealt with just by our thinking, when it has been formed into a self-sufficient enclosed body; and Nishida's so-called absolute free will, which does not determine the other and can neither be determined by the other, is no more capable of being called any " standpoint," but is " life " itself, which cannot be our object of thinking by any means. The gap to be jumped in the concept of limitation is such a gap as remains even with jump after jump, and this jump also cannot ultimately reach its end. Mathematics follows after the development of the relation of mathematical

meanings with each other; *but meanings themselves cannot relate with or develop*. The relation or the development of mathematical meanings signifies relation or development of the acts of mathematical meanings. The fact that mathematics necessarily develops signifies that the act of mathematical meaning necessarily develops. Of an undetermined act which does not form a self-sufficient enclosed body it cannot be said whether it is necessary or contingent. Self-sufficientness as the combination of "ought" with "is" must be always self-consciousness of a certain "meaning." *So-called absolute free will is an infinite system of meanings that have the above-mentioned natures*. The act of meanings is pure consciousness; so that it cannot be dealt with by a psychology which belongs to natural science, but furnishes the latter with a foundation. Thus we shall be able to get rid of a pure metaphysics that is not strictly scientific as well as avoid being caught in a mere epistemology which does not permit us to move reasonably in any direction.

Sōda next dealt with the system of values; and here he has just given a definite position to what is called the creativity-value, as over against the cultural value. First, he argued against any scheme that arranges the various values so as to establish a relation of supremacy and dependency among values by giving one of them a predominating position over the rest; and this seems very reasonable for him with his desire to remain within the stand-

point of strict epistemology. No value can have any provisional meaning for any other, but all should be arranged on the same line, and claim the same right. If values were to be arranged in the relation of supremacy and dependency, it necessarily follows that the member of a lower class would lose its independent meaning as value and could have no meaning, but would be a mere means for the other values in the upper class. But since these several values are distinguished from each other we see at once, on the other hand, that there does lie a common ground, *i.e.* the general cultural value which must arise as the concept of limitation to connect them in order to render the several cultural values logically possible. Hence, according to Sōda, so-called Culturalism is a metaphysical endeavour to attempt the substantial realization of the general cultural value uniformly and altogether in all the spheres of cultural lives. Thus he acknowledged a sort of class-order lying between the general cultural value and the various cultural values, but, of course, not in the metaphysical sense. Then can we find some value besides and co-existent with the general cultural value ?

In this mode of thinking Sōda could not help again listening to Hegel's system of values, which he had already opposed on the ground of its metaphysical arrangement of values. Surely there lies, according to Sōda, some ground for a distinction between Hegel's objective spirit and his absolute

spirit. According to Sōda, the objective spirit is developing, separated, and social, whereas the absolute is self-sufficient, unifying, and individual. "One expresses the nature of social cultures, and the other tells us the meaning of an individual genius." But if we think still further, the same observation that is directed to the absolute spirit can be applied to the objective spirit, and its converse also can be admitted as true. Therefore the distinction between these two sorts of values does not mean one between *the kinds* of values themselves, but between the *standpoints* from which they are dealt with. "All value, no matter of what, of the several kinds of cultural values related with various spheres such as the special sciences, politics, law, economics, technics, religion, art, morality, philosophy and others generally and uniformly must have two sides to their meanings as follows: First, the cultural values must admit the possibility of development and progress as a product of the history of mankind, leaving the perfection or realization of their ideal to our posterity for ever as a crystallization of the co-operation of all the people in the societies of the ages. And, secondly, in whatever sphere, in whatever age, and in whatever race, there exist geniuses who, in respect of some values, transcending time and place and their fellow-men, can directly express the inner meaning of themselves, and self-sufficiently show that they are in unity and harmony. The former seeks the *process* of values, and the latter,

their *meaning*. The one observes from the viewpoint of explaining and realizing the problems imposed, while the other tells directly the meaning of the values themselves. All values have those two sides." And, according to him, the former is the cultural value and the latter is what is termed "the creativity-value." But the cultural value and the creativity-value are only two separate sides of the interpretation of the same value, and that same value which allows us the interpretations, was named by Sōda "value" or "value as it is." In the dignity of the creativity-value, said he, the meaning of the individual will culminates, and in the perfection of the cultural values the meaning of society will become more and more complete. The harmony between individuals and society, therefore, must be founded only on the fact that the ultimate agreement of the two values is in the same common value—oughtness or ideal—and this kind of value becomes the goal of all our acts. But a parallelism of the two values cannot be always expected; the creativity-value must experience, for the time being or eternally, the sorrow of being *lonely*, until it enters into the process of the realization of the cultural value.

Sōda began his thinking originally with economic problems, so that he has often discussed the fundamental concepts of the social problems. As the principle for the social movement he adheres to the so-called culturalism. His argument upon socialism

was surely worth noticing (in his treatise, " The Community-ethics of Socialism as viewed from the Philosophy of Culture," comprised in " Neo-Kantians' View of Socialism," in 1925). And this argument was entirely a direct deduction from his earlier argument regarding the system of values. According to Sōda, the meaning of society ends in culture, and that of the individual, in creativity. Hence to think of a genius as not utterly overwhelmed by society is by no means impossible; and, to call that alone genius which is estimated as such by average men hardly expresses the meaning of the word *genius*. Thus, he said, two ends of life must be distinguished: first, that end whereof the fact that there are many individuals shall be regarded as an indispensable constitutional element in its meaning; secondly, the end which can be comprehended irrespective of whether there are many individuals or not. The former is the concept of end with regard to cultures, *i.e.* " the end or goal of cultures," and the latter is that with regard to " man's own nature," *i.e.* " with regard to the goal of man." If we name them values, the former is the cultural value, and the latter the creativity-value. Now, if in our refinement of the community-ethics of the socialist we define the relation between the individuals and the community as corresponding to the relation between members of a series and their limit, in such a way as to make the whole individual keep his original status unchanged in every particular,

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and also as to make him look up to culture as the whole, then, with this new meaning, community-ethics can be identified with Culturalism; but, in this way, the meaning of the creativity-value will not be elucidated. The uniting of these values is an eternal problem imposed on us; and the two can only be thought of as meeting at the infinite ends of two parallel lines. If anyone speaks of the unity of these values, which are *oughtness and ideal*, as if they were the socialist's "society," he will have to be regarded as usurping the name of socialism, and thus proposing other ethics or logic which should by rights be differently named. The unity of the cultural value with the creativity-value, according to Sōda, is an eternal problem, not capable of explanation by socialist writers. Of course, for anyone who cannot understand this problem or even where the problem lies the meaning of socialism will be incomprehensible. Therefore, upon the philosophy of the twentieth century, according to Sōda, is imposed the duty of solving this problem.

Thus Sōda's philosophy may be said to have arrived at its destination. The argument for the relation between individuals and society, already seen in his "Money and Value," is now fully achieved. But I, for one, cannot possibly acknowledge his so-called creativity-value. Anything to which the name of value belongs is necessarily the cultural value; and the cultural value always furnishes the end both to individuals and society. I am con-

vinced with Sōda that various cultural values are arranged co-ordinately, and that this is the ultimate ground for democracy, and that there are several kinds of modes in the realization of values. But I have many doubts as to whether this distinction in the modes of the realization of values may give any ground for that distinction between the cultural value and the creativity-value which Sōda makes. Sōda himself said that these two values could meet at the infinite end of the parallel lines, but I call this agreement, from the beginning, the cultural value. Thus my cultural value corresponds to his " value as it is " or " value in itself." Is it not a fact that the distinction in the modes of the realization of several cultural values is conditioned mainly upon the nature of the contents of the values being realized? Let us observe, for instance, the case of the realization of a moral value. It looks social and incomplete, but this comes from the thought that one act that has been done forms a history, and then, in its being criticized from the standpoint of the whole person, it continually enriches its contents like a snow-ball indefinitely. If I think, on the contrary, of the isolated act as *per se*—as a sole act absolutely moral—this act will have the realization of its value in itself rather, and thus resemble the case of art. But now let us turn our eye to the case of value in art. Although the realization of this value may be complete in itself in some one definite work, it is never in the life of the artist himself complete;

because being criticized from the standpoint of the whole person, it may advance and be infinitely unable to be completed, just as in the case of morality. Therefore it is not valid to attribute the distinction in modes of the realization of values to the nature of the values themselves. Which of two things did Sōda think, in case one cultural asset such as art, morality, etc. may be thought of as involving the corresponding cultural value? Did he think that this cultural value is one that is able to become *actually* a community-asset in a certain historically constituted society, or that, though it may not be actually welcomed in this society, still it *ought to be* welcomed as a community-asset in the society? Was not Sōda, in thinking of the loneliness of the creativity-value, contemplating the cultural value in the former sense? But if thought of in terms of the second meaning, creativity-value could not have any reason for being lonely. The so-called creativity-value which absolutely cannot become a cultural value is in no sense a value. To take any work by whatever genius who has not been acknowledged by the times, or is thinking himself as having no connection with the times, if it had been a work of a genuine genius, the work could be neither irrelevant to the times, nor yet would it be possible that, in the motive for this work, no element of the times should be taken in. After all, Sōda's argument looks like a revision of the old problem of whether art is for art's sake or for life's sake. I, however, think that

the very unifying concept from the point of view which gives the impression that the two are contradictory with each other is the cultural value. What meaning a certain work has for society cannot be determined by the way it has been welcomed by that society. Nevertheless, if we say that the creativity-value is not exclusively the possession of genius, and that every man's work has its absolute meaning, by means of the involving its own original creativity-value, this proposition will contain a great meaning. But in this case, we are, after all, explaining the dignity of personality, maintaining that the unity of life in personality is wholly coloured by the person's own individuality. Thus I cannot be convinced of Sōda's creativity-value, and further cannot agree with Sōda in his criticism of community-ethics. I think that the ideal towards "community" is the end for individuals and for society alike. That there is no socialism which cannot be explained by idealism, and conversely, there is no idealism which cannot be explained by socialism, is my ultimate conviction.

The fact that, in Sōda's philosophy, the domain of a genius has been isolated from society in general, means, from the view of the times, that only one-half of philosophy has come into possession of the people at large, but the other half has been left as a domain that cannot be understood by them. Kihira also saw art to be aristocratic. But the present time does not so regard the domain of genius. The door

to become a genius is open to everyone in society; but everyone contents himself with expression as his capacity admits: this is our ideal for the relation between individuals and society.

Finally, I must mention here the name of *Seiichi Hatano* as another philosopher who is, like Sōda, clinging to the standpoint of epistemology. Hatano's main work is "The Essence and the Fundamental Problems of Religious Philosophy" (1920). He has also contributed much to the history of philosophy and of religious thought. According to Hatano the fundamental spirit of critical philosophy lies in study. This study concerns the domains of cultures that realize their concrete contents in history, of their ground in reason, as well as of the principle which is able to give each of them its definite meaning and definite value. The various domains of cultures which exist as the facts of history must be impartially honoured; and, in so far as there is a generally valid value, as the *ground* of this, as Kant said, there should be acknowledged the existence of reason. Religion secures its own independence as a characteristic domain of this reason. Then what is the essential meaning of religion? Hatano says: "The essence of religion is purely to experience the generally valid values as appearances of transcendent and absolute being that realizes its content of values in us and through us." Then how can this position be established? Hatano

established it in *conscience*. Value will not be possible if it does not hold any real connection with the world of reality, and is not convinced of having ability not only to co-ordinate but to master reality, standing in the supreme position not only of validity but of reality. Thus to experience the agreement of reasonable values with transcendent and absolute reality as such, and therefore, the former as the contents or the appearances of the latter, is surely, according to Hatano, religion. On the ground of this fundamental thought he interpreted various religious concepts. His philosophical standpoint as seen in the argument above seems to approach most nearly to that of Windelband. Hatano considered God to be what is transcendent and at the same time immanent, and accordingly denied pantheism on the ground that it entertains only the immanency and not the transcendency of God. But beneath the former main religion of Japan—Buddhism—there has always existed a certain amount of pantheism so that the principle of religious life most heartily clung to by the Japanese was pantheistic mysticism. Hence on what logical ground this pantheism will revive is going hereafter to be the serious and living problem of religious philosophy for the Japanese.

CHAPTER VII

CRITICISM OF CIVILIZATION AND SOCIAL THOUGHT (*a*)

I HAVE already stated that contemporary Japanese philosophy sprang up after coming in contact with foreign philosophies, the last of which was German; and that by this latter contact Japanese academic philosophies have developed from dogmatic to strictly scientific ones remarkably specialized. Philosophy, however, as a view of life, could never remain only such; so that, in Japan also, there sprang up philosophies utterly different from those academic ones, namely, criticisms of civilization, which have been and are occupying an important position in the sphere of thought. And it has been always these and not academic philosophies which have influenced the people at large.

Our discontent with academic philosophies mainly came from the following causes: In the first place, these philosophers appear to the people at large to have scarcely held an earnest view of the unity of life which was originally the ideal of philosophical speculation. The philosophies, of course, have not lost that interest, but the more careful their criticism of cognition becomes the more it develops towards subtlety and becomes problematic and

inconclusive. In the second place, these philosophers seem to have lacked, in a way, vividness in thinking. It is likely that the more the criticism of cognition has deepened the more remarkably has thereby been developed a one-sided, retrogressive criticism, which by rendering the negative argument in too conspicuous a manner has impoverished the positive assertion regarding life. In the third place, criticism of life by these philosophers has been merely formal and not directed to concrete particular matters. This attitude, of course, must be acknowledged to be right because they want to speculate on the ultimate problems of life. But what the people at large want to solve, as they are confronted by them and brought into conflict with them, are their own actual lives. They are those very problems of life with which philosophers will not concern themselves; and the people are always incapable of applying for themselves to those problems the formal solutions proposed by the philosophers. And more than that: although, in order to give any solution to those actual life-problems, some provisional knowledge of the special sciences and a keener eye and sense for those problems are necessitated, the academic philosophers at large are especially lacking on these sides, and at times have even been criticized with such cynical words as the following: "The least philosophical are the philosophers" because their criticism of life is not pertinent to the events of the day. In the

last place, they have possessed in general but little social interest and have not been dynamic enough in their attitude. But inasmuch as that which troubles most people of the present day is the social problem, and the man to solve these important problems is the philosopher, he especially ought to have the social interest in, and dynamic attitude towards, actual life. Thus academic philosophy in general has, in a word, from the viewpoint of the people, been far from possessing a humanistic interest. It really does, I think, deserve the discontent of the people.

Then, as making good this deficiency, the ideas of the so-called critics of civilization have been important for the people. In their ideas such common characteristics as the following have been observed: First, they have all attacked the academic philosophers for being too scholastic and too ideological, and for having taken scarcely any positive attitude towards life. And they have taken for the direct object of their studies the matters of actual life. Secondly, their attitude in philosophical thinking is always dynamic and functional. Hence they are likely to fall into the so-called genetic method which is sure to be excluded by academic philosophers. Freedom from this method surely was, in one way, a good point for the latter, notwithstanding the attack by the critics of civilization; as well as a weakness for which the attack was reasonable. Thus between the academic philosophers and the critics of civilization there has been a conspicuous

difference, each disdaining the other. But this antagonism may be pronounced either permanent or transient at the same time. Academic philosophy, provided it maintains its original fundamental demand for a unity of life, should reach its acme of course in a criticism of the civilization of our life and of our day. On the other hand, the criticism of our own day's civilization, since it is seeking for the fundamental principle of the relation between " is " and " ought," should be based on strictly epistemological thinking. Therefore, I think the two standpoints, at bottom, should not differ from each other; and in case the principles of the two are inconsistent with each other one of them must surely be false. But, on the other hand, the so-called critic of our day's problems is one who, with the keenest eye and sense of the times, is standing at the outpost of philosophy; so that when the academic philosopher is busy in readjusting knowledge already acquired and in giving it form, it will be possible for the critic of the day's civilization to find out any inconsistency between the academic knowledge and the actual life which is on the point of being revealed, to survey this inconsistency, and to apply the plummet to it. As a consequence of this the fallacies of academic philosophies must be clearly revealed and must receive a new and reformed orientation. Therefore, though the fact of the formation of two opposed groups does not appear to agree with the original ideal of philosophy, still, so long as philosophical thinking exists, and

is not allowed to lose its vividness, that fact must be the destined tendency of human thought. Ultimately the true problem of philosophy lies in a synthesis of these two attitudes, and the man who should complete this work would, I think, be the one true philosophical genius.

Chogyū Takayama was one of the most important critics of civilization in the past. His humanistic utterances have all greatly impressed the people and influenced the times. Since he wrote, the problem of civilization most earnestly discussed among the people was naturalism. During those times the objects of criticism taken by thinkers were in the main those suggested by literature; and between a criticism of civilization and of literature no clear distinction was drawn. It might be said that the so-called criticism of civilization was merely the appreciative eye of literature directed towards civilization. But after the Great War, as the social problems came to be the centre of our thinking, the main end of so-called criticism of civilization appeared to be these social problems, and discussion round these problems was as heated as it ever could be. At this time the man who had once regarded outward society with the eye of literature turned about and regarded literature with the eye of outward society.

As critics in the present we can mention *Ōdo Tanaka*, *Kōjirō Sugimori*, *Manjirō Hasegawa*, *Chikusui*

Kaneko, *Reikichi Kita*, *Chōkō Ikuta*, *Takanobu Murobuse*, *Kameo Chiba*, *Jirō Abe*, *Yone Noguchi*, the present writer, and others. However, the social problems have an intimate relation with economics and politics as special cultural sciences, so that among prominent critics we have to include men who base their criticism on these sciences and who are socialists, anarchists, and labour agitators. Regarding those critics, I shall speak in Chapter IX.

Ōdo Tanaka, an eminent philosopher of Japan, presented himself from the beginning as a critic of life and civilization, and up to this time has been earnestly and steadily endeavouring to give to the Japanese people good advice, to speak on their behalf, and to suggest a goal for Japanese civilization. His first contribution was "From a Study to the Street" (1911) and then "Philosopher-ism" (1912). In those days his attitude in thinking was too new for the times at large; and his eminent position as a thinker was at once completely marked by his published works. His attitude as well as his interest were already well shown by his choice of the title of "From a Study to the Street." In the preface to the work he states that "Criticism is a unity of theory and of practice, and an agreement of philosophical thinking and of utility," and "with a character like mine that has an equal interest in philosophy and politics, in conducting myself towards times like these when theory and practice have gradually come near each other, I want to have both the intelligence of a scholar and the spirit of a

patriot to pursue the studies as a scholar and with the insight of a patriot, and to render useful service as a patriot with an attitude of a scholar." When he published those opinions the people at large were still unable to free themselves from the influence of such sentimental subjectivism as that of Chogyū Takayama; and accordingly they could not feel any intimacy with Tanaka's philosophy though it was grounded so near upon practice and even upon politics and economics. But this attitude gradually came to be regarded by the people as important—I think with reason. Former philosophies even though they treated of a much wider world of reality confined their concern almost to literature or religion, and did not extend to politics or economics, not giving these latter an equal importance with the others. But Tanaka was a thinker who had emancipated *all* the sides of life with complete justice to each, and with an acknowledgment of their respective meanings. Even the start, therefore, towards the study of economic philosophy in Japan was not in truth made by Sōda. Tanaka, earlier than Sōda, set about on those lines, and treated List, Ninomiya, and other economists, from the standpoint of a philosopher.

His own expressive word for his consistent position from beginning to end is "symbolism." But his word at the moment, in order probably to express his attitude towards the criticism of the day's prevailing thought, has varied from time to time. For example, he has used many expressions

such as the "attitude as a philosopher" (or "philosopher-ism"), "non-philosophy," "radical individualism," "new philosophical radicalism," "romantic utilitarianism," "philosophy as a re-interpretation," in order to express his attitude. Nevertheless his fundamental standpoint has never varied throughout the above seemingly-varied attitudes. The root of his culture, other than what comes from his own country, is in the main English and American philosophical thought. He has absorbed into his culture much from Carlyle, Emerson, Mill, Pater, and other eminent English and American thinkers. Hence his style is always free from the scholastic colour seen in academic philosophers and is refined in the manner of Carlyle or Pater. If the essays of any man in Japan were to be translated into English in full, the one who would be most admired by the English people must be surely this same Tanaka. At the start he mainly agreed with William James, and consequently I have been able to designate his attitude in a broad sense as pragmatism. But since then his pragmatism has gradually developed into a wider view probably as the consequence of his return to the tradition of the English philosophy which lies at the root of pragmatism in the narrower sense. At that time he said of himself, "I have turned from pragmatism to romantic utilitarianism." "For me," he said, "the life that is desirable is one with fullness of content and liberty of mode. At all times, the life which adapts its mode to present

necessities and can establish a purpose and, while fulfilling its content, is not losing the brightness of its mood, is the most worthy life for me." How to reconcile the self that ever wishes to make its mode of life more and more free, and the self that unceasingly desires to bring the content of life to fulfilment—in other words to reconcile oneself as a romanticist with another as an economist (by this very thinking showing the two sides of a character that is capable of an equal interest in art and economic life)—has been always the problem faced by Tanaka's mind. In this, I think, he must be taken as a true representative of the people of the day.

Tanaka has been a radical actualist, and at the same time, a radical individualist. Hence in his impartial appreciation he will not without reason exclude any ingredient present in actual life, yet he will not, on the other hand, receive abruptly anything transcendent to himself which is not comprised within his own deeper needs and demands. This means that he only wishes to adjust his surroundings, to train his own nature, and ultimately to create for himself a happier life. Accordingly to him every side and every institution, since they have all appeared as a means of life, if ever they apparently oppose each other should be understood not as essence but as function. To criticize the many problems of actual life from this point of view has been his constant endeavour; and he has always been a good adviser for the Japanese

people in their rapid strides towards civilization. The Japanese people have often blindly imitated Western civilization, but in opposition to this excessive tendency he has earnestly urged man's constant need of the best perspective. "To see a matter as it is does not mean to see it *without* a subjective concern, but only to see it refined by a *good* subjective concern: that is, every man should see the matter as it exists in the focus of his own standpoint." Hence he states that "to see a matter without any perspective means not to see it as it is." From his standpoint, what is called the ideal of life never means something already defined and so transcending our actual life. "The ideal and the actual are nothing but the two sides of the present. A fact, seen in its whole meaning, is revealed as an ideal, whereas the same, seen as a partial value, is revealed as a reality."

Man's fallacies in our times, and accordingly his troubles, in Tanaka's opinion, come from the fact that he does not understand the meanings and bearings of modern civilization. Modern civilization as the subject of synthetic activities emerged from man's self-consciousness that he is the centre of all things. As vehicles for it, in the world of experiences, science, and in men's relations, democracy, have been active. Hence both "fact" and "equality" need to be rightly understood. In synthesis the meaning of fact, and in function the meaning of equality, must be accepted. In other words, fact is whatever, entering into experience, shapes its

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elements, and granting it its individuality and value, is systematized into as small a number of systems as possible; and equality consists in a just estimation and a right utilization of every member of one co-operative life in accordance with every member's respective special intelligence and talent in order to advance each member's happiness and the solidarity and mutual aid of the groups. This modern civilization is, in fact, the best in every respect of all the civilizations thus far produced by men; and its intention is incomparably more spiritual than any other. To revise defects in present-day civilization does not therefore mean to transcend its intention but to complete it. The supreme principle of the unity of life is re-interpretation. Re-interpretation should precede reconstruction. In spite of this original intention of modern civilization many of the present-day views have the following tendencies: first, they fail to regard re-interpretation as the supreme principle of the unity of life; and, secondly, as the natural consequence of this, though to the very end all actualities and machines should be functions, they reduce them all to essence. The view that there exist two sorts of essence that have respective definite contents, and that then communication between them may be formed, is at the best doing injury to *actuality*. Modern civilization must develop towards the symbolic civilization as its ideal. What then is the intention of symbolic civilization? "Nothing," our author states, "but to see everything *sub specie æternitatis*." The

symbolist acknowledges nothing except what appears as a special manifestation of the moment, but at the same time he comprehends that for everything the capacity to take *form* has been already present in everything as its innate nature. Still our author understands and treats all feeling, all thought, and all men as completely real as well as ideal. Symbolic civilization, according to him, does not appear as the result of the neglect of modern civilization, but is the breaking of its shell from within by means of the force of criticism, revision, and continuity.

Kōjirō Sugimori is another eminent philosopher to be classed with Tanaka for his constant interest in the times. On many social problems which have from time to time arisen in Japan he has given us good advice from the standpoint of the genuine philosopher. His training came in the main from English philosophy. However he is not at all indifferent to German thought. His standpoint also includes German idealism, but he dislikes the subtle and scholastic tendency characteristic of German thought and retains his attitude as only a critic. His style of writing also, with Tanaka, is the most characteristic in Japan.

Though between Sugimori and Tanaka there are many differences in the content of their philosophical thought regarding their attitudes as critics, still they have many points in common. For example, in the first place, Tanaka accepted actuality as that which is given to us as it itself is, and wanted

to receive all implications comprised within it with a sympathetic eye, rejecting no part without reason: Sugimori is also such an actualist. What appears as an intermediate experience, what is given, or the *facts* for Sugimori's cognition, are politics, economics, education, the home, and the like: in other words more concretely, a parliament, taxes on luxuries, a triumph of Labour, etc. He disdains the attitude of the so-called philosophers who, though posing as critics of actual problems, really neglect such problems and treat only quite different things. The so-called category of "the given" ("*gegeben*" in German) is for him nothing but a window of criticism looking out on the times. Hence the so-called natural laws of the natural sciences are for him nothing but habits which have lost the function of invention. Whereas Kant dwelt upon the intuitive forms of time and space and the forms of thinking such as causal relation, substance, etc., Sugimori says, "Men, especially young men, cannot exist as such without being in love," or "Love and sexual desire are an original window." This is Sugimori's epistemology. In the second place, however, Sugimori always emphasizes the consciousness of principle in the complex relations of actuality. To recognize those relations, for him, is merely to reduce them to the ultimate principle and to criticize them from this standpoint. In this Sugimori must be regarded as neither a sociologist nor a scholar of political science but ever purely as an excellent philosopher. Sugimori, in a criti-

cism of present philosophy, once said, " Sociology is still generally in so primitive a state as not to express as yet an instinct, a self-consciousness or a practice, either as an experimental science, a normative science, or a planning science "; and the discontent expressed in these words at once shows in turn the characteristics of his own thought. His view must be designated, on account of its acceptance of *actuality as it is*, as an experimental science, and on account of the reduction of this actuality as it is in due course to its principle, *i.e.* to normative science, and on account of its habitual creation of a plan constructed on a large scale so as to form a plan-creating science.

Sugimori always demands a radical reform—a radical re-construction—of all former philosophies, ethics, political science, economics, and sociology. All these demand a re-valuation and a restoration to the real principles of present-day cultures. The greatest fallacy of those sciences and cultures which has caught his eye and which has been judged by his creative power is the lack of the *social eye*. He said: " At the present day, one of the essential conditions first to be fulfilled for our obtaining a right view of the individual is certainly a new and sufficient social eye. One of the representative, common defects of present-day civilization, one of the greatest lacks of present-day civilization, and accordingly, one of the greatest needs, is the social eye." I can entirely agree with him, in his severe attack on the social blindness of

present-day philosophy. He says, " The present-day metaphysician often speaks or writes of reality. I would like to put to the present-day epistemologist the question, whether such subjects as politics, economics, the home, or education are or are not within experience. I will ply the present-day metaphysician with the question, on occasion, whether such subjects as politics, economics, the home, and education are in or out of reality," and, " Experience and reality—these are both but empty words for the so-called philosophies of the present day. So-called value, so-called ' ought ' or ' ought to be,' norm, ideal, truth, goodness, beauty, or holiness—these have no meaning but are stupid visions and mirages. In a sense each of them is a dual product of stupidity and dishonesty. They may even be anything except philosophy, but philosophy they surely cannot be." " For example, those thinkers, in spite of the troublesome problems of their own home life, never so much as mention it, and this is universally characteristic of present-day philosophy. Is such philosophy anything but mere waste and abuse of letters or words? I cannot think it anything else."

For Sugimori, therefore, a poor technical word such as social philosophy is useless. " Philosophy " is itself identical with " *social* philosophy." " Philosophy," he says, " is an intellectual, spiritual strife in which the essence, the relation, and the value of the experiences of the social life were first treated." " Present-day epistemology as a methodology loses

the right to claim the name by neglecting such facts as social experience, social reality, or social value." The genuine thinker, according to Sugimori, should always have the ability and the effort to show clearly the *ground* for his judgment. This is the province of the philosopher. Of ideal principles, which apply to present and future mankind and society, Sugimori enumerated the following three: self-government, obligation, and creation. In the first place, man being a free agent, the ideal principle for life should be such as to protect and help man's free will. In the second place, man, having at the same time an important side as a member of society, should, in his participation in social life, that is, in his co-operative life, completely assume and discharge his obligations. In the third place, though man is a free agent and at the same time a member of the social life, he is further—nay, more essentially —a complex body possessed of growing vitality; so that he should hold the following third principle of life, which really belongs first, namely, a realization of the productive ideal, the obligation to create useful things, necessary things and all things that are capable of making our lives beautiful, good and happy, in the sense both of quality and quantity, as fully as possible. These essentials, production, obligation, and self-government are the fundamental ideas of his philosophy and accordingly of his ethics.

Jirō Abe started with a criticism of literature, and

then stepped to social criticism. He also seems, perhaps as the result of his character, to have interest equally in beauty and morality. His principle of individual and social life is based on German Idealism. He holds that the fundamental principles of an ideal society are freedom and love. His philosophical thought and social theory cannot be said as yet to have been fundamentally completed. This is probably left to his future work. But his private papers, in which he reflected on and weighed the secretness of his life as a philosopher who thinks as an artist, were written passionately but with a certain intimacy which surely gave them the power to charm everybody. With him it was none of the systematic philosophers who gave light to his life, but men like Goethe and Dante. His most famous work is " Santarō's Diary " in which is the fictitious life-history of a commonplace man named Santarō. Abe seems to be charmed equally by the roads of Stendhal and St. Francis.

Reikichi Kita seems to have based his philosophy on that of the South-western German school. His main works are not yet published except certain treatises. He also is equally interested in philosophy and politics but differs from Tanaka and Sugimori by basing his thoughts upon German academic philosophy. But he has expressed a certain amount of discontent with even Rickert and Lask and even more with Windelband. Those philosophers, according to him, " cannot solve the fundamental

problem of how that which is transcendent may become that which is immanent." He says: "The ultimate end of philosophy should be to make clear how to relate value in itself with the pure Ego." Thus his philosophy presupposes at the outset a certain non-rational element. "We must start with a split between form and content which have emerged from a non-rational element in man, and then we must discover the rôle played by the transcendental apperception in forming a certain relation between those severed elements." In his discussion of political philosophy, he asserts that "a democracy which holds liberalism as its content is the right road for politics," but he also leaves a place for compromise as something often unavoidable and in admitting the right of revolution as a self-assertion of righteous laws against actual laws. But as yet we cannot see the whole construction of his philosophy.

Chikusui Kaneko's personal history as a Japanese philosopher is a very long one. His contribution to Japanese thought with his criticism of the problems and the ideas of the times cannot be neglected. On this point his position will be rightly compared with *Kuwaki's*. The following are common to both: the breadth of their purview; their generosity towards all new thought; and, recently, their championship of so-called culturalism, where Kaneko seems to adhere, in his philosophical standpoint, to German idealism.

CHAPTER VIII

CRITICISM OF CIVILIZATION AND SOCIAL THOUGHT (*b*)

In the preceding chapter I have stated the general features of the criticism of civilization by a number of philosophers. Though they have written their criticism in a manner different from that of the academic thinkers, still they consider themselves philosophers because their culture issued originally from academic philosophy. In this and the following chapter, I shall discuss the other type of criticism, *i.e.* criticism by social thinkers, among whom besides original social thinkers I shall include socialists, anarchists, and leaders of the social movements in various directions.

Nyozekan (his pen-name) or *Manjirō Hasegawa* is one of the greatest in this respect. He was formerly a journalist, but has now, in association with one of his friends, *Ikuo Oyama*, another eminent social critic and student of political science, and a number of others formed the "*Warera-sha*" (The "We" Society), and publishes a monthly journal entitled "We." The "We" has represented the most progressive thought in Japan, and criticizes all

problems of the times from a new standpoint. We cannot call Hasegawa's thought remarkably systematic. In fact it seems characteristic of him to prefer breaking such fixity of thought. Hence he always disdains and attacks academic philosophy. But his criticism is always very characteristic in its construction as well as in its nuance, and is entirely his own. His cynical remarks and his calm views are charming. None the less he is a philosopher. Hasegawa is one of the most passionate actualists and, at the same time, an evolutionist. According to him, thought does not precede fact, but fact precedes thought. "The logical validity," he says, "cannot be necessarily followed by the practical validity." "Facts have not, indeed, been produced from thoughts, but thoughts have been produced from facts. Therefore, even though thought should be exterminated, facts would not be necessarily destroyed. Thoughts cannot be exterminated so long as facts have not been destroyed." "An institution such as the home or the State can be originally nothing but a fact of every member's life, and can be nothing apart from this life itself." Thus Hasegawa wishes to exclude the ideological atttude as far as possible; and accordingly, when he observes man's life as the foundation of such an institution, he is not content with man's psychological life but wishes man to step into activity. The various systems of man's life are not systems of the will but of activity based on the instinct to survive.

" Man's life is a series of activities, which begin with creativeness and end in enjoyment. In the economic life, all is a process from production to consumption ; in the political life, all is a process from genesis of power to class culture ; and in the individual's lifetime, all is a process from activity in youth to rest in old age. And what advances in this process from creativeness to enjoyment by means of collective co-operation is the social life." Then he interprets various phenomena of human societies and individual lives from primitive ages by reducing them to the activities of the social life. The instinct to survive under conditions favourable to human life is expressed only as a group-activity entitled biological obedience to the environment ; but when it fights against any kind of oppression it is expressed as active resistance. " Mind also in itself is but a primary step of activity." " Where there is no activity there can be no mind ; but though there is no mind there can be activity. Nay, in the first step of activity the general rule is that there is no mind." In other words, in the first step of life it is activity alone which appears. When activity has gradually developed correspondingly mind appears. The more activity advances the more mind becomes distinct. And at a late stage of this development it comes to be that, though activities have declined, mind alone is at work, and consequently an erroneous consciousness governs life. Hasegawa always severely attacks the products

of such an erroneous consciousness unaccompanied by a corresponding activity. The ground of Hasegawa's attack on present academic philosophies is originally based on this idea. He speaks of those philosophies in the scornful phrase—" the scholastic *fin de siècle* excitement of philosophy." Any way of interpreting all social phenomena as a system of mind or of voluntary acts is according to him altogether false.

One of the objects of Hasegawa's attacks as a product of this erroneous consciousness is the prevalent metaphysical view of the State. At the present time the science of the State, failing to recognize correctly the State as a fact of life, *i.e.* as a system of activities, often dares to deal with the State as if it were a romance of life produced by this erroneous consciousness. But it is not a mythology of the State but its natural history that we should seek, though the former is not entirely useless. But its real value consists in being a material for the natural history of the State, and the natural history of the State should be built upon such a material; but to set forth a metaphysics of the State from a mythology is bound to be false. Looking upon the State as a fact of life we cannot help saying that it is an expression of the social instinct of mankind in its fighting aspect, and it is this which has developed into the institution of the State. The life of the State does not include in it all the forms of social life, nor even the most

important ones. And, it may be that, as an organ perfectly adapted to the actual life of the individual, the State itself is not adequate. He thus maintains that the " idealization of the State " on the ground of the agreement of the goal of its life with that of individuals should be absolutely denied. Nevertheless he does not state anything concerning what future social form should replace the present State. To assert anything beyond activity is nothing more than describing some Utopia. He then does not agree with utopian thought concerning the construction of a new State. Even the movements which have grown up from Marx and the scientific socialism of others have in their evolutional function developed far beyond scientific socialism. " The greater part of the social thought of the present day does not necessitate any scientific or logical connection with organic evolution but relies on contemplative criticism." With Hasegawa, at any rate, to propose any future ideal is an error; and all that truly exists is activity. Whenever mind has gone more or less beyond activity and any fixation of ideas has occurred, this fixation must be at once destroyed by activity itself; and this procedure is to continue throughout life. Thus he argues that civilization arises by means of destruction rather than by means of construction.

Hasegawa also places emphasis on the need of a social sense in everything. Creation and consumption as life's activity are nothing but pheno-

mena of the group; so that he states that "no creation and consumption can be pure individual activities." Hence, whenever he observes any phenomenon of life, he never forgets to see it as an activity, and especially as a social activity. But to him society means after all a "group" of individuals in action, and accordingly his social activity means nothing other than a "group-activity." Apart from group-activity in a group Hasegawa can see no other mode of combination in society itself. "In a word, a group is nothing but a system for individuals." There is no reason why, besides individuals, another group should exist, or that individuals should be sacrificed for the preservation of the groups.

Takanobu Murobuse has advanced from criticism of social thought gradually to criticism of civilization in general. He once said, "I go alone by myself apart from the centre of the learned circle or of the world of thought," or "I will always to be a lonely man like the lonely Nietzsche." He is now writing several essays concerning the problems of life and civilization with the inspiration of a poet. One of his works, "The Downfall of Civilization" (1923), perhaps influenced by Spengler, aroused a great sensation among the people. Murobuse also attacked the academic philosophers for their inactivity; his own thought is grounded rather upon idealism. On the other hand, however, he attacked

such schemes for predicting the future of society by the law of social evolution, as, for example, those of the scientific socialists or anarchists. According to him: "In every culture the deepest ground is religion and art. Without religion and art culture would be unable to exist. An age of religion and art is truly an age of culture." From this standpoint he always attacks the scientific, mechanical and intellectual civilization of the present day. "Go from the world of intellect to the world of spirit. Pass from the glare of consciousness to subconsciousness; from the world of phenomena to things themselves; from the nature of the naturalist to the depth of the world-ground. Go breaking through the bounds of the conscious subject into the mystery of the creativity of the Universe. That is an eternal road with no end to it. And only in the deeps of this endless intuitive world is spread out before us the world of art." "An age of the city and its life is an age dead and buried. The city's spirit is buried when the earth and its real being are buried." "Man has returned to earth; civilization has fallen; and men have returned to earth and the deepest it includes." "Go beyond the world of ordinary, dead-level experience into the kingdom of being. That which lies furthest off lies nearest. That which is highest is always in the earth. Earth! Go and build culture upon earth; true culture lies on earth because the native place of spirit is there."

My description of the critics of civilization ends here. There is another group of noted thinkers, the editors of newspapers or journals, including *Setsurei Miyake* and *Sohō Tokutomi*. My description of their careers and contributions to Japanese thought has been given in the first chapter of this book. Setsurei Miyake originally started as a conservative but afterwards changed into a liberal. Absorbing impartially Eastern and Western knowledge, he is healthy and liberal in his attitude of criticism. At present Miyake, with his moderate opinion, is a representative of sound liberalism in Japan. Sohō Tokutomi was first a liberal and changed into a conservative. He seems in domestic affairs to advocate liberalism with ingredients of State socialism added to it, as well as a broad imperialism. Tokutomi is now endeavouring with all his power to complete his great work on modern Japanese history.

There have been and still are also literary men and religionists who arouse great interest among the people by means of their writings. As literary men, I can mention the late *Takeo Arishima*, *Saneatsu Mushanokōji* and *Momozō Kurata*, and as religionists *Toyohiko Kagawa*, *Tenkō Nishida*, and many others. The following are the points they have in common: interpretation of religious life in a humanistic spirit; emancipation of man's soul by means of liberalism; and the assumption of a certain spiritual attitude towards social problems. Each of these

characteristics tells something of the modern spirit. Mushanokōji, together with his friends, once published a magazine, " The White Birch," and they are still greatly influencing young men. He is now devoting himself to the completion of his " new village "—a spiritual and co-operative body established in order to solve the problem of the agreement between our spiritual and economic lives. Kagawa has played an important rôle not only in works of religious emancipation but even more in the Japanese labour movement. On these lines his contribution has been very notable. The systematic movement for the emancipation of labourers and farmers in Japan was in fact begun by him. His social thought seems to be akin to guild socialism. As a critic, he always expresses liberal views on every social and individual problem. Among the people, he is most famous for his novel, " Beyond the Death-line " (or " Before the Dawn "), in which is treated the new social life of Japan.

Of those who, originally students of natural science and at the same time critics, always express their views on the problems of life, the most remarkable are *Asajirō Oka* and *Jun Ishihara*. Oka I have already described in Chapter II. Ishihara is famous as a student of theoretical physics, especially of the Principle of Relativity. His criticism of life is always clear and deep; hence his attitude is that of a philosopher and an artist. It is natural that scholars of several cultural sciences should come

into touch with general problems of life. Among such scholars, we cannot neglect either, in the domain of political science, *Sakuzō Yoshino*, or, in the domain of political economy, *Tokuzō Fukuda*, with their great merits. We are indebted for much to both these scholars in various movements for the emancipation of the people in Japan. They are severe in their attacks on the old bureaucracy and are trusted by the people. Were we to speak of the most important thinkers in Japan in a broad sense, we ought, first of all, to name and describe these two scholars; but since in this book we are principally treating of the philosophical problems of Life and the Universe we must omit such details of them for the present at least.

CHAPTER IX

CRITICISM OF CIVILIZATION AND SOCIAL THOUGHT (*c*)

WHAT has most greatly influenced the Japanese people since the Great War is socialism. It is not, of course, an occurrence peculiar to Japan; but since then Japanese thought has been more definitely tinged with the new colour than previously with the following consequences: First, the view of life which had been till then individualistic became tinged with a certain social sense; secondly, the view which had been subjective and romantic became objective and actualistic; thirdly, the view which had been static and speculative became dynamic and practical; and, lastly, the view which had been aristocratic became democratic, which was for Japanese thought quite a revolution. So all thought is called "new" or "old" according as it is socialized or not. This development of thought has surely owed much to the rise of socialism since the War; and now there is no one, however conservative, who will not own that this democratic tendency among the people is past blotting out. The evils of the capitalistic system are acknowledged, in a measure, by the people at large.

As to the origin of the socialistic thought which has since shown such great advancement, probably we can trace it to the revolutionary spirit of the Meiji Restoration. When public opinion was aroused over democratic thought about 1881 the claims of the times unconsciously or partially contained socialistic thought. At that time socialist pamphlets were already published; and even the nationalization of land was advocated by certain progressivists. But though, in 1897, the Society for the Study of Social Problems, and, in 1898, the Association for the Study of Socialism, were respectively formed they remained societies for the mere study of those problems and they never attempted to advocate socialism. However, when in 1901 the Social Democratic Party was formed, they definitely advocated socialism based on Marxism as the party-platform. Here, it cannot be denied, was the foundation of a Japanese socialists' body. The founders of the party were the late *Denjirō Kōtoku*, *Isoo Abe*, *Sen Katayama*, and others. But as soon as the programme of the party was published the formation of the party was prohibited, so that, in place of the party, the People's Association (the *Heimin-sha*) was founded in 1903. By this time a socialist weekly, "The People's News," was published. As the Russo-Japanese War was popular amongst the mass of the people, these few leaders stood alone as the determined advocates of pacifism, but since that time the socialists, though small in

number, have gradually become noticed as important by the people. Then appeared the period of the socialist's calamity. The so-called socialists of those days included not only socialists strictly so-called but anarchists and others. Leaders of the movements in addition to the above were *Toshihiko Sakai*, *Sanshirō Ishikawa*, *Kin Yamakawa*, *Katsuzō Arabata* and the late *Sakae Ōsugi*. Many societies and magazines were founded and dissolved one after another; and the imprisonments of socialists were frequent. However, it was the so-called High Treason Case, in which twelve anarchists including *Kōtoku* were hanged, which dealt the mortal blow to socialists. Since then the pressure on the socialists by Government and people has been most severe, and, in general, socialists have been regarded as dangerous bombs in social life. After passing through this period of painful experiences, at last came a time for the acknowledgment of socialism in its right meaning and significance. The cause of this change was the Great War. Since the War all men's views have been radically revolutionized. That is the situation at present.

The famous socialists of the present day are *Toshihiko Sakai*, *Kin Yamakawa*, *Hajime Kawakami*, *Katsuzō Arabata* and *Motoyuki Takabatake*. Except Takabatake, who is a State socialist and has parted company with the others, they are all Bolshevists. Marx' " Capital " was translated in full into Japanese by Takabatake. Sakai and Yamakawa, after long

and painful experiences and several variations in thought, are now two chief leaders of the socialist movement in Japan; and since the Russian Revolution have consistently adhered to Bolshevism. Yamakawa translated Dietsgen's philosophical work into Japanese. The historical materialism of Sakai and of Yamakawa goes beyond that, in a mere epistemological sense, into metaphysical materialism. Kawakami, while a professor of the Imperial University, has also made great contributions to the diffusion of socialistic thought among the people through his magazine, "Studies of the Social Problems" (1919—), and other writings. We can say that in Japan he was the first to be a professor of the Imperial University and at the same time a socialist. But afterwards this has become not uncommon among teachers of social science. But up to the present, among professors of the philosophical sciences in the Imperial University, there is not a single instance like it. Kawakami's own character seems to be more or less idealistic notwithstanding his materialistic attitude in the interpretation of history. Hence how these two tendencies can be reconciled in his argument promises to be an interesting problem.

The late *Sakae Ōsugi* was the most important anarchist in Japan, but, to our regret, was assassinated at the time of the Great Earthquake Disaster in 1923 by the gendarmerie, whose members always looked on him as a poison to the nation.

At first, he had participated in the general socialist movement, but afterwards parted with it in order to become an open advocate of Anarcho-Syndicalism which, in his case, was idealistic. He was influenced in his character by Bakunin, and in doctrine by Prince Kropotkin. Ōsugi's thought was remarkably idealistic. According to him, "the labour movement is for the labourers a movement to acquire liberty and self-government in human life. It is a movement for humanity, for personality." It cannot be based merely on the biological demand for "food with ease." Concerning the social ideal, he was such a humanist that he said somewhat philosophically that "man's life is no book already written and complete. It is a book of blank pages on which we write letter by letter. To go on living —that is life." "We should endeavour to advance our actual condition in accordance with our own temperament and environment, and thus to seek the ideas and ideals suitable to ourselves." Here, learning from syndicalism, he saved himself from the utopianism of so-called scientific socialism. From this standpoint he attacked the Russian Revolution because, according to him, "in every revolution the labourers were always made the means of destroying the old society but had no hand in the construction of the new."

All thinkers and labour agitators concerned in the social movements are adhering either to anarchism or to bolshevism; and these two tendencies are

resulting in two parties within the social movement. "A or B?" (meaning "Anarchist or Bolshevist?") is the password whereby each man's thought is rightly tested. Both A and B, at one time, firmly repudiated parliamentarism, but since Yamakawa advocated "change of front" in both the socialist and the labour movements, the bolshevists have revised their attitude, and have participated in political movements with the liberals.

Among these emancipation movements, the woman's movement also must, of course, be included. Regarding this, I will say only this word: that feminine morality which was feudalistic before the Restoration, having gradually broken down, was first individualized, and is now being socialized. In reality these several stages in the development of morality are still mixed and in confusion. The most eminent new women of the present day who represent socialism are the poetess *Aki Yosano*, the thinker *Haru Hiratsuka* and *Kikue Yamakawa*. Hiratsuka has an introspective and philosophical and rare brain among Japanese women.

I can fully agree with the above-mentioned thinkers when they express their discontent with the academic philosophers. Just so far as those academic philosophers fail to take an interest in the concrete and actual social problems, or fail to have any notion of the new demands among the people, they cannot hope to be philosophers for to-day and to-morrow even with their fine and strictly logical

construction of thought. For instance, Hegel's philosophy, even with its finest palace of logic, cannot be in any respect a philosophy for the present day. In order to be a good adviser to the new and living age, philosophy, as I have already stated, must be, on the one hand, strictly methodological, and on the other, true to actual and concrete social phenomena. In other words, it must be compatible negatively with reflection as well as positively dynamic; in form it must be rightly arranged and, at the same time, conspicuously practical and inseparable from the activities of our practical life; and finally, it must be deeply connected with our individual beliefs whilst at the same time not losing sight of the goals of our social, co-operative life. Although unity of thought between academic philosophers and so-called critics of civilization is very difficult, the philosophy of the immediate future should always, ideally at least, be one capable of combining the two kinds of motives mentioned above. It is to be regretted that socialism in Japan has been based on the so-called materialist conception of history interpreted in a metaphysical sense, that is, on metaphysical materialism. Consequently socialism in Japan has actually no strictly philosophical ground. In opposition to this, I, for one, believe that the so-called materialist conception of history should be an empirical law of sociology interpreted in the epistemological sense, and that the ideal of socialism should be obtained from the philosophy

of personality. The fact that the academic philosophers have always understood the correlation of all phenomena as the correlation in essence instead of in function surely makes academic philosophies purely formal and definitive. Therefore to observe all social phenomena from the genetic point of view, as in the socialist's historical materialism or in Tanaka's and Hasegawa's thought, is indeed necessary and should not be overlooked. But I cannot believe that the genetic method is the whole of philosophy. As a preparation for philosophy it is indispensable, but is in itself no philosophy. In a criticism of civilization, therefore, I cannot hope to free myself from Kant's fundamental standpoint. No matter what the genesis of life's history may be, for example, a mathematical system does not admit, as in Tanaka's philosophy, of being reduced to function, much less to Hasegawa's system of facts. Therefore, though I greatly rely upon the genetic view in the analysis of social actuality, yet I must obstinately insist that, in the criticism of individual and social ends of life, we must maintain the transcendental viewpoint. But, at the same time, in the discussion of the epistemological ground, I cannot rely absolutely upon the Neo-Kantian so-called logism. I want to seek a combination of the so-called logism and the so-called psychologism upon a phenomenological standpoint.

My social philosophy begins with the claim for personal autonomy. And first I want to combine the

socialist ideal with the anarchist ideal. Major C. H. Douglas once said that there are only two Great Policies in the world to-day, namely, Domination and Freedom; but the opposition between socialism and anarchism is truly nothing but an opposition between these two ends of the policies. H. G. Wells saw the spirit of socialism as the spirit of service, while Bertrand Russell said that anarchism had the advantage as regards liberty, and socialism as regards the inducement to work; and I, for my part, can endorse both these opinions. After all, in my opinion, *the fundamental spirit of socialism is Service, and that of anarchism is Freedom.* In all social movements which aspire for a new social order these two spirits have been rising and falling by turns. That is to say, the one wants to control individuals in society in accordance with the ideal of the community, whereas the other wants to break the fixation caused by such control, and is careful not to lose the initiative of the individual demands. But the true ideal for the construction of society would be that, in such a society, no demand of the individual should lose anything of its initiative; and that each individual should express his original meaning in the right degree, and likewise contribute his share to the control of social life. The control in the socialist society should not be a merely formal and homogeneous one but one that is substantive and heterogeneous, and again the initiatives in anarchist society should not be

naturalistic and individualistic but moral and social. In this way, the social ends of those two ideas leave no room for a distinction to be drawn between them. When Marx dealt in one of his works with the highest stage of Communist society—*Criticism of the Gotha Programme*—he formulated the highest socialist maxim as follows: "From each according to his capacity, to each according to his need," but this maxim should apply as well to the anarchist; because Kropotkin gave exactly the same as the anarchist maxim in his work "The Conquest of Bread." I think that is reasonable; for, in my opinion, the standpoint on which the thought may be combined is that of "personal autonomy" which means an activity where the normative self defines the empirical self, as was shown in Kant's Ethics. And if so, we can conceive the meaning of Service and of Freedom relative to this activity as follows: first, for the normative self in this activity to realize itself in the empirical self means Freedom in a really true sense; and next, for the empirical self, modestly to obey orders from the normative self, and thus eventually acquire its own right position means Service in a really true sense. In this way personal freedom is combined with personal service in one and the same activity of personal autonomy or autonomous personality. Accordingly, in my opinion, *since the socialist spirit of Service and the anarchist spirit of Freedom mean one and the same spirit of our personal activity, they can agree with each other*

in our Idealistic Ethics. We can express this spirit not merely formally but also more substantively in the above-mentioned words of Marx. I would name this spirit, in which the socialist spirit and the anarchist spirit shall agree, *the ideal for the community*, and this unified standpoint, *socialism*, in its broad sense.

I think further that this socialist ideal can at once agree with the idealist ideal. I started from the belief of personal autonomy. However, personality instantly demands society. Apart from society, personality cannot be. The self-evidence of my self is that of my self faced by other selves. Without the fundamental ethical claim against the other self self-evidence of my self cannot be. Now what does the fundamental ethical claim of my self against the other mean but the combining of my self with the other by means of our struggle towards the ideal of community and by the consciousness of mutual restriction under this ideal? *This consciousness of mutual restriction under the ideal of community is Society.* In this sense philosophy would again be Social Philosophy in its broad sense; and for philosophy, apart from its ultimately becoming social philosophy, there is no task. Society is after all personality in its true meaning. A mere aggregation of men only means a group and not a society in any true sense. Society is a reality which embodies a certain ideal. Society, which is identical with personality, should be autonomous. That which

becomes the content or the end of this autonomous activity of society is none other than the ideal of community. In the ideal society each should contribute his strength to society according to his capacity, and should at the same time realize his life according to his inner demands. *Hence democracy means no quantitative, homogeneous restriction of individuals, but the bestowal upon each demand of each man of its respective qualitative and heterogeneous position from the viewpoint of the whole community through the combining activity of those individuals or of those demands.* Realization of the ideal of the community is one and the same personal activity, but always has its two sides: Freedom and Service. Therefore, the fundamental principles of the social reconstruction are, in my belief, "Freedom" and "Service."

All men respectively have their various kinds of demands; accordingly, each demand of each man, respectively associating with the same kind of demand of other men, forms a functional society. This society is termed *Association*. The richer therefore each man renders the content of his personality the greater are the number of Associations he may be able to form by means of the growing complexity of his demands; and these Associations, in their turn, combining with each other will so form complicated social relations. Each Association embodies its own value of life as the goal for its own demands; and each member of

an association is under the order of this value. Each man directs as much of his capacity as possible to the realization of this value in order to perfect himself and to contribute to the Association at the same time. This means that freedom combines with service in the one and the same activity. In case these Associations combine with each other, the same relation as in the case of individuals holds between a higher, compound Association and a lower, elemental Association. And so on; thus all social relations advance towards the one end—personal unity. That which becomes at last an ultimate unity of all relations is the ideal of the community. The more deeply the meaning of each man's demands may be expressed the more complicated will be the differentiation displayed of what constitutes the goal of its demands. Then the radius of a circle of each Association being gradually diminished in its length the compound construction of whole Associations will become so far complicated. That is, each society including within itself many small Associations its construction becomes regionalistic and not centralistic. At its limit, the elemental Association will shrink in the length of its radius to a mere point. In other words, each elemental Association will ultimately accord with each side of each man's individuality. On the other hand, however, each man will be so far differentiated that he can form any Association with any demand of any man to any individual

degree. Accordingly each individual who belongs to the community will be able to have a certain interest in each individual demand of every other person. I shall call such an ideal construction of society a *Personal anarchy*. It completely agrees with Marx' social ideal. However, it is distinguished from a so-called scientific socialism by the fact that my idea does not run to any utopianism which assigns a society constructed as above to any future *finite* point of our historical advancement, but aspires to such an ultimate perfection of society at the infinite furthest point of man's endeavour. And its distinction from merely so-called anarchism is that, according to my view, such a society is not to be produced and supported merely by man's free, natural character, but by man's idealistic endeavour. I call such a theory *Culturalism*. This philosophy of my own has been stated fully in my several works, namely, " The Principles of Culturalism " (1921), " An Introduction to Cultural Philosophy " (1923), " The Principles of Social Philosophy " (1925) and others.

EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

CHAPTER X

CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF CHINA (*a*)

CHINESE thinking, unlike Japanese, can boast a great and long tradition. It was pre-eminently great in its philosophical treatment of human nature, ethics, politics, and economics in very ancient times. In the words of one of the ancient writers: "By ruling himself, managing his own home, governing his own State, to bring about peace in the world," we discover the common tendency of Chinese philosophers to attempt, by starting from a psychological introspection of human nature, to construct a system of personal morality, to arrange customs and morals in the home, to harmonize mortality and politics in the State, and thus to achieve our purpose, *i.e.* peace in the world. The problem occupying contemporary Chinese thinkers also is none other than this. Hence, in a word, the main problem of the Chinese philosophies may be stated as a psychological observation of social philosophy. And what it has mainly lacked is a logical criticism of cognition. In this respect, we can find nothing to be compared even with the old Indian logic, much less with such a system as that of Aristotle. All was an unsystematic expression of intuitive knowledge. In this lie both the good and the weak points

of Chinese philosophies. However, social philosophical thought in China can claim great and lasting brilliancy. It is safe to say that, just as in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Hobbes and Rousseau and many other great thinkers lived, all the new social thought of to-day in a less systematic form but substantially the same existed, so present-day social ideas of the West were almost completely anticipated, so far as the *direction* of ideas is concerned, among the philosophers of the so-called Hundreds Schools, thousands of years ago in China. In these thinkers we find State socialism and anarchism as well as utilitarianism and the Social Contract theory all in a nearly complete form.

But these Chinese ideas were unable freely to assert themselves against the social system of China itself. The Chinese world slumbered soundly on for a long time far from industrial revolution. Meanwhile, in the West, industrial civilization and the system of capitalistic production made great advances with regard to the prospect of world unification. This world unification is a demand implicit in the very nature of industrial civilization and of the capitalistic system. When once civilization takes this direction there can be no compromise for this demand, which cannot be satisfied short of final unification of the world irrespective of the fact whether the promoters themselves desire it or not. While Eastern countries were unaware of the existence of such a civilization, civilization was making great advances in the West; and when at last the

East faced the West through the mediation of this civilization the East was unable to reject this foreign civilization with its world-uniting power, and unable to maintain its own. As a result Japan introduced the civilization all at once; but China had to accept it in fragments and gradually because the area of China is incomparably greater than that of Japan. But this civilization and system of production which were introduced have their own appropriate system of thought. Hence China in facing this new Western civilization could not escape facing a new problem, namely, how to manage these new ideas.

Thus contemporary thought in China has before it the following two practical problems: First, how to re-arrange those philosophies handed down from ancient times into contemporary forms which have a meaning for the present day without losing their original significance, or, in other words, how to re-arrange the new forms into Chinese traditional thought. Secondly, to what extent, and with what modifications, is it possible to introduce Western thought into China? The latter may be again divided into two problems, namely, first, in the case where the thoughts are observed in their general features; and, secondly, in the case where they are regarded in a narrow sense—in their special scientific aspect. Then, in my description of contemporary thought in China, I shall divide the theme for the sake of convenience into four aspects, as follows: (1) New interpretations of traditional philosophies; (2) The contact with Western civilization; (3) Which—

metaphysics or the natural sciences? (4) Social thought. It is unnecessary to restate the meanings of the first two of these themes. The third theme is the name of a problem which really has appeared in China in recent days as a synthesis of both the former problems. The fourth is given only for the sake of convenience.

(1) New Interpretations of Traditional Philosophies

On reading *Liang Ch'i Yueh's* "History of Political Thoughts of the Early T'sing Dynasty" or *Hu Shih's* "Outlines of History of Chinese Philosophy" we see the famous ancient philosophers being respectively interpreted from the new contemporary viewpoint. If now we turn to inquire which of the expositions of the ancient traditional philosophy requires reinterpretation, we shall find as first in time and importance that of Confucius. The Chinese people regard him almost with religious passion, and always speak of him as "the teacher of all time." He has exercised great influence from antiquity down to the present on every custom, rite, language, and literature, deeply tinging them all with his own thoughts. There was once a movement of the people in favour of making Confucianism the State religion of China; and even the Constitution of the Republic of China enacted in 1917, though not yet powerful over the people, at least clearly states that "Confucius is to be held in rever-

ence." How to interpret anew this most significant Confucianism must, then, be the most important problem for contemporary Chinese philosophy.

K'ang You Wei is a thinker who has endeavoured to interpret Confucianism in accordance with our own times and to seek in it some new meanings. He is one of the most eminent philosophers in modern China as well as a scholar in several branches of learning. But, as a leader, he is not adapted to the people of the Republic of China, but to the overthrown T'sing dynasty. Nevertheless, his argument, with its far-sighted scheme for an ideal society, cannot be neglected. He took for his authority a passage in one of the ancient sages' books, namely: in " The Record of Rites " (*Li Chi*). In this book, in the chapter entitled " *Li Yun*," is the following paragraph: " When ever the Great Way is realized, the following will surely take place: all the world will be a common possession; the wise and the able are elected; all people will be bound by equal ties of intimacy so that no man sees only his father as father nor only his son as son; the old keep their ease, the ripened youth has his responsibilities; the boy and the girl are trained up; widows, orphans, the disabled and the like are respectively cared for; men take their respective parts while women respectively marry; as for property, while one would hate to let it go to waste, he will not wish to have it in private possession; as for man's talents, while he would hate not to have exercised them, he will not

necessarily expend them on himself; and thus plots will come to an end, thieves and brawlers will not be seen, so that people will come to leave every door open: such an age should be called *Ta T'ung*." According to K'ang, that which was held by Confucius as the social ideal, was none other than this *Ta T'ung*; and the ideas which are set forth in these words, if interpreted into modern terms, would mean, after all, nothing less than Democracy, International Federalism, public education, endowment and sickness insurance, communism and sacredness of labour. He also argued that this ideal community, that is, *Ta T'ung*, will be completely realized in history through three stages; and that all social institutions must pass through these three stages. Some illustrations follow:

The First Stage	The Second Stage	The Third Stage
Federation of former States.	Construction of a new Public State.	Extinction of the State in a world society.
Inequality of personal rights within the several countries.	Gradual equalization of rights within countries, but inequality between the races.	Equality of all people, distinction between the States and the races being extinguished.
Capital punishment not yet abolished.	Capital punishment abolished, but not life imprisonment.	All punishments abolished, sense of shame being sufficient.
Every country having its own money.	The moneys of various countries gradually unified.	Money disappears.
The people owning private property, and the Government paying the price for its expropriation from the people.	The people's private property not to be expropriated, without great reason.	Private property extinguished.
Every country protecting its own trade.	The International Government protecting the trade of the several countries.	The distinction of States being extinguished, there is no protection needed.

According to K'ang, this third stage where the ideal, *Ta T'ung*, is to be completely realized, is called the Age of Great Peace and must be considered as Confucius's conception of an ideal community.

The words in "The Record of Rites," which have been taken as authority by K'ang, are very interesting; and K'ang's interpretation cannot be said necessarily to be false. Especially the words "As for property, while one would hate to let it go to waste, he will not wish to have it in private possession" are interesting when compared with Marx' sayings concerning the social ideal in "Criticism on the Gotha Programme." I think that both are advocating the same ideal. Therefore, we can say that K'ang's *Ta T'ung*-ism, though usually interpreted into English as "Internationalism," is really an advocacy of the same social ideal as in Western communism or anarchism. The fact that there were anarchists in ancient China has been well known in the West; but their number was limited to Lao Tze and a few others of his School. But now it can be seen from the "Record of Rites" citation that there were advocates of anarchist communism in the other Schools. But whether K'ang's view of history, that is, the three-stages theory, though very interesting, can be rightly deduced from Confucianism, seems very doubtful. Of the three social stages in his discussion the first stage may correspond in a general way perhaps to the early stage of undeveloped capitalism; the second stage to that of full developed

capitalism mixed with State socialism; and the third to that where anarchist communism is fully accomplished. His explanation of the social development towards communism through those stages, in comparison with Marx' doctrine, seems especially interesting. Thus K'ang's thought has comprised a certain amount of originality as Chinese thought. But regarded as social philosophy we cannot assign it great merit because his schemes concerning the development of history were merely arbitrary speculative sketches founded on no sound economic basis. Why these social stages necessarily pass through these successive changes is not at all explained by him; and even his statements of those stages are often inconsistent. What we would like to hear from him especially is the social principle in the development from the capitalistic to the communistic social system, for his reasoning on this point seems too easy. Thus, since his argument lacked scientific basis and was mere arbitrary assertion, he cannot be called a socialist, notwithstanding that his theory seemed socialistic, simply because the theory had no connection with practical life. This is the point at which it is radically distinguished from true socialism, which we shall discuss later.

But what is important to our present discussion is whether or not K'ang's interpretation can claim to be a representative development of Confucianism. Granted that the development of one aspect of the

teaching of so great and complex a thinker as Confucius leads us to *Ta T'ung*-ism, it does not necessarily follow that this rightly expresses Confucianism as a whole. To revise Confucianism with emphasis on one side, and to be the modern successor to Confucius, are very different tasks. Did K'ang not mistake the latter for the former? On this point, K'ang's position has been severely criticized by a famous Marxist, Ch'ên Tu Siu.

Ch'ên Tu Siu, being a Marxist, adheres to the materialist conception of history, and hence, could not consider Confucius' philosophy by itself apart from the age he lived in. According to him, since the doctrine produces the society and conversely the society produces the doctrine, there can be no doctrine that is eternal; the road varies with the times. When he turns to the philosophy of Confucius, he states that it was endowed with every characteristic of the feudalism of those days; and that all of its views of morality, rite, politics, etc., took their standard solely from the minority; so that the life of the great majority of the people was quite unaffected by it. According to Ch'ên's argument, therefore, for the people of the new China, which is already democratic and becoming more so, Confucius' feudalistic philosophy can have no meaning other than as an instrument to turn back the spirit of the times. The people's attitude towards Confucius, therefore, contrary to K'ang's argument, should be, according to Ch'ên, to reject him com-

pletely, and thus to reform Chinese morals, and achieve their purpose of State revolution. This position has gradually grown influential among the people through having gained the support of the younger generation. This movement is called the *Revolution of Ideas* or the *Ideological Revolution*.

The discussions between K'ang and Ch'ên as to whether the Chinese people should hold Confucius in reverence form not only one of the most important questions in present-day China, but also can give certain hints to us. But in my opinion both these positions are erroneous in that each of them has mistaken a partial view for a comprehensive one. Every thought contains two elements: the essential part which transcends the changes of time and the changeable part which reflects the characteristics of its time. These cannot be interchanged. I am convinced of the truth of the materialist conception of history; but this view must, at the same time, take cognizance of the essential and unchangeable part of every thought. Otherwise we shall be unable to explain the existence, within the same age, of two opposing thoughts. Though, on the one hand, I can agree with Ch'ên in believing that Confucius' philosophy was thoroughly tinged with feudalistic morality; yet, on the other, I am convinced that, within this expression of feudalistic morality, he still set forth most valuable and permanent contributions to the essence of morality. Confucius' morality should not be applied

in its original form to the present. But the meaning of the saying, "Return to Confucius," should be, like that of the Neo-Kantians, "to transcend Confucius," just as much in Kant has been transcended. In that case Confucius' philosophy will shed an eternal glory in the world. Ch'ên seeing only the variable part of Confucianism rejected its eternal part, while K'ang, seeing its eternal element, was liable to the fallacy of applying its variable part to the present.

With regard to the attitude to be taken in the study of the ancient philosophies, Hu Shih once said as follows: first, as regards the method, Chinese scholars should open-mindedly adopt the scientific method of the Western scholars, to make good the Chinese lack of systematic and logical habits; secondly, as regards the subject-matter, scholars should have recourse to the innumerable works produced by the scholars of Europe, America, and Japan. From this standpoint, Hu Shih, Liang Ch'i Yueh and others actually have been and are endeavouring to interpret old philosophies anew. Accordingly it seems to me that the Chinese philosophers of the present day have need to study the ancient philosophies on two sides. In the first place, they have to write, in accordance with the scientific method, an authoritative history of Chinese philosophy. While, of course, I do not say that nothing of the kind has been undertaken, it seems to me that the old thoughts have been dealt with by

themselves and not arranged in connection with the whole social structure and culture. In the second place, they have need to revivify those thoughts with new meanings. If these two things happen, we can prophesy a great future for the Chinese philosophies.

(2) The Contact with Western Civilization

Another source of intense antagonism between conservatives and progressives has been the question whether or not China should introduce Western civilization. But, either way, China could not be for ever isolated from Western civilization; and, in fact, she has been gradually introducing it. Even so, there was one thought, in which many Chinese found satisfaction, namely, that the twentieth century was the appointed time for the wedding of the world's two greatest civilizations, the Western and the Chinese; the Western civilization being preferable on the material side, on account of its measurements and technique, while conversely the Chinese is far preferable on the spiritual side, on account of its morality; so that the marriage of the two would supply the lacking material elements to the Eastern civilization from the Western, and thus ensure fresh progress for its spiritual side. This view has been most widely accepted by men of the intelligent classes in China as well as in Japan. I could cite many advocates of this view.

But it must be acknowledged that this desire for

marriage between the two civilizations is too difficult to realize. Granting that the superiority of the Western civilization is in its measurements and technique, that fact implies a spirit underlying and characterizing it, which we may call the " urge towards civilization," entirely different from the Oriental spirit; and when the two civilizations meet—no matter from what angle—the real encounter is between these two spiritual elements of which the Western has a special unity not found in the Oriental. I cannot think, therefore, that any scheme of combination whatever between the material element in the Western civilization and the spiritual element in the Eastern can be achieved. The case is quite the same as in Japan.

As a matter of fact Western civilization and thought have been gradually introduced into China, and as a consequence several important reforms have taken place in Chinese civilization and ideas. The most notable of them are, first, the Literary Revolution; secondly, the Revolution of Ideas; thirdly, the anti-religious movement; and, fourthly, the socialist movement. Among these, all but the first were connected with the socialist movement; and, in all four movements, Ch'ên Tu Siu has always been the most active.

First, the Literary Revolution was opened by *Hu Shih*, an intelligent young thinker, who had studied in America, and was supported by a man of decision, *Ch'ên Tu Siu*. The main point of their

contention was to eliminate the distinction between the colloquial and the written languages, and to express present-day thought merely in present-day language. Hu's motto was, "Literature in the native language, the native language in literature," which means that literature should be written in the living language, and that, if literature is so written in the national language, a true national language will at once be formed. Hu, having studied under Dewey, is a Pragmatist; accordingly, beneath his efforts concerning the language was sought, as Hu said himself, a certain evolutional attitude. According to him, since literature varies with the age, and each age requires its own literature, the present should create its own literature, as the past ages created theirs. Of course, as Ch'ên has said, since in recent China industry has remarkably advanced and the population has been centralized, and under those conditions the modern language is growing notably influential, the time was approaching for a literary revolution even had there been no Hu and Ch'ên.

Secondly, the Revolution of Ideas was the Anti-Confucian movement which I have mentioned above. Thirdly, the anti-religious movement was mainly directed against Christianity, and was supported by Ts'ai Yün Pe'i, Ch'ên Tu Siu and many other young socialists. Liang Ch'i Yüeh, who was a disciple of K'ang and one of the most eminent and learned thinkers in China, criticized in

1922 this movement as follows: "That such a movement exists, must be taken as evidence that the people are active and energetic in their thinking as well as in their real lives, so that the movement may be on the whole desirable; but religion and superstition are not identical things; religion means only feeling in its passionate state, and accordingly, it is most sacred as well as useful and necessary for human society; and now, since men are enthusiastic in behalf of anti-religious thought, is not this spiritual activity itself a kind of religion?"

The fourth movement, namely, the socialist movement, I will treat later on.

Since the Great War, there have been widely heard in China, accompanied by the severe criticism of Western civilization by Westerners themselves, voices proclaiming the bankruptcy of Western civilization, and saying that hereafter Eastern civilization must rise to replace it. To-day in China, side by side with young men's progressive movement, there is also the conservative movement endowed with certain new meanings, and strongly welcomed by a part of the Chinese people. This group is represented by *Ku Hung Ming* and *Liang Sou Ming*.

Ku Hung Ming is one of China's great old scholars. Whatever criticism he makes of Eastern or Western civilization always includes something worth while. Since he was educated in England as a boy, he can

write English with skill so that his works are known pretty widely in the West. His purpose is also to combine the good points in both civilizations, and thus to eliminate the line between the West and the East. According to him Eastern civilization has already reached its completion and is fit to live by, whereas Western civilization is still incomplete and under reconstruction. In order to possess a true civilization we should have a true philosophy of life, *i.e.* one corresponding to the "Road" in China; but the Westerners, having no such "Road" as yet, cannot have true civilization. Citing the differences between the West and the East, he says: First, when we examine their individual lives we find that Europeans live to work whereas the Easterners only work to live. Though the latter earn money, it is only for the sake of enjoying their lives; and when they have earned sufficient to live on they are content with that. On the contrary, Westerners, since they aim only at earning money, cannot be content however much they earn. Secondly, concerning education, the Westerners aim at building up the man of success, adaptive and useful to society, whereas the Easterners aim at building up the man of character who is not only adaptive to present life but also serviceable in constructing a better world. Thirdly, regarding society, that of the West is founded on money, whereas that of the East is on morality. Fourthly, regarding politics, that of the East is founded on

the conscience or on the sense of shame, that of the West on power. Lastly, he continues, characterizing the two civilizations, Eastern civilization aims at building up better and better manhood; the Western at building up more and more useful machines. Western civilization is called materialistic; but the true materialistic civilization appeared in Rome, and the present civilization is far worse than materialistic—*i.e.* it is mechanical. The true meaning of "civilization," according to him, is both beauty and intelligence.

The above criticism of civilization by Ku, I think, is surely full of significance, notwithstanding some misconceptions. But the so-called Chinese civilization of his admiration is not China's present-day civilization. He only longs for the classical civilization of China, in the way the classicists in Europe longed for the Greek civilization. According to him the Renaissance in China was in the T'ang dynasty when Chinese civilization was in full bloom. However, in the present day, this tradition has been accepted by only a small part of the Chinese; and probably half of the Chinese people have been mongolianized. The succession to the T'ang civilization has fallen rather on the Japanese, so that in Japan true Chinese civilization is still flourishing. Ku has thus changed and has become an admirer of Japanese civilization. His attitude towards civilization, being always against quantity in favour of quality, is against the democratic

thought of the present day, and he regards it with scornful disdain. His spirit of pure loyalty to the fallen T'sing dynasty still cannot even now be moved. In his old age he came to Japan and was given a hearty reception by the conservatives here.

The five distinctive points between Western and Eastern civilizations that were pointed out by Ku not only include certain self-contradictory elements but his logic is also not infallible. But to summarize his positions, he must be regarded as one who has exposed intelligently the fallacies with which commercialism, industrialism, and imperialism in the West have been infected, and his criticism thus agrees in many points with that of some eminent Western critics. For example, Edward Carpenter has said that in Western civilization unity of life has been lost; and Edmond Holmes has said that the Great War has revealed to Westerners the hollowness of the materialistic civilization upon which they had prided themselves; and still further Bertrand Russell has criticized the times by showing that the all-important fact of the present day is the struggle between industrial civilization and humanity. Essentially in spirit these sayings are not very far from Ku's criticism. As I have stated above it is incorrect to call European civilization thoroughly material because the material side of that civilization is nothing but an outer expression of its inner spirit. I grant that the inner spirit of Western civilization has hitherto been advancing somewhat towards

injustice. Ku Hung Ming has indicated the main characteristics of Eastern civilization in the fact that political and economic lives have been directed not by self-interest but by the moral sense. This means, in my opinion, nothing but that our political and economic lives have not become separated from the whole unity of life. I want to lay stress on this criticism. On the other hand, our desires are incessantly endeavouring to increase their contents, while the advancement of our science is also incessantly opening out ever new fields for us. We cannot close our eyes to this advance. Now, then, can this new advance be unified by our life? That is the point where our problem lies. Though Ku has pointed out the fallacies of the commercial civilization of the present time, still he seems to disregard the historical process through which our economic reality has necessarily developed, and conversely he wishes to return to the morality and ideology of a former feudalistic age. Can we succeed with such a scheme? Whoever advocates the return to a past civilization always seems unable to get rid of this fallacy. What was cited by him as characteristic of Eastern civilization, therefore, was really what was held by a small minority of the nobility. For example, when Ku says that the Westerners are living to work while the Easterners are living to enjoy their lives this means only that the morality of the Westerners is that of producers; that of the Easterners of consumers. And

of these moralities, the former everywhere prevails among the labouring majority of the people, whilst the latter is confined to the small circle of those who have no laborious work.

When Ku lectured in Japan on the true meaning of political economy his misconception was far more distinctly exposed. In that lecture, emphasizing that Eastern economy had been led by morality, whilst Western economy had displayed the loss of morality, he went on to say that though before the introduction of Western economy the Chinese people had possessed a community life, when once that economy was introduced the fine community life was completely destroyed. But, in my opinion, the condition of Chinese society before its contact with industrial civilization was as follows: First, its economic life was self-sufficient. Secondly, the people were not awakened to a knowledge of class-conflict. Thirdly, the people's wants were still very simple. And, lastly, the volume of products being still small, there were as yet no surplus goods requiring a foreign market. Under such conditions China was probably unique in possessing a commonwealth including the ruling and ruled classes together. Such a commonwealth, therefore, must be called a feudalistic or slavish community. But after China started on her industrial advancement those conditions were inevitably destroyed. However great the defects in this new civilization are it is absolutely impossible

to return to the old life of the slavish community. The reason, then, why Ku's principle of morality, though it comprised fine motives, was welcomed only by a few of the nobility and was rejected by the majority in China as well as Japan lay in the above reasons. We are awaiting a new unity of life which is not slavish for the community.

Liang Sou Ming is professor of Indian Philosophy in Peking University, and his latest work, "Eastern and Western Civilizations and Their Philosophies" (1922), has been pretty widely read by the public. According to Liang Sou Ming the present is an age in which civilization is Westernized, to be sure; but in the future it will turn back to the Chinese and ultimately to the Indian form. Recently when Tagore lectured in several places in China the number of his sympathizers was by no means small. Thus all the tendency to emphasize the value of Eastern original cultures must be interpreted as an expression of the anxiety of the Chinese people to free themselves from the pressure and restraint of Western countries. However, when I place Chinese civilization side by side with the Western and the Indian in turn I cannot believe that its future development will be away from the Western and towards the Indian. At any rate the Chinese view needs a more scientific demonstration in the light of economic facts before we can accept it as the orientation of China in the future.

We must now proceed to observe what influence Western academic philosophies have had upon Chinese academic philosophies. We have already observed that while Japan has shown remarkable advancement in its academic philosophies, in China Western academic philosophies have not yet been deeply thought of. There does not exist anything like a circle of so-called academic philosophers who are studying the common philosophical problems of the world. *Hu Shih* is a Pragmatist, but we have yet to see him make public any systematic philosophical thought of his own. He once wrote a treatise, "The World's Philosophies of the Last Fifty Years" (1922); but what he treated as the latest philosophies were nothing but James's and Dewey's Pragmatism, Bergson's intuitive philosophy, and Russell, Marvin, and others of the New Realism movement. Moreover his criticism also was not really thorough-going. This treatise exactly shows the level of Chinese academic philosophies. The newest German philosophies—Neo-Kantianism and others—have not as yet been widely studied in China.

CHAPTER XI

CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF CHINA (*b*)

(3) METAPHYSICS OR SCIENCE?

THE most interesting discussion for us in China of late has been on the question "Metaphysics *versus* Science." As a philosophical problem, this problem was not a particularly new one, and may be said in a certain sense to have been already solved in the circle of Western philosophers. But in the circle of Chinese philosophers it was necessary at first for each thinker to define his respective attitude towards this problem. In this discussion almost all of the eminent thinkers participated; so that the standpoint of each Chinese thinker is best observed by its means.

The discussion was opened with a furious attack by *Ting Wên Chiang*, professor of geology in Peking University, on a lecture entitled "A View of Life" by *Chang Chün Li* in 1923. Before this discussion, scientific studies in China had been gradually advancing in the direction of the natural sciences; and the traditional Chinese metaphysics had seemed to be more or less neglected so that Chang expressed his natural disagreement with this lecture. His

main point was as follows: All sciences have their respective principles; but there are limits to the validity of each science. For instance, "Introspection," though it is simply a theory concerning the relation between the self and its environment, has been a greater subject of dispute in the world through all the ages than any other. We can cite such kinds of problems as the following arising from this subject:

(1) On the relation between self and relatives—*i.e.* the question of a large or a small household.

(2) On the relation between self and its opposite sex—*i.e.* the question of male dominance or sex equality.

(3) On the relation between self and property—*i.e.* the question of private property as opposed to public ownership.

(4) On our attitude towards social reconstruction: whether it should be gradual or sudden—*i.e.* the question of conservatism or progressivism.

(5) On the relation between the mind and soul within the self and matter outside it—*i.e.* the question of material *versus* spiritual civilization.

(6) On the relation between self and society—*i.e.* the question of Individualism *versus* Socialism.

(7) On the relation between self and humanity as a whole—*i.e.* the question of Egoism or Altruism.

(8) On the hopes of the self in relation to the Universe—*i.e.* the question of Pessimism or Optimism.

(9) On religious belief—*i.e.* Atheism, Monotheism, Pantheism, etc.

Examining the comparative fitness of Introspection and the Sciences to treat these problems we find that the special characteristics of introspection, (1) subjectivity, (2) intuitiveness, (3) synthetic power, (4) free will, and (5) personal unity, fit subjects for their consideration, as the sciences never will be able, advance as they will, to answer such questions. The answer is beyond the reach of anything but humanity itself dealing with its own meaning and values. At present China's new civilization is adopting Western material civilization; but we must constantly bear in mind limitations of this material civilization and not lose our own introspection. The above was Chang's main point.

Ting Wên Chiang who attacked Chang's position, being himself a scientist, supported the standpoint of natural science, saying that it would be unjust to place the responsibility of the Great War on the natural sciences but rather upon the fact that politicians and educators were unscientific; and

that we must be very careful not to encourage the neglect of science among the young men who had become gradually interested in its study. According to Ting, granting that the view of life is at present not reconciled, it is not permanently of an irreconcilable nature; but if by the analysis and proof of its facts it can be reconciled, the duty of closing this controversy rests upon us. The above was Ting's advocacy. Since then thinkers have argued the matter out in detail; and many other scholars such as Liang Ch'i Yüeh, Wu Chih Hui, Hu Shih, and Ch'ên Tu Siu respectively have expressed their views on the controversy. Of late, this controversy has been most active amongst many within the circle of Chinese thinkers.

I have already stated that *Liang Ch'i Yüeh* once supported the necessity of religion. Examining his lecture, "The Scientific Spirit and Eastern and Western Civilizations," he takes a correct view of the meaning of science, and points out several ill effects which have arisen owing to the usual lack of the scientific spirit in China; and he states that although he could not assent to the view that Westerners were scientific and Chinese not so, he nevertheless believed that Chinese culture would gain a most powerful new element through the rise in its midst of the scientific spirit. But when he discusses the effects of science, in his work, "The First Volume of the Recent Works by Liang Jên Kung," he appears rather among those who proclaim the

bankruptcy of science. According to him, in this book, the scientist's new psychology turns the human soul into a kind of material phenomenon, and the materialistic philosopher even constructs a purely materialistic and mechanical view of life from the sciences, and explains all inward and outward activities by means of " necessary laws " of material and mechanical movements. Thus the free will of human beings is annihilated. But if men's wills could not be free, how can men be responsible for their acts ? This is the crux of the present situation ; and upon this view our life would lose all value. Even now we hear among Europeans the cry that belief in the omnipotence of science has turned into a dream, and that the age of the bankruptcy of science has come. This was Liang's opinion about the meaning of science. In his criticism of the controversy between Chiang and Ting he seems also to be on Chiang's side, attacking the belief in the omnipotence of science.

Liang's opponent aroused by " The First Volume of the Recent Works by L. J. K. " was *Hu Shih*. Originally Ting's attack on Chang's lecture appeared in a weekly paper, " Endeavour," managed by Hu, who entertained scientific thought as a Pragmatist. Naturally he had agreed with Ting in this controversy. In adverse criticism of Liang's opinion that European science is bankrupt, he said that in China, where even the good effects of science have not as

yet had a chance, the time has not arrived to speak of its ill effects, but that our business is rather to develop it to the utmost in present-day China where the means of communication as well as of business are still in undeveloped infancy and where the view of life of the Chinese still savours of superstition, and the sooner scientific education makes a clean sweep of this atmosphere the better. *Wu Chih Hui* treated the same problem much more minutely in his treatise, "A New View of the Universe and Life." His scheme was to construct a view of life on the basis of science. The following was his view of life: (1) We know from the conclusions of astronomy and physics that space is infinitely great. (2) We know something of the infinite duration of time from our knowledge of geology and paleontology; (3) We know by means of the various sciences that all the movements and variations of the Universe and of all that it includes come of themselves, and not by any supernatural aid of any Creator; (4) We know by means of biological science the waste and the brutality present in the struggle for existence; (5) We know by means of biology and psychology that there is only the difference of degree and not of kind between man and the other animals, man originally being a kind of animal; (6) We know the cause and the course of evolution of living creatures as well as of human society by means of biological science, anthropology, ethnology, and sociology; (7) We know by means of the biological and

psychological sciences that all psychological phenomena have their respective causes; (8) We know that our morality and rites are always varying, and that the cause of this variation may be sought in the scientific methods employed in biology and sociology; (9) We know from the new bio-chemistry that matter is not a dead but is a living thing, and also that it is not static but is active. (10) We know from biology and sociology that the individual—the microcosmos—is mortal, whilst humanity—the macrocosmos—is immortal. The above is the outline of Wu's view of the Universe and Life. Hu commended this view, calling it " the scientific view of life," and took the point of view that in such scientific views we could expect to find every kind of beauty, poetical object, and moral responsibility as well as full opportunity for expressing our " creative intelligence."

Thus over against the metaphysicians Hu Shih held his position as a progressivist. But, in turn, he was censured on his left wing by socialists for not being radical enough. The head of those socialists was *Ch'ên Tu Siu*. Ch'ên, criticizing these controversies, said that there was not much to choose between Ting and Chang since each only served to break down the other side, and that for the step forward Hu was needed. According to Ch'ên, each of the nine themes proposed by Chang as problems insoluble by science could be logically explained by analysing them in the light of the social

sciences. For example, the problem of the patriarchal household or the small family arises out of the change from an industrial to an agricultural society as a natural effect of the social development. Or, again, the problem of male dominance over woman or the reverse, and of the system of marriage, may be explained by the fact that in agricultural society parents and husbands treated their sons and daughters as means to production, *i.e.* as their property, whereas, in industrial society, the system of home industry has begun to wane, and, in its place, has arisen the wage system, under which naturally the members of the family can no longer be treated as means to production, and the woman's movement for her rights has been started. The other themes also may be explained in the same way. After all, it was his belief, he said, that there are always present the objective, material causes behind all phenomena, by means of which society may be varied, history interpreted, and our life determined. He called this belief " the materialist conception of history." Such was Ch'ên's opinion.

Thus the controversies have developed finally to a controversy between the scientists and the materialists. Hu Shih replied to Ch'ên's criticism as follows: Ch'ên's view as just shown is merely one way of interpreting history, whereas *his own position* in the controversies was the need of the *introspective method.* This means a view concerning

the relation between the individual and the Universe, including humanity and everything else, whereas the former view—being but a way of interpreting history, *i.e.* of interpreting the relation of the individual to history—is but a part of the latter view. Ch'ên said that there are indeed objective, material causes in all phenomena, by which society may be changed, history interpreted, and our life determined. But if Ch'ên did not believe as well in the power of thought, knowledge, opinion, and education to change society, interpret history and govern our view of life, why, instead of thus laboriously engaging in the work of propagation, is he not quietly waiting for the conditions where the economic system will vary of itself? The above was Hu's answer. In replying to this, Ch'ên again explained the meaning of historical materialism. Ch'ên argued that the historical materialist rejects neither human endeavour nor the activity of any genius; but that the historical materialist holds consistently to economic monism in institutions, religion, thought, politics, morality, culture, and education, whereas the other side advocates pluralism and thus each of these elements separately. This, he said, was the main difference between him and Hu.

Thus almost all the eminent thinkers in China have dealt with this controversy concerning the relation between introspection (or metaphysics) and science. And their agreements as well as their differences have been clearly brought out. This

gives us a rough separation of the thinkers of China into three factions: the metaphysicians, the scientists, and the historical materialists. Moreover we shall be able to guess why these tendencies have appeared in China, as well as see the direction in which they will probably develop in the future.

It is my opinion that neither of these three tendencies is really wrong, but that each by a completely different method has dealt with a different problem. The great mistake of each was in attacking the others' standpoints in order to assert his own standpoint. Philosophy engages in criticism on the meaning of life, science analyzes the causal relations in natural phenomena, and social science interprets materialistically the social phenomena; these are respectively different functions and necessarily neither can take the other's place. These thinkers have entered into an endless dispute because the points at issue have been different. The nine themes presented by Chang as the main problems of life were not in the least suitable as problems for metaphysics, and could be far better arranged from the standpoint of social science. Ch'ên's attack on Chang's argument, always using his examples, seems to me very reasonable. For instance, the problem of the patriarchal household or the small family is not one merely for metaphysics but one which should have a preliminary consideration from the standpoint of the social sciences. Is it not natural when such problems

are treated by the vague method of metaphysics that the answers resulted in disunity? Again, natural science may treat the whole of the problems concerning the Universe and Life, analyzing all into the numerous relations of cause and effect. However, the special task of criticism on the value of life should be left to metaphysics as its original sphere of thinking, and not committed to the natural and the social sciences. Several problems of life presented by Chang, after having been arranged by the natural and the social sciences, still should be passed over to metaphysics for a consideration of their value. Although Wu argued the possibility of arriving at *one* view of life by means of natural science, his conclusion was *a* view which may be arrived at according to naturalistic theory and yet leaves it possible for us to draw an entirely opposite conclusion from the same ground of facts. For example, Wu argued that space is infinitely great from the standpoint of astronomy and physics, and though the facts regarded from the view of natural science are surely so, yet when we consider that all this knowledge is within our comprehension, we can say that that which is infinitely great is nothing more than I myself, who am able to embrace all these thoughts, and thus space so comprehended within myself must be very small. If we have known the waste and brutality in the struggle for existence from the knowledge of biological science, I can say at once that, from the same cognition of fact,

one man will conclude, "therefore be generous to the others and co-operate with them," and another, "therefore be aggressive lest we succumb in the struggle." Thus I hope that these tendencies of thought in China may fully develop in future, each for ever keeping its original sphere. However, for the present, there is far more need for the development of the natural and the social sciences. Because, by means of the natural sciences, the material conditions of life in China will be better arranged, while, by means of the social science, social philosophy in China, originally utopian, will be capable of acquiring a sounder basis.

(4) Social Thought.

Chinese philosophies were indeed originally what should be called social philosophies. Thus what has been so far discussed by us must be called from a certain point of view social thought. But at this juncture by these words I mean especially socialistic thought in a wider sense than it has been previously treated. China was for a long time under severe restraint, and has but recently changed to the life of a new republic, thus producing all sorts of modern social movements. The majority of the people, of course, are still in their long sleep, but small bands of progressives are engaging in extraordinarily new social movements. So that we can say of China that, in taking this new step, she is

dragging along with her both newer and older things than are present in Japan.

As a socialist the most eminent in China was the late *Sun Wên*. Sun Wên was not only a thinker but also a leader in the Revolution as well as the real founder of the Republic of China. To write the history of the Chinese Revolution is to write the biography of Sun Wên. He was the Lenin of China indeed. The outline of his socialistic theory was stated in one of his works, "Sun Wên's Theory." But in the closing years of his life he seemed to be more inclined towards Bolshevism.

The point of his opinion is well expressed by his two mottoes, namely, "To *act* is easy but to *know* is difficult," and, "Where there is a *will* there is a *way*." According to him, the Chinese are ignorant, for example, of the nature of food—what quantity of nutriment to be supplied; how it affects the human body, etc. For that reason, they have despised the blood of the ox and of the pig which contains large quantities of nourishment. To this, he said, "Eating itself is not difficult, but knowing what to eat is the difficulty." So he spent many chapters in his book to make this truth plain. This same truth really suggests that to start a revolution as an *action* is not necessarily difficult, but to acquire a just *knowledge* why we should start the revolution is most difficult. On hearing this opinion of Sun's, I happened to remember that Kropotkin in his criticism of the process

of the French Revolution once remarked that the fact that men concerned in the Revolution were so timid in their thinking notwithstanding their having been bold in their actions—such a fact constituted the chief defect in the Revolution. The moral sense of the Chinese has always been practical and inclined towards compromise. And it would be especially hard in the case of China, after three hundred years of social fixity under the T'sing dynasty (though in China a change of dynasty was common enough throughout her history), to acquire a just knowledge of the reason for a revolution and to get the will to start it.

Sun's argument, I think, was most appropriate for one who stood in the midst of the Revolution and spread its brands and exactly predicted its course. The action of the Revolution was easily accomplished but the majority of the people actually still seem not to know clearly the *ideal* of the Revolution. This is the fundamental reason, in my opinion, why China cannot get rid of her present confusion.

Sun Wên's socialistic thought is expressed in his so-called "tri-*min*-ism" and in his "constitution of five powers." I shall state his ideas in outline. "Tri-*min*-ism" was so named because in each of the mottoes Sun adopted, in order to express in brief the three principles of his socialism, was the Chinese word "*min*" which means "people." The three principles are Race-determination (*Min Tsu*), Democracy (*Min Ch'üan*), and Socialism

(*Min Shêng* = people's living). Fundamentally, to be sure, his argument was for Democracy; but the principle of Democracy, according to him, must be realized, first, along racial, secondly, along political, and, lastly, along economic lines. Hence, Race-determination, Democracy, and Socialism were laid down as the main principles. His whole position was often called Socialism; but, strictly speaking, that name applied only to the third part.

Sun Wên's race-determination means a just combination of the five great races of China, namely, the Han (or Chinese proper), Ts'ang (or Tibetan), Mung (or Mongolian), Hui (or Mohamedan) and Man (or Manchurian) races. Among them the Han race comprises by far the greatest portion of the Chinese people, having a population of about four hundred millions, and leaves only a small remainder for the other four races. However, the Han race has hitherto been oppressed under the T'sing dynasty; and though their Revolution was accomplished, their State has not yet been constructed. As for the other four, they can no more than keep their lives under the power of foreign countries, namely, Manchuria under Japan, Mongolia under Russia, and Tibet under England. For this reason, according to Sun, China must construct a State which consists of one great Chinese nation, with China proper as the central force which shall assimilate the rest into itself. On the other hand, as his foreign policy, Sun insisted upon making

the Chinese race independent of the pressure of foreign countries.

Sun's second proposition—Democracy—is a demand for political powers for the people. What these political powers are is fully set forth in his proposal of a constitution of five powers. His five powers are the legislative, administrative, judicial, impeaching, and appointing powers. Of these, the first three are an imitation of European politics, and the remaining two are original with him, but indicative of historical conditions in China. The last power—that of appointments—means the power to conduct the examinations for the appointments of governmental officials by means of the will of the people and is especially interesting to all who know how odd and undemocratic the system of appointments has hitherto been in China. Sun's last proposition, namely, "the demand for people's life" (to translate him literally), meant, according to himself, nothing less than European Socialism, of which he had been, according to himself, the earliest advocate in China. His socialism was less theoretical than practical, and was applied to Land and Capital. In short, it was State Socialism, or better still, State Capitalism. To me the economic conditions of present-day China more or less resemble those of Russia under the New Economic Policy. Hence, in my opinion, judging by Russia's case, where in reality life has been unable to become completely socialistic in spite of having become

formally so, in China, where all the conditions are far worse than in Russia and where the power of the central government is so weak, it will be certainly a difficult thing to reach even State capitalism, and the day when China will become a completely socialist State must be far distant. This is not the day for China to discuss socialism, but to study the problem of how to establish capitalism soundly. After all, Sun Wên's socialism, though it looked to be well arranged in its form, in the main sacrificed its theoretical consistency to the practical, and does not furnish a very good basis. He was so situated, I think, that he could not help being practical, and accordingly unable to unify his theory; because present social conditions in China demanded immediate reformation and were besides of a very complicated nature.

Sun Wên's eminence was rather as a radical statesman than as a theoretical socialist. A name well known as a socialist in the true meaning is *Chiang K'ang Hu*. Chiang K'ang Hu's experience as a socialist in both theory and practice has been very long. Politically he holds tenets of the New Democracy, which mean somewhat as follows: first, the right both to vote and to be voted for to be given to all who have passed an examination in a general knowledge of the laws; secondly, independence of the three Government powers; and, thirdly, the adoption of the system of vocational

representation. Next, economically he advocates the New Socialism which means as follows: first, the transfer of private property to public ownership; secondly, payment for all labour to be regulated by the State; thirdly, government support of universal education and care for the sick. Summarizing the above propositions he gives them the name of New Democratic Socialism; and, on this principle, the Social Party was formed.

His thought as in Sun's case (and probably a characteristic weakness of the present-day Chinese thinker) is not necessarily fine in principle, and lacks originality in spite of its well-arranged form. What Chiang presents is at best but what has already been seen in European socialism. And finally we must note that his theory, as a whole, is still a species of State socialism.

As Marxists, *Ch'en Tu Siu* and *Li Tai Chao* are the most eminent. Ch'ên holds Marxism with almost no modification. But as regards the method of solving political problems in contemporary China he earnestly urged the formation of a powerful political party, combining all the democratic elements in the country; and then, within the State, the overthrow of the feudal military caste and the construction of one all-embracing democratic Government over the whole country; and abroad, to make China independent of the universal imperialism of foreign countries. The fact that thus the ideals of all socialists in China are at present more or

less tinged with the purpose of State unification can be said exactly to correspond with the present stage of the development of Chinese society. This condition seems to be identical with that of Japan at the time of her Restoration.

Anarchism in China was especially represented by the late *Liu Szŭ Fu*, who once translated Kropotkin into Chinese. He started the Anarchist movement in China, but afterward was caught and put to death. At present *Li Shih Ts'êng* and *Ching Mei Chiu* are most eminent.

Finally, *Chou Tso Jên*, who though neither a socialist nor an anarchist, must be mentioned as an important thinker in China. Chou alone is cosmopolitan in his character and thought at a time when the other thinkers with few exceptions are nationalistic, whatever their views in other respects may be. He directs his passion steadfastly beyond all sorts of barriers towards all humanity.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

I HAVE already traced the outline of contemporary thought in Japan and China with regard to its meanings and development in both countries. I think that, on reading this book, Westerners will be much astonished; first, that Japan and China, though having through long ages had a common script, have no actual connection in thought; and next, that those Eastern peoples, who have had their own original and splendid philosophies, are actually labouring to reconstruct their systems on the basis of Western philosophies, keeping scarcely any of their own traditional ideals. From this point of view contemporary thought in the East is certainly inferior to that in the West—a lagging follower after the latter. Were I asked if I consider whether contemporary thought in the East has displayed any advance over original thought, my answer would have to be at the same time Yes and No. For Japan and China have certainly displayed some progress in the fact that the people having become conscious of the defects in the past philosophies have endeavoured to produce anew thoughts

without flaws; but these philosophies are certainly inferior to the original ones because the old philosophies were fairly unified in their tradition and individuality, whilst the new ideas, not being a product of the tradition in its internal development, are lacking in a realistic ground of life and are only a jumble together of the philosophies of both East and West without any unity. But this change was unavoidable. Economically Western industrialism and capitalism caused a great revolution in Eastern lives, giving rise to industrialism and capitalism there; and the same thing inevitably took place in the sphere of thought. In the contact of the two thoughts the defects in Eastern thought, of which the people became aware, were, first, that they have but little method. In other words, the Easterners are not logical but intuitive in their natures, and though they are sensitive *subjectively* in finding means for arranging their own hearts well, yet they are crude *objectively* in selecting the means of making their environment conform to their demands. Now the exact antipodes to this are the characteristics of Western thought. It was unavoidable that Eastern thought should set about its reconstruction absolutely anew from the very foundation in order to become methodical. And also it was unavoidable that its development in the present should still be inadequate; because, since this change of the East, history has passed through only half a century.

One of the natural effects of the fact that Western

thought is essentially methodical was industrial civilization ; and the effect of the latter being guided by capitalism the result was imperialism. Therefore, I think, it was but natural that the East, in its contact with Western civilization, hastened to construct a life and civilization which would withstand the Western one. During that time Japanese as well as Chinese thought have held in general the spirit of national romanticism. Japan has now at last accomplished this work by a toil of half a century. This tendency is fairly expressed in the fact that though Japanese philosophy in the course of this process first endeavoured to construct a system of metaphysics on the ground of national romanticism, its present endeavour is to become strictly epistemological. After the Great War, new social thoughts were introduced into Japan, and a certain amount of disturbance was caused in Japanese society. However, in Japan, in these days, fortunately national romanticism has reached a position capable of bearing this social unrest. In China, however, since this work was still unachieved, the social disturbance has been twofold. But in my opinion this social disturbance must be settled in stages. In other words, in China contemporary thought must be tinged with national romanticism for the time being, and after national romanticism has been achieved to a certain extent it must be turned into internationalism.

Thus Oriental thought in both Japan and China

has certainly lost more or less of its worth; but I am not at all hopeless of its future. Oriental thought has become for the present radically methodical as well as international, and as a result has preserved scarcely any of its original characteristics. But this proves neither that the Easterners have by nature low capacity for philosophical thinking, nor that in the East splendid original philosophies will not be produced in the future. Still, all this must be a process of development. When contemporary thought shall have completely broken down unmethodical thought, and when it shall have made progress beyond so-called Eastern individuality and so become fully cosmopolitan I will rather congratulate the individuality of the East on having just budded (though certain men—for example, such as Rabindranath Tagore—will regret it, saying that the East in thought has been lost). *Because so-called individuality is to be produced from the depth of a mind perfectly unbiased—a mind no longer conscious, through reflection on itself, of being specially individual.* When any thought is set up in opposition to some other thought in one's mind while that other is suppressed the result cannot be called true individuality. Our individuality is only naturally expressed when we are believing that we have completely suppressed so-called individuality in ourselves. For, even then, human creativeness has to occupy its position at the intersection of a certain tradition and of a certain environment;

and yet, if the man is a true creator, even the product of that situation, though to his own eye rather submerging his own individuality, will be appreciated by others as appearing full of individuality. Recently some few Japanese philosophers seem to me really almost to have reached this consummation.

To be individual in one's thoughts, one should first be individual in life. So long as Eastern life differs from Western life, Eastern philosophy cannot help doing so, and doing so without any effort. If the time ever comes when there is very little difference between East and West, it will probably come from the circumstance that, all over the world, men are living under the same conditions, so that no one will be able to go counter to this current. Anyone who has seen the beautiful *Ukiyo-e* of Japan, may wish that Japan would remain in her romantic dreams for ever. But, for the Japanese themselves, they also should have their own lives to live, and cannot dream the old dreams for ever. Whoever has been in Japan and has enjoyed seeing the houses and dwellings like those which Edward Carpenter would have longed for, "so simple and elemental in character that they will fit in the nooks of the hills or along the banks of the streams or by the edges of the woods without disturbing the harmony of the landscape or the songs of the birds," he will be sorry, on seeing so many buildings in the Western style in Tōkyō or in Ōsaka, to see that the whole appearance of those cities has been westernized. However,

now that Japan has started to learn the sciences and to found industrialism, can she manufacture goods or do business in those small houses and dwellings? At present in Japan and China all things are in a disorderly mixture of Eastern and Western conditions; but, unless they abandon living, this current of the times cannot be checked. And this discord and novelty are by no means incapable of readjustment. However, this readjustment should not be hastened.

In my opinion, all men in the world in whatever situation of life should always be generous towards one another. To be generous means so to cooperate with each other that each should be as far as possible autonomous in his personality. We cannot afford to coerce others into our own taste or into our own mode of life. Even when the coercion is for the benefit of others, the help will be harmful if hurried, seeing that time is needed to readjust the foundation of our lives. Thus, in a given case, the world cannot help going along its former road, even when it knows it to be an incorrect course. In so much as the whole world holds imperialism as the consequence of capitalism, even a communist State like Russia, for example, is compelled to hold imperialism for the time being. In the same way, I think, the world hereafter will become more industrial, and in consequence everything in the realm of thought will become more cosmopolitan. Nevertheless I cannot think of the alternative of the

East's return to the old mode of life in the present, to the rejection of industrialism. In the East we cannot get to the new mode of life beyond industrialism except through the industrial stage.

We must conclude then that the world's mode of life, and accordingly thought as its general expression, will in the process of being unified tend in the near future not to be easternized but rather to be *generalized* all over the world. When such a time arrives at what conclusion will the world's philosophies arrive? The real problems that are common to the present world are not yet completely solved. These are social problems. In other words, the problems are those regarding the bringing into existence of a commonwealth which will unify all races, all classes, and all the States of the world. Now then how can we solve the problems? Though a few thinkers may have attempted to answer, in as much as philosophy is merely unified expression of man's real life, it is doubtful to what degree the schemes of those few can be accepted as a true philosophy by the people. But, of course, that every one in the world should hold one and the same philosophy is no more thinkable than desirable. Philosophy is an agent for the unification of life which requires disunity for the sake of its existence. Man will have to go forward, eternally thinking over riddles which do not admit of ultimate solution. So I dare say the future of the world's history lies utterly beyond any prophesy.

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